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Abstract

The purpose of this research is to develop a general approach to quality
economics in Total Quality Control. Based on microeconomics theory and
the development of prevailing quality control approaches, the research
develops a set of economic quality concepts which provide a solid
theoretical base for economic design and evaluation in quality control. A
number of quality economics modeling procedures are established in the
phases of both the consumer's and the producer's decision makings on
product quality as well as their interactions.
In the context of a total quality control approach, the research first
analyzes consumer behavior under quality discrimination

and derives

expected quality value, consumer quality loss function, consumer quality
surplus, and the consumer quality decision model. Results will provide a
useful means for measurement of quality loss and its effect on consumer
welfare as well as information

on consumer assessment of product

quality.
This research also analyzes the producer's behavior under quality risk
in an increasingly competitive market and provides both general and
approximate

forms

of

the

production

loss

function.

Conventional

approaches to the analysis of the producer's optimal behavior may not be
adequate to illustrate product quality setting and producer behavior in
quality

competition.

A consumer-based

approach

is established

and

employed to implement multi-competitive advantages in higher quality
setting, lower cost and better consumer satisfaction. The effects
producers'

production/market

quality

strategies,

with

which

producer affects consumers' quality decisions, is studied and modeled.
1

of
the

This research provides theoretical guidance for quality activity in an
environment of increased competition. It also offers a set of simplified
and computable functions to be applied in quality control practices.

2

Chapter 1

Introduction and Objectives

Quality in recent years has become an attractive topic and an important
competitive tool in industry and in the marketplace. Consumers and
producers have paid more attention to product and service quality which
affects both the consumer's decision making and a firm's competitive
position. High quality is regarded as one of the key points in explaining
Japanese success in economic development and competition in the world
markets after the 1960's.
Production

management,

process

control

and

firms'

marketing

strategies in the traditional forms have been challenged by the wave of
quality improvement in the world. Bhote [1988] points out that published
data from more than 3,000 businesses indicate that quality is closely
related to productivity, market shares, profits on sales and returns on
investments, and that the total costs of poor quality are estimated to
"reach an astronomical 50% of the sales dollar." In an increasingly
competitive

economy,

continuous

quality

a firm

cannot

improvement

survive

and

cost

and

succeed

reduction.

without
Quality

improvement must be one of the most crucial objectives of any firm.
The whole society has benefited a great deal from quality improvement
which is usually accompanied with social cost reduction, resource saving
and efficiency improvement in capital utilization. Without a doubt, in this
decade quality improvement will dominate policy decision making in
production

management,

process

control

and

market

strategy,

and

economic competition in quality will be more intense than ever before.
A large number of papers have contributed extensively to the fields of
quality design, quality control and quality management in theoretical
3

development and practical applications. However, only a few papers have
been devoted to the investigation of the economic motivation behind
quality activities and the role economic criteria play in decision making
for quality design and quality control. This research is mostly aimed at
establishing a set of economic quality concepts which provide a solid
theoretical base and applied criteria for the economic design of quality
activities.*

1.1

Quality Control in Transition

The definition of quality and its contents in quality activities change
with economic development and technological progress. Evolution of
quality may be classified into three stages based on time periods and
their applications. They are traditional approaches, modern approaches
and current approaches, i.e., total quality control.

1.1.1

Definition of Quality and Quality Control

Quantity and quality are two major properties of any commodity. A
competitive environment and consumer satisfaction are the main sources
of motivation for quality activities (design, improvement, control and
management). When a society needs more commodities supplied to meet
its requirement of demand and development, quality plays a supporting
role. On the other hand, when demand can be satisfied with a sufficient
supply, quality plays a major role in meeting the requirement of social
development. The change in quality definition is not a word puzzle, but a
reflection and summary of people's insight for quality property and its
effects on society.

4

Garvin [1984] summarizes different perspectives of product quality
from

the points of view of philosophy, economics, marketing, and

operations management. He lists five major approaches to the definition
of quality which are described as transcendent, product-based,

user-

based, manufacturing-based and value-based. Each approach emphasizes
some basic elements of quality features and properties and poses a
conflict. Following is a set of representative quality definitions.
Leffler [1982] writes, "Quality refers to the amounts of the unpriced
attributes contained in each unit of the priced attribute."
Juran [1974] provides a user-based definition of quality: "Quality is
fitness for use."
Based on SPC management approach, Crosby [1979] defines quality as
"conformance to requirement."
Stephens [1981] gives a definition of quality as "conformance to a given
requirement or specification on a product or service." Another

related

definition is, "The totality of features and characteristics of a product or
service that bear on its ability to satisfy a given need." Obviously this
definition of quality is ideally related to the properties of product quality
which satisfy consumer needs.
Taguchi and Wu [1985] define quality as "the loss imparted to the
society from the time a product is shipped." This definition reveals the
social effect (economic, environmental and consumer effects) of product
quality.
Diversification of quality definitions also is a result of multi-dimensions
of quality, as Garvin [1987] points out, which include
features, reliability, conformance,

durability,

performance,

serviceability,

aesthetics

and perceived quality. Progress in quality improvement is closely related
5

to the following factors:
(1) Level of economic development of society. Change in quality level
corresponds to societal progress. This is why quality issues have been so
competitive in the past 20 years in most developed countries, and why
developing

countries

developed countries,
(2) Degree

of

adopt

their

quality

objectives,

in contrast

to

in accordance with their economic status.

availability

of

technology.

It

includes

technical

knowledge, labor skill, available machinery and the transition period of
new technology from the laboratory stage to the production process.
Technological progress results in quality development and improvement
at the levels that were impossible before and greatly reduces the cost of
production.
(3) Change in consumer behavior for quality. Income, commodity price,
tastes, hobbies and satisfaction vary with time and determine consumers'
attitude toward quality variance.
(4) Market

structure

and

organization

pattern.

A

competitive

environment stimulates a firm to improve product quality so as to be
able to stay in business.
(5) Degree of harmful side effects. Higher quality will

significantly

reduce side effects on the environment, human health and safety, and
other external factors. For example, quality requirements must be strictly
met at a nuclear power station to ensure that its harmful effects on
residents around it and on the environment are minimized.
(6) Economic

motivation

in

producer

behavior.

A firm's

market

strategy, cost reduction, profitability and competitive advantage should
involve quality activities.

6

Therefore,

it would not be meaningful

to define

quality

without

consideration of current conditions including economic, technological and
social constraints.
Because different people have different views on quality, we define
quality as the functional performance of a product or service to
satisfy consumer needs. This is a consumer-based

definition.

Consumer requirements and the effects on society for product quality
should be the main objectives of product design. Quality control in a
broad range is aimed at ensuring implementation of quality objectives,
which includes managerial, design, process and market quality activities.
Managerial quality activity includes an effective organization for quality
development, quality improvement and quality maintenance in various
groups

to

enhance

efficiency

and

reduce

errors

in

strategy

and

production process. The human-factor is the largest single cause of poor
quality. The difference in product quality levels between American and
Japanese manufacturing

industries is believed

to be mainly due to

managerial methods rather than the degree of application of quality
control procedures.
Quality design activity optimizes the product design and manufacturing
process design under available technology and machinery so that the
functional variation of the product is minimized in a wide range of
conditions. Process quality control is meant to diagnose and discover
unusual states in each stage of the manufacturing process as quickly as
possible, and to adjust the process and return it to its normal state.
During and at the end of a manufacturing process, inspections are
performed in order to avoid the shipment of nonconforming items to
consumers. Market quality activity includes surveying the market size
7

and competitor's strategy; measuring the consumer quality requirement,
complaints and preference; and feeding information back to the firm's
quality development stage. Thus, it reduces design cycle time and whitecollar errors.
1.1.2

Traditional Approaches of Quality Control

The traditional approaches of quality control (TAQC) emphasize the use
of statistical principles and techniques to diagnose, analyze and adjust
process performance at all stages of production, maintenance and service,
directed toward the economic satisfaction

of demand. Inspection

nonconforming

in

items

is

also

mentioned

these

approaches.

for
The

statistical Process Control (SPC) approach is an important component of
TAQC.
Major

sources

predetermined

that

cause

specification

product

quality

to

are: (1) inconsistency

vary

from

the

in the quality of

materials and components purchased, (2) operator mistakes and errors,
(3) inherent problems in the wear and tear of tools and machines, (4)
unstable manufacturing processes or procedures, and (5) environmental
disturbances.
Since

1924

when

Walter

A.

Shewhart

of

the

Bell

Telephone

Laboratories first introduced statistical procedures for the control of
manufacturing

processes,

SPC

has been

widely

used

in

American

industry. In the 1950's and 1960's other quality assurance approaches
such as quality, cost, reliability engineering and quality management
were developed. The zero-defect approach (ZD) was aimed at stimulating
workers to increase product quality and reliability. After World War II,
SPC approaches found widespread use in the Japanese industry. The
8

Japanese also creatively developed Quality Control Circles (QCC) based on
their cultural situation. QCC have been extremely successful in quality
improvement.
Conventional statistical process control techniques for quality efforts
mainly

include control charts, flow

charts, run charts,

cause-effect

diagrams, Pareto diagrams, histograms and scatter diagrams. These TAQC
techniques are used to manufacture products with the quality specified
through identification

and control of systemic causes of defects and

variations in each process. If the process is under control and capable, the
product is considered consistent and defect-free. Any product outside the
specification

should not be shipped to consumers. An effective

SPC

program is instrumental in reducing the cost of waste and work and
increasing productivity and efficiency.
Although

TAQC have made a significant

historic contribution

to

improvements in products and services, with time, some of its inherent
disadvantages have become evident. They are: (1) The effect of product
quality improvement is assessed by the consumer rather than by the
firm. Consumer quality behavior and satisfaction should be first carried
out

as

the requirement

of

quality

control

rather

than

the

firm's

subjective quality settlement. (2) Quality control is only executed in the
manufacturing process and inspection stages. No emphasis is placed on
the early stages, quality development and quality design. (3) Those
approaches are usually "cost-up" and slow in their ability to solve chronic
quality problems. (4) Any product quality characteristic

inside

the

process specification is regarded as a conforming item for which no
quality loss is accounted. This kind of product cannot compete with a

9

product that has less quality variation. (5) No consideration is made for
the variance of product functions at a wide range of operating conditions.
1.1.3

Modern Approaches of Quality Control

In recent years, many concepts and new methods of quality assurance
have been devised to improve product quality. Taguchi's methods are the
most outstanding of these modern approaches. Combined with

other

effective methods in quality control, Taguchi's methods are referred to as
the "secret weapon" giving Japanese products the reputation of quality
leaders in the world.
These methods were developed by Genichi Taguchi, a well-known
Japanese engineering-statistics

specialist. Taguchi's methods

creatively

combine engineering and statistical methods to improve quality and
reduce cost by optimizing product design and manufacturing processes.
Taguchi's approach is based on the theme that "quality is the loss
imparted to the society from the time a product is shipped."

Continuous

quality improvement and cost reduction is very important for a firm to
survive and succeed in business in a competitive environment. More
specifically, Taguchi's approach includes quality loss function, parameter
design, tolerance design, system design, on-line quality control, design of
experiments using orthogonal arrays for product quality and measuring
systems.
A product performance variation leads to consumer dissatisfaction and
must be considered at the product design stage in order to minimize the
deviation of the performance characteristic from its target value at a
wide range of environmental conditions. From quality development to the
quality manufacturing process, parameter design distinguishes those lowcost factors that possess significant effects on the target value but small
10

(or no) effects on the quality deviation. The "cost-up" is emphasized on
the tolerance design where higher-cost factors are used to obtain the gain
from variance reduction. These methods optimize product design and
manufacturing
reduction

processes

to

simultaneously.

because it eliminates

achieve

This

quality

approach

compromises

is

at early

optimization

and

cost

definitely

cost-effective

stages. A

loss-function

performing as a cost saving term is used in Taguchi's on-line quality
control procedures to obtain optimum diagnosis and adjustment intervals.
There are other significant advantages in the approach, such as reducing
performance

variance

by

exploiting

the

non-linear

effects

of

the

parameters on the product performance.
With

more

attention

paid

and

more practice

applied

to

quality

activities, some problems associated with the modern approaches have
surfaced. They are: (1) Quality is closely related to the progress of
technology and the economy. Quality should be redefined. (2) Consumer
satisfaction and requirements under quality discrimination have not been
fully considered. Since consumer assessment of quality discrimination is
subjective, the producer should obtain such consumer information and
then feed it back to the quality development stage. (3) Quality loss
function is derived from the consumer behavior under quality risk, not
from

mathematical

deduction.

(4)

Consumer

and

producer

quality

behaviors and attitudes interact with each other. (5) These approaches
lack a sound economic basis. Quality improvement is an economic
activity. Economic motivation is the engine, and quality control methods
are the tools to achieve the firm's objectives. Development of quality
economic criteria is urgent. (6) These approaches do nothing to reduce
the design and manufacturing process cycles.
11

1.1.4

Total Quality Control Approach

A new approach, the Total Quality Control Approach (TQCA), which
seeks the commitment to quality activity in all stages of an entire cycle
from consumer to producer and in the way quality information
transferred

is

between those connections, is proposed to cope with the

problems or disadvantages mentioned in the previous sections. The idea
of the Total Quality Control Approach has been described in various
forms by

Feigenbaum [1983], Sinha and Willborn [1985], Shores [1989]

and many other authors.
CONSUMER SIDE

ASSESSMENT

DNFLOWX DECISIONMAKING

INFORMATION
MATRIX

SIGNAL
INFORMATION

WARRANTY

QFD

INSPECTION

ESIGN QUALITY

ON-LINE QC

OFF-LINE QC

PRODUCER SIDE

Figure 1. TQC Approach

A schematic of a modified TQCA is illustrated in Figure 1. It consists of
two sides, consumer and producer behaviors under quality risk; two

12

links, a transformed consumer information matrix on decision making
and a producer information signal on market strategy; and two flows,
information flow in the consumer side and cost flow in the producer side.
The

cycle

from

consumer

to

producer

is

for

continuous

quality

improvement, which should be viewed as a spiral curve in threedimensional

space

rather

than

a

circle

in

two-dimensions.

The

management of TQCA is aimed at improving product quality in a more
efficient and economical way and accelerating the quality improvement
cycle by running quality activities parallel rather than in series, i.e.
concurrent quality engineering.
Consumer attitude toward quality performance variance depends on
the quality deviation pattern, product price, income level, taste and the
consumer's subjective judgment of quality. A product with higher quality
may not be competitive in the market if it does not meet the consumer
quality requirement and consumer preference

weight distribution

for

attributes of quality in comparison with the competitor's product. Quality
design and quality control are not concentrated exclusively on meeting
firm or technical requirements, but upon consumer quality expectation.
An operating mechanism, consumer information matrix, is developed to
transform consumer quality expectation into a standard form for quality
development. Furthermore, the main and side effects

of quality on

society can be measured by consumer surplus and social welfare.
A

consumer-based

firm's

attitude

toward

product

quality

is

determined by the firm's market strategy, market size, demand pattern,
and market structure as well as by competitor's decision making.* In this
phase, the quality of design not only involves statistics and engineering
control methods, but also economic criteria and constraints. A trade-off is
13

necessary if there is contradiction

among economic and engineering

conditions. Moreover, a firm will execute effective management of TQCA
in the specific operation environment in design, planning and control of
all activities related to quality assurance. The new management approach
is a challenge for conventional quality management methods in which
quality improvements are accelerated in parallel phases from design to
inspection

stages. The total cycle of quality

improvement

can

be

shortened significantly to achieve a strong competitive advantage. A firm
will assure its success if it provides the product faster than other
competitors to meet the higher level of consumer satisfaction and needs.
The

consumer

reflected

in

an

quality

expectation

information

matrix

and

subjective

assessment

and

fed

to

back

the

are

quality

development stage while the firm's quality information is accompanied
with prices or advertisements (or other promises) to influence consumer
decisions regarding the purchase of the product. In summary, TQCA is not
an approach containing a cradle-to-grave system; rather, it focuses

the

spot-light on the decision-maker's behavior, consumer-producer decision
interaction and competition in quality improvement.

1.2

Thesis Statements

The definition of quality given in Section 1.1.1 is quoted here again.
"Quality is the functional performance of a product or service
to satisfy consumer

need."

TQCA (Total Quality Control Approach) is the most promising approach
to meet this quality definition and easy implementation in practical
application. The motivation behind quality assurance is the economic
rationale where the consumer spends money to purchase the product
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with better quality for satisfying his needs, and the producer improves
the quality of the product for profitability and competitive advantage.
Since the 1920's statistical and engineering methods of quality control
have been developed extensively. A great number of applications have
been

extremely

successful.

However,

the development

of

economic

concepts of quality control is far behind the progress in other related
fields.
Conventional microeconomics theory has mainly concentrated on the
product quantity. But with increased quality competition, it is required to
develop a theme of economic quality concepts to provide a sound
theoretical base and to guide quality activities in the correct direction.
Moreover, a number of economic criteria should be established

in

decision making at all stages of quality activities. Otherwise, present
quality approaches cannot cope with the challenge of quality assurance in
the future.
Therefore, this research is concentrated on the development of quality
economics in TQCA in light of microeconomics theory and conventional
quality control approaches. Specifically,

the following

goals will be

pursued.
(1) Development of a theoretical base will explain the decision maker
attitude toward

quality risk. This is a field

purely dominated

by

economics research.
(2) Quality loss function, transformed consumer information matrix and
social

assessment

for

quality

improvement

will

be

derived

from

consumer behavior under quality risk.
(3) Establishment of the product quality function. This function will
provide economic criteria for product quality design and manufacturing
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process design.

Quality cost function will be employed to indicate where

corrective action is profitable, illustrate how to accelerate the cycle time
of quality improvement, and how to execute the concept of "optimal
quality setting for consumer satisfaction."
(4) A consumer-based

approach will be developed to describe the

producer's product quality setting under various market conditions.
(5) Models will be set up describing firms' quality production strategies
under demand uncertainty and firms' information

signals on market

strategy to influence consumer decision making.

1.3 Research Objective and Organization
The research objective is aimed at implementing the goals mentioned
in the thesis statements. It provides comprehensive coverage from basic
economic principles to applicable economic criteria in decision making for
quality activities. The research will give a sound understanding of quality
economics and deduce a number of relationships to carry out calculations
for numerical problems. The research has a strong economic orientation
and requires an adequate statistical background.
This research consists of seven parts from Chapter 2 to Chapter 8.
Chapter
economic

2 deals
concepts,

measurement

with

the recently

consumer

of quality

and

assurance

published

producer
on

social

literature

behaviors
effects,

on

basic

under

risk,

firms'

quality

strategies in competitive environments, and product quality function all
of which are related to quality assurance, productivity and profitability.
This chapter also includes an overview of papers on the economic
implication in quality engineering and management.
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Chapter 3 presents a theoretical development for consumer attitudes
toward quality risk. A general quality value expectation is derived, and a
consumer quality loss function is computed on the basis of consumer
quality

discrimination.

The

loss

function

proposed

by

Taguchi

is

compared with the consumer quality loss function developed in this
research.
Chapter 4 develops

a comprehensive

model

of consumer

quality

evaluation. A consumer decision model is set up on the basis of the
quality utility function reflecting the consumer preference

distribution

for

information

a multiple-attribute

quality

product.

A transformed

matrix containing consumer subjective judgment and weight distribution
for a multiple-attribute quality is extremely useful for quality design. A
fuzzy set model with empirical data is employed to illustrate consumer
decision making in product quality selection.
Chapter 5 presents the effect of quality variation on social welfare. Two
concepts, equivalent quality price and consumer expected price, are
developed to evaluate a quality activity. Neither consumer nor producer
quality loss functions are capable of assessing the quality's effect on
society. Two consumer surplus approaches, the demand shift-based and
the expected price-based, are discussed and compared with each other.
The total producer quality loss and social welfare are analyzed under the
partial equilibrium conditions.
Chapter 6 establishes product quality function and quality cost function
based on the experiences and development in quality control practice in
past decades. The relationships among price, quantity and quality are
discussed. The product quality function and quality cost function

are

employed to set up the theoretical criteria for product quality design and
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manufacturing process design. Quality cost function is used to indicate
where quality improvement is most profitable and how to accelerate the
cycle period of quality design and control in combination with quality
management and quality engineering methods. The long-run and shortrun effects

of quality cost function

patterns, which

correspond

to

technological progress and managerial development, on the continuous
quality improvement is presented.
Chapter 7 describes producer behavior under quality risk and market
uncertainty. The producer's quality loss results from a consumer switch
to

the

competitor's

product

due

to

inferior

product

quality.

The

conventional approaches to the study of producer's optimal behavior are
not adequate to describe product quality setting and producer behavior
in quality competition. A consumer-based approach, which contains both
consumer and producer behaviors under quality uncertainty as well as
the interaction in both sides' decision making, is developed to determine
quality

settings

production/market
influence

under

various

strategies,

consumer

decision

market

with

conditions.

which

making

and

A

number

of

the producer

attempts

to

advantage

in

gain

the

competition, such as quality leadership, rebate policy and the optimal
investment, is studied.
Chapter 8 summarizes the conclusions derived from the research and
provides directions for further development.
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Chapter 2

Background and Literature Review

Despite the important roles of managerial, engineering and statistical
functions in quality assurance, the orientation of this research is focused
more on quality economics. The following background and literature
review reflect heavily recent developments in these related fields.

2.1 Basic Quality Economic Concepts
Although only a few studies have contributed extensively and directly
to quality economics, development in microeconomics theory and other
disciplines, such as marketing and management science, have provided a
sound base for multifaceted quality economics.
In the early literature on microeconomics, product quality were viewed
as differencial products and resulted in shifts in a product's demand
curve [Chamberlin, 1953; Dorfman and Steiner, 1954; Akerlof, 1970;
White, 1972 and Spence, 1976].
Lancaster [1966] proposes an approach to dealing with the problems of
consumer choice of a product with multiple-attributes as well as market
penetration of a new product. In spite of being a good illustration for
durable quality differences, the model ignores the evaluation weights
that individuals usually assign to a set of quality attributes and the
difficulty

of

deriving

an effective

statistical

method

to

aggregate

consumer demand in accordance to widely varying preferences [Garvin,
1984].
How price and quality are correlated is an interesting topic in quality
economics. Riesz [1978, 1979] points out that when a consumer is well
informed and higher quality can only be produced at a higher cost, price
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and quality will move together positively. If price information is not
completely available, the consumer will use comparative prices to make a
purchase decision. Price would not reflect the real quality. Therefore, the
availability of information determines the price and quality correlation.
Some researchers have indicated a positive correlation between quality
and price, especially for durable goods [Gabor and Granger,

1966;

McConnell, 1968; Westbrook et al., 1978]. Curry [1985] uses the Law of
Comparative Judgment (LCJ) to measure price and quality competition.
He concludes that price and quality are positively associated and price is
a fairly

accurate indicator of quality for a group of

manufactured

products, whereas some empirical studies reveal negative price/quality
correlations [Friedman, 1967; Sproles, 1977]. Other empirical studies on
the relationship between price and quality [Morris, 1971; Geisfeld, 1982]
concluded that quality/price relation is product-specific
general. Gersner

[1985] used real data (1980-1982)

and weak in
to explain

the

variance in the quality/price relations across products, and he claims that
higher price appears to be a poor sign of higher quality. Curry and Riesz
[1988] carry out a longitudinal analysis and confirm that price decreases
in real terms over time periods.
quality

level diminishes

flexibility

declines,

Correspondence between price and

over time, which

competition

would

implies

be

focused

that
on

as

pricing

increased

expenditures rather than on relative quality improvement. Jacobsan and
Aaker [1987] propose a model to determine the role of product quality in
market

competition

and

find

that

compared

with

variables, the product quality is more attractive

other

strategic

and facilitates

increase of profitability in both a focus and a market share context.
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an

Mussa and Rosen [1978], Phillips [1983], Cooper [1984], Maskin and
Riley [1984] separately develop a similar model of quality distortion
under

discriminating

discrimination

based

monopoly,

which

on the assumption

parameterizes

of

between total and marginal quality utility

a positive

quality

relationship

across consumer

groups.

These studies suggest that the discriminating monopolist will not provide
distortion at the highest quality level, but degrade quality at lower levels.
Srinagesh and Bradburd [1989] provide an alternative model based on
the different assumption that total quality utility is negatively associated
with

marginal

monopolist

quality

may

utility, and they derive the result that the

enhance

quality

rather

than

degrading

quality

to

maintain profitable market segmentation.
Quality improvement is viewed as a strong method to provide higher
productivity, lower costs and a better competitive position [Deming, 1982;
Gitlow and Hertz,

1983; Day, 1988]. Several advantages,

including

increased quality, productivity and capacity along with lower cost per
unit can be obtained by process quality control. Kraft II [1983] proposes
a

method

of

quality

improvement

in

Concurrent

Engineering

Management. Quality activities are run parallel, not in a series, to reduce
the cycle time for product design and manufacturing procedures as well
as entry time to market. Quality assurance requires intensive hard
technical

data

on

performance,

manufacturing

yield,

testing

and

inspection in all of the stages in order to take corrective action on time.
Simulation

methods

with

sufficient

data

supplied

are

strongly

recommended. More specifically, observation is emphasized on the data
flow rather than on the product flow.
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In the service quality field, Behrman and Birdsall [1983] argue that
quantity alone rather than the incorporation of quality and quantity will
lead to biases in estimated returns to schooling.

Their model shows that

an estimated social rate of return to quality substantially exceeds the
social return to quantity of schooling,-and that inclusion of quality may
lead to better policy making under the constraints of scarce resources.
Research suggests that consideration of quality should be incorporated
into analysis of public investment decisions in conventional quantitative
methods.
Deaton [1988] points out that the change in price not only affects choice
in quantity but also in quality. The quality difference is

transformed into

a unit measurement value in some agricultural goods, such as beef, meat,
fish, cereal and starches. Thus the analysis of price elasticity would be
carried out more easily.

2.2

Decision Making Behavior under Quality Risk

Only a few papers deal directly with quality discrimination. However, a
large number of papers have been published to deal with the concept of
attitude toward risk which is an important concept in the theory of both
prescriptive

and

behavioral

decision

making.

Both

consumer

and

producer behavior in the decision making of purchasing and producing a
product with certain quality specifications fall in the scope of decision
theory.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern [1953] developed the expected utility
theory to measure and rank consumer preference. Pratt [1964] and
Arrow [1971] state that a person is risk neutral relative to all lotteries if
the utility of the expected value of the lotteries equals the expected
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utility of the lotteries. A person is risk averse relative to all lotteries if
the utility of the expected value is greater than the expected value of its
utility. Since Von Neumann and Morgenstern's utility function contains
both attitude toward risk and the intensity of preference for riskless
outcomes, Dyer and Sarin [1979, 1982] provide a risk utility function and
a riskless measurable value function to separately represent the risk
attitude and intensity of preference for difference between outcomes. For
a region of riskless intensive preference, a person with an attitude
toward risk is relatively risk averse, risk neutral or risk seeking if his
risk

utility function

is strictly

concave, linear

or

strictly

convex,

Based on the outcomes of a pair of lotteries involving

extreme

respectively.

combinations of attribute values [E] or involving moderate combinations
of attribute values [M], Richard [1975] defines a person as multiattribute
risk prone, multiattribute risk averse, or multiattribute risk neutral if he
prefers E to M, M to E, or is indifferent between M and E.
Either the additive or multiplicative multiattribute utility function is
widely employed to capture the behavior of the decision maker in risky
multiple objective decisions. The additive utility function implies that the
decision maker is consistently multiattribute risk neutral, whereas the
multiplicative utility function suggests that the decision maker can be
either consistently multiattribute risk averse, or consistent multiattribute
risk prone [Richard, 1975]. Some studies [Tversky, 1967; Fischer 1976,
1977; Currim and Sarin, 1984] illustrate that either the additive or
multiplicative multiattribute utility function
behavior

of

the

decision

maker.

can well approximate the

Many

studies

[Fishburn

and

Kochenberger, 1977; Laughhunn, Payne and Crum, 1980; Payne et al.,
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1981] have proposed that people are risk averse for gains but risk prone
for losses. But Keller [1985] and

Fowicz [1983] shows that relative risk-

preference for gains and losses is not clearly different by employing Dyer
and Sarin's relative risk preference approach.
Fischer et al. [1986] also argue that Payne et al.'s finding is ambiguous
because of the unsuitable system referred.

Fischer et al. develop a

reference risk-value [RRV] model to capture a multiattribute reference
effect in comparison with Payne et al.'s findings. They conclude that any
direct generalization of the findings to a multiattribute context may be
questioned.
Wiggins and Lane [1983] assume that consumer risk results not only
from quality variables, but also from variation in quality across products
as well as consumer inability to evaluate the particular product quality
before purchase. Roberts and Urban [1988] suggest that the consumer can
only approximately evaluate a new product with an uncertainty which
includes the inherent product variability and information

uncertainty.

Consumers use media, retail salesmen and friends as information sources
to resolve the uncertainty of imperfect information. Consumer risk could
be reduced through information obtained either by buying advertised
products that a firm uses as an implicit signal to affect
decisions, or by a direct search (Hey and Mckenna [1981]).

consumer

Wiggins and

Lane construct a full partial-equilibrium model to examine the behavior
of both consumers and producers and conclude that the consumers who
are risk averse tend to purchase the lower variation in product quality in
the advertised array if the information is not perfect and the search cost
is high. Furthermore, Chadler [1988] argues that the producer's attitude
toward quality improvement should be beyond consumer satisfaction, to
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achieve the goal of consumer delight to catch up with more serious
competition in the future.

2.3

Measurement of Social Benefit in Quality Improvement

In microeconomics social benefits in any social cost-benefit calculation
are usually measured in terms of sum of consumer surplus and producer
surplus. This is because the market price, even in a perfectly competitive
economy, is not a standard measurement to value the social benefit from
the analysis [Willing, 1976; Mishan, 1984]. Taguchi and Wu [1985] define
quality as the value which can be measured by society loss resulting
from imperfect quality. The quality improvement is inversely related to
external effects (harmful side effects); that is, higher quality is related to
lower society loss.

However, this approach actually is cost saving due to

quality improvement rather than the social loss approach. Taguchi et al.
[1989] employ a similar loss function to estimate society loss at the
present time. They also use a time series return method to compute the
loss due to quality deterioration over a time period.
Spence and Sheshinski [1976] studied the effect of quality choice by a
monopolist under perfect information on social welfare. Shapiro [1982]
demonstrated

that

imperfect

information

in

a monopolistic

market

tended to reduce the product quality, which might lead to either a gain in
social welfare if the quality was overestimated, or a loss if the quality
was underestimated. Shapiro [1983] also analyzed the welfare effect of
the minimum quality standards in a perfect competition market. Besanko
et al. [1987] examined the policies of a price ceiling and minimum quality
standards on social welfare improvement. The price regulation showed a
sufficiently positive effect. However, it was ambiguous for the minimum
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quality standards. Specifically, Breshahan [1986] and Trajtenberg [1989]
carried

out the welfare

innovation

for

analysis of technical advances and product

mainframe

computers

and

tomography

scanners

respectively.

2.4.

Producer Quality Objectives and Market Strategies

2.4.1 Producer Quality Objectives
A firm's objectives and its market strategies are usually summarized as
maximizing revenue (market share), minimizing cost, maximizing profit
and maximizing the firm's utility in traditional microeconomics.
Quality is viewed as a great potential strategy to achieve a strong
competitive advantage [Juran, 1981; Deming, 1982; Crosby, 1979, 1984;
Taguchi, 1985].

Research has shown a strong positive relationship

between quality and market shares. Buzzell and Wiersema [1981] point
out that during the 1970's businesses with improved quality increased
their market share five to six times faster than those with declined
quality, and three times faster than those with unchanged quality. Other
researchers

have

also

confirmed

the

positive

relationship

between

quality and market shares [Gale and Branch, 1982; Phillips et al., 1983].
Recent studies show that the effort devoted to the improvement of
quality may reduce the unit costs of products [Daetz, 1987; Gunter, 1987;
Sullivan, 1987]. Gavin [1983] indicates that Japanese products possess
both higher quality and lower cost than American products.

The

perception that higher quality is accompanied with higher cost dominates
a wide variety of American industries.

The objective of minimizing total

cost not only includes the quality cost as commonly understood, such as
reworking and scrap cost, but, more importantly, involves the cost
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derived from

the loss function

[Taguchi and Wu,

improvement may exert a significant effect

1985].

on a firm's

Quality

profitability

change with (1) lessening elastic demand and higher prices or an increase
in sales and market shares and (2) reducing cost by means of quality
control activities [Chamberlin, 1953; Dorfman and Steiner, 1954; Darvin,
1984].

It is confirmed by some empirical studies that quality and

profitability have a strong positive relation. Schoeffler et al. [1974] have
found

that

high

quality

produces

a higher

Businesses with poor quality experienced

return

investment.

about one fourth of those with

higher quality in return on an investments [ROI].
that the enormous costs

on

Bhote [1988] points out

of poor quality, including

scrap,

rework,

warranty, inspection and tests, would range from 10%-20% of the sales.
In

broader

meaning,

quality

cost

including

equipment

down

time,

supplier delinquencies, long manufacturing and design cycle time, poor
quality management and loss of consumer due to shift to competitors'
product, would be estimated as much as 50% of the sales dollar.
Since it is difficult to evaluate the relationship between quality and
other variables such as price and direct cost in accordance with current
economic theory, more theoretical research and empirical studies are
needed.

Producer

decision

making

can

be

represented

through

a

multiattribute utility approach. For the problem of maximization of
market shares, Albers and Brockhoff [1977] proposed a solution for equal
weight attributes by using a heuristic algorithm, while Zufryden [1979]
employed

a

mixed

integer

program

multiattributes differently weighted.

to

get

the

solution

with

Shocker and Strinivasan [1974] and

Green et al. [1981] suggested an approach to profit maximization for a
firm's objective.

Hauser and Simmie [1981] employ Lancaster's model in
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a framework for identifying the profit maximizing position. All of the
above studies are based on consumer-based methodology to identify a
new product.

Traditionally,

quality

is viewed

introduced into the market of a class of products.

as a new

product

Gavish et al. [1983]

propose an approach to the analysis of requirements on the demand side
of the consumer and the cost of producing a new alternative on the
supply side as well as competitive equilibrium. They give algorithms for
the problem of market share maximization and a heuristic method for the
problem of profit maximization.
Garvin

[1984] identifies

framework

to

describe

eight dimensions that can be used as a
properties

of

product

quality.

They

are

performance, features, reliability, conformance, durability, serviceability,
aesthetics, and perceived quality.

A firm's quality strategy must improve

one or more aspects of the dimensions to gain a competitive advantage.
Dorfman and Steiner [1954], Schmalensee [1978], and Wiggins and Lane
[1983] have indicated that the firm may use advertisements as an
implicit

signal, other than price, to provide consumers with

information

on

product

quality

and

to

affect

consumer

some

purchase

decisions. Nelson [1970, 1974] developed a theoretical argument for a
positive association between quality and price and introduced two basic
properties of goods distinguished with "search" and "experience." A
consumer could determine the attribute of the former

prior to the

purchase while he or she could learn the attribute of the latter after
using the purchase. Nelson deducted theoretically that higher advertised
products were of better quality. The evidence on this claim is conflicting.
Surveys and some studies

[Cole et al., 1955; Rotfeld and Rotzoll, 1976;

Farris and Buzzell, 1979; Barksdale et al., 1982] indicate that the
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association is negative and the consumer is no more likely to respond to
the advertised product than that without advertising. Nevertheless the
positive association is supported by other research [Archibald et al.,
1983; Lambin, 1976; Marguardt and McGann, 1975]. Tellis and Fornell
[1988] argue that empirical evidence is scarce and that theoretical work
is controversial. They employ a product life cycle model to carry out the
study and suggest that it is more likely for a highly advertised product to
be of better quality when the quality cost is lower and when consumers
do not solely rely on advertisements for their information.

2.4.2 Quality Cost Function
In both theoretical concepts and empirical evidence on the quality
activity and its cost, an obvious controversy and an inconsistency exist.
Lundvall and Juran [1974] claim that cost trade-off analysis should be
considered

to

find

the

optimal

quality

level

in

their

economic

conformance model, whereas Deming [1982] and Crosby [1979] assert
that zero defects should be the objective of the optimal quality level.
Taguchi [1985] argues that any quality deviation from the target value is
the firm's loss. The zero defects quality concept does not completely
capture the cost feature of quality;

the quadratic loss function does.

Kackar [1986] argues that if firms want to stay in business, they should
adopt a strategy to improve quality and reduce cost on a continuous
basis.

Crosby

[1984]

and

Taguchi

[1985]

point

out

that

quality

improvement need not increase product cost, and the correspondence
could be negative through product quality design and other

effective

quality activities, such as defect prevention rather than defect detection.
The core of off-line and on-line quality control is to provide higher
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quality at a lower cost. Trade-off made in the early stages are common in
U.S. industries, and they preclude the utilization of robust functions for
product quality design

[Sullivan, 1987]. The "inherent idea" of the

positive relation between quality and cost would be the reason why the
American product is far behind the Japanese product in a competitive
market [Gunter, 1987].
The relationship between quality and cost is ambiguous. One reason is
that quality costs are defined

differently,

based on the assessment,

background and understanding of quality control activities in different
research and practical areas. Campanella and Corcoran [1983] consider
quality cost as any expenditure on manufacturing or service in excess of
those that are normally occured before the product design is exactly right
the first time. Quality cost usually includes prevention, appraisal, failure,
and internal and external failure costs [Batson, 1988],

Compared with

Taguchi's methods and concurrent quality engineering, the cost at the
stages of quality development and design as well as the cost of cycle time
in schedule management are not accounted for. Taguchi et al. [1989]
introduce the quality loss function as an important part in total quality
cost, in which quality is negatively associated with cost. This approach
gives the insight of continuous quality improvement to stimulate a firm
to improve quality at a minimized total cost.
Gilmore [1983] suggests that prevention cost is the key ring in quality
cost chains.

Greater

expenditure

on prevention

would

effectively

improve quality performance and reduce the total costs of quality in all
subsequent stages of quality control activities. Although some empirical
studies [Gale and Branch, 1982; Phillips et al., 1983; Bader, 1983] have
revealed the form of association between quality and cost in special
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industries, a general quality cost function should be formed to verify the
relationship between quality and cost for a wide range and variety of
businesses.
Forrester [1956] first proposed the method of industrial dynamics in
which interacting flows of material, staff, money and information were
collected and fed back loops so that proper organization policy could be
determined

for

achieving

goals.

These

concepts

have

seen

many

applications in social, biological and economic systems [Robert, 1963;
1981]. Knight et al. [1987] have applied these ideas to the quality of
manufacturing products by simulating quality circles. Batson [1988] uses
a system dynamics flow model as a communication device to construct a
quality system in which the quality cost system is prevention oriented to
feed information back to the early stages of the product.
Cooper and Kaplan [1988] propose an activity-based cost model to
guide corporate strategy selling multiple products.

This model, different

from conventional cost accounting, is based on the fact that many
important cost categories vary not with changes in output in the short
term, but with the changes over a

period of years in the design, product

mix, and other factors. With more accurate cost information, management
can take corrective action in the most profitable products and processes
as well as in decisions about product design, marketing and pricing.
Hauser and Clausing [1988], Rose [1988], Sullivan [1988] and Delatore
et al. [1989] contend that Quality Function Deployment (QFD) plays an
important role in quality assurance, which links and transforms

the

requirement and voice of the consumer into the development of product
quality and specifications for the producer.
to reflect

consumer

satisfaction

Products should be designed

and tastes and management
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should

organize a group, including marketing staffs, design engineering and
manufacturing staffs, to carry out the mission through QFD. This approach
is more crucial in international market competitions [Sierra, 1988].

2.4.3 Producer Behavior in Quality Competition
Taguchi's approach is widely applied in American industries and has
been extremely successful. Taguchi and Wu [1985] claim that off-line
quality control, executed at the early stage of quality development and
quality design, seems more significant and efficient

to achieve both

quality improvement and cost reduction than that in on-line quality
design for production process control.

Off-line quality control consists of

two-step procedures: product design and manufacturing process design.
The objective of product quality design, which consists of three stages,
system design, parameter design and allowance design, is to minimize the
effect of noise sources at a lower cost.
first

step, because

it determines

Parameter design is the core of the
the

optimum

level

of

individual

parameters of the system within a wide range of performance conditions,
but at the lowest price.
and

wide

varying

Through investigation at this stage, a low priced

element

which

is

resistant

to

a

variation

of

performance conditions will be selected from a substitutable group while
a higher priced and less varying element in the allowance design will be
used to narrow the variance of quality performance.

It is necessary to

decide on a trade-off between cost and quality at this stage.
Manufacturing process design also consists of three stages to meet
specifications, i.e. system design, parameter design, and tolerance design.
Again, parameter design is an effective "cost-down" stage while tolerance
design and system design are "cost-up" stages.
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Therefore, parameter

design is the most important step in quality design and may be used to
explain the difference in market shares between Japanese and American
industries. The latter puts emphasis on the allowance design and the
system design which demand increased expenditure on quality control.
While a large number of studies have concentrated on the engineering
and

statistical

applications

of Taguchi's

methods, few

papers

have

adequately dealt with the economic design in off-line quality control.

No

economic criteria have been established for selection of input factors. The
production

function

in

microeconomics

describes

the

relationship

between output quantity and input quantity. This concept could be
applied to off-line quality design to form a product quality function for
describing the relationship between output quality and input quality.
Bhote [1988] proposes an approach to identify crucial variables in
product and process design to reduce the performance

variance of

product quality, and to open up the tolerances on the unimportant
variables

to reduce cost substantially.

Actually,

this approach

is

consistent with some aspects of Taguchi's approach.
Lambert [1980], in his study, indicates that some other cues, such as
brand name, store image, and country of manufacture would project
quality stronger than price. Kiechel [1981] and Porter [1980] suggest that
higher quality possesses an advantage for product discrimination

to

create customer reputation, to lower price elasticity, and to present
barriers to competition.

There is a significant advertising and quality

interaction

price

that

makes

elasticity

lower

than

that

of

quality

improvements alone [Farris and Reibstein, 1979]. Rational buyer behavior
under imperfect information

or product quality discrimination has an
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attitude

toward

pioneering

brands

with

reputation

in

quality

[Schmalensee, 1982].
Consumer

quality

reputation

is

regarded

as

the

motivation

for

producers to improve product quality under situations in which there is
asymmetric information about product quality. Miller [1988] and Kreps
and Wilson [1982] developed a game-theoretic approach to analyze a
monopolist behavior for successive generations of new and improved
products, and how consumer reputation for high-quality products was
established in the sequential equilibria of the product's life cycle.
Following Friedman's [1971] development of trigger strategy equilibria,
Shapiro [1982] proposed a decision-theoretic approach for reputation
building. The reputation as a consumer's expectation of product quality,
was a force to prevent quality distortion in a monopolistic market with
imperfect information. The producer took the consumer reputation into
quality setting for once-choice and time variation improvement. Dybving
and Spatt [1980] and Shapiro [1982] explained how to maintain a
reputation.
Klein and Lettler [1981] suggested that consumers are assumed to have
knowledge in acting as the firm to induce the product quality at the
market price. In a competitive environment, the firm acquired a bad
reputation and was excluded from the market for selling the low-quality
product at a high price. The firm with a higher quality product would
make positive profits through nonprice competition.
In contrast with Klein and Lettler's equilibrium model where price was
equal to margin cost, Allen [1984] proposed a model to consider the role
of reputation for unobservable product quality. With the aid of a moral
hazard curve, the firm produced quantity at the market equilibria where
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price was equal to average cost but greater than that marginal cost. The
consumers were more sophisticated and perceived the firm's behavior to
avoid buying low-quality products.
Feenstra [1988] investigated the quality change in Japanese car and
truck imports during 1979-1985 and demonstrated that a quota restraint
resulted in a significant quality improvement and price increase for
Japanese car imports. Rose [1990] studies potential linkages between
financial variables and the firm's product safety (product quality) choices
with empirical data in airline safety performance. The results of this
study strongly support the linkage and reveal the advantage of a high
reputation firm in safety competition.
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Chapter 3

Consumer Behavior and Quality Loss under Quality
Variation

3.1 Theoretical Background and Some Basic Assumptions
Classic

microeconomics

theory

and

decision

behavior

theory

are

employed to establish a theoretical base for quality economics. However,
to some extent, some important concepts in quality economics are not
consistent with, and may even violate some of

the basic assumptions in

the classic microeconomics.
Products actually are different in quality, which definitely affect both
the consumer satisfaction and the producer profit. Consumer satisfaction
and product quality competitiveness are the forces that promote quality
improvement. The term "consumer" used in this paper does not refer to
only a single individual but also a unit (household or agent) which makes
decisions collectively by delegation of responsibility on a variety of
matters affecting the well-being of the unit and its members. Consumers
behave rationally as described in classic economic theory. In perfect
competitive

conditions,

information

is available to both consumers and producers. However,

product

quality

all

variation

agents

is

behave

closely

as price

associated

takers.

with

Perfect

information

uncertainty and technological effects. External technological effects and
market failure connected with uncertainty violate the basic conditions for
the

perfect

competition

market.

All

of

the

above

conditions

for

information availability and technology effects need to be revised in
quality economics.
Neumann-Morgenstern

expected

utility

functions

are employed

in

explanation of consumer behavior and decision making under risk [Von
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Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953; Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1971]. Product
quality variation can be treated as a type of risk. Taguchi and Wu [1985]
provide a meaningful

quality loss function

to illustrate social

and

producers' loss due to quality variation. Since this loss function is derived
mathematically, based only on the producer's cost function, development
of a comprehensive loss function on a consumer-based utility function is
necessary.
The

assumptions

transitivity, reduction

in

decision

theory,

of compound

ordering

uncertain

of

outcomes

and

events, continuity

and

substitutability, are satisfied in quality economics. Although it has been
shown in a number of papers that the assumptions used in this approach
have limited its application to some extent, its advantages are still
attractive in explaining of a decision maker's behavior under quality risk.
Lancaster [1966] proposed an approach to deal with the problem of
consumer choice of a product with multiple-attributes. In spite of good
results for quality difference in durable products, the model ignores the
evaluation weight that consumers usually assign to quality attributes,
and the variation of product quality.
With increased competition, consumer satisfaction and the assessment
of product quality are very important for a firm in order to improve
product quality. There is a need to develop a comprehensive method to
convey consumers' quality information and preference to producers.

3.2 Consumer Behavior under Quality Risk
3.2.1

Quality

Information

Discrimination,

Quality

Uncertainty
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Value Functions

and

Quality

Quality

discrimination

for

consumers

is

based

on

the fact

that

consumers pay the same price for a certain product but may get different
product quality. Compared to the value of the highest quality in the
product, consumers experience a loss under quality discrimination. The
larger

the product quality

variation,

the more

serious

the

quality

discrimination. Quality discrimination is a result of both quality deviation
from its product quality mean value, and difference between the mean
value and quality target value in evaluation of a brand of products.
Quality activities are not meaningful if the assessment of product
quality is separated from the product market value which is the price in
a perfect competitive market. If the product price is determined by its
quality, no quality discrimination (or quality loss) will occur. However, it
is very difficult to establish a price based on a product quality before it is
used. The performance of product quality varies with the environment
and usage conditions, built-in variability and maintained reliability. For
brands

of products

with

the

same

functions

of

performance

and

utilization, if the differences in their prices do not match the differences
in their qualities in light of consumer utility function, either quality
discrimination, or price discrimination, or both will occur. Consumers
want to purchase the product with the smallest quality

and price

discriminations in a set of products subject to their budgetary constraints.
Phadke

[1989]

gave

four

types

of

quality

characteristics

in

manufacturing processes, which can also be used to illustrate product
quality variation. The product quality characteristics are symmetric on
either side of the finite target value; such quality characteristics are
called the nominal-the-best type. Deviation of the quality characteristics
in one-tail may be different from that in the other direction. This is called
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the asymmetric type of quality characteristics. The further the product
quality deviates positively from the target value which is set to zero or
small value, the worse the performance of product function. Such quality
characteristics are called the smaller-the-better type. On the other hand,
if

an increase

in the product

quality

characteristics

improves

the

performance of the product, the characteristics are called the larger-thebetter type. These definitions are only associated with product quality
distribution

variances; no quality

discrimination

resulting

from

the

difference in quality target values is considered.
The desired product quality corresponding to the price paid, in the
view of consumers, is the highest quality value of the product. This is also
called the consumer quality target value. Figure 3-1 shows the quality
values corresponding to the prices paid for the above four types of
quality

characteristics

with

asymmetric case). T, \i, and a

normal

distributions

(except

for

the

in Figure 3-1 represent the consumer

quality target value, the mean value, and the standard deviation of
product quality distribution, respectively. Product quality deviation is in
the range between u. + 3o and u. - 3o\ The quality that the consumer
attaches to the price is the mean value in the cases of the nominal-thebest type and the asymmetric type of quality characteristics, while it is
the largest value in the case of the larger-the-better

type and the

smallest value in the case of the smaller-the-better type of quality
characteristics.

Consumer

quality

discrimination

is

the

difference

between the value provided by the quality of the product purchased and
the highest value provided by the best quality product purchased by
other consumers.
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T=target

Nominal-The-Best

The Smaller-The-Better

Asymmetric

"The Larger-The-BettCT

Figure 3-1 Consumer Quality Discrimination

Traditionally, the product quality desired by consumers with respect to
the price paid is assumed to be the mean value of product quality
distribution. This

approach

does not

account

for

consumer

quality

discrimination and fails to describe consumer quality loss and decision
making under quality variation.

For example, if the consumer desired

quality is the mean value in the case of the larger-the-better type of
quality characteristics, the consumer compares his product quality value
with the mean value of quality distribution, and then this is possibly
augmented with other consumer quality surplus (or shortage) provided
by the quality better (or worse) than the mean value of the product
quality. Actually, quality comparison is not made between the product
quality value that the consumer has and the mean value of product
quality distribution, but between the quality purchased and the best
quality purchased by other consumers. Even if the product quality has a
normal distribution for a durable product (in the case of the larger-thebetter), the consumer quality target value is not located at the mean
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value but at T = |x + 3a. Therefore, product quality variation will definitely
result in quality discrimination and the consumers experience a quality
loss if other conditions remain constant.
The effect of quality discrimination is relative with time change. Since
it is impossible to determine the eventual target value of product quality
for any time period to make quality assessment, the only thing the
consumer can do to determine quality target values is to find the best
values of a brand of similar products currently available. With time,
quality target values will change, and the consumer's satisfaction met by
previous

quality

value

result

in

quality

loss.

The

a

new

consumer

discrimination

and

discrimination

requires continuous quality improvement

change in

a

will

consumer

satisfaction

and

time-relativity

to compete

with

quality

of

quality

to meet

the

rivals.

The

consumer's requirement and quality competition is the power to push
product quality activities forward.
We define consumer quality loss, CQL, as the difference between the
highest quality value, w H , and the actual quality value, w, realized by the
consumer for a workable product.
CQL = wH - w

( 3.2.1-1 )

Poor quality results in consumer dissatisfaction, complaints and waste
of resources. Poor quality also results in producer loss due to warranty
cost, reducing market shares, bad reputation, consumer boycotts and,
eventually, going out of business.
The quality value function for a product is derived from consumer
assessment for deterministic quality. The consumer is willing to pay more
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for higher product quality. No uncertainty and risk are involved in the
determination of quality value function. Consumer quality value function
can be rationally assumed to be a monotonic increasing function with
continuous and higher differentiable

characteristics

over a range of

product quality. For instance, if quality level 1 possesses quality value 5
which corresponds to the market price of the product, how much will the
consumer be willing to pay for quality level 3? Figure 3-2 shows
consumer quality value function over a range of quality values. The
vertical axis represents the consumer quality value in terms of monetary
units and the horizontal axis indicates quality levels.

Figure 3-2 Relationship Between Consumer Quality Value
and Quality

The

shapes

of

the

quality

value

function

for

different

product

characteristics depend on consumer preference strength for deterministic
quality, product performance

features

and product

price.

Consumer

marginal quality value (first derivative of the value function with respect
to quality variable) can be decreasing, constant, or increasing, which
corresponds to concave, linear and convex curves over a range of product
quality.

Increasing,

constant

or decreasing
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marginal

quality

values

suggest that consumer quality value corresponding to one unit increase in
quality level is increasing, constant or decreasing. There may be other
quality value functions which are a combination of the above quality
value functions over a range of quality levels. The quality value function
for which marginal value is constant is a logical candidate and the
simplest form to use when one tries to describe the behavior of the
consumer under quality certainty. It will be more clear in later sections
to illustrate why linear, or transformed linear, quality value function is
more convenient to describe the effects of product quality variation and
price

difference

on

consumer

utility

under

relative

risk

aversion.

However, our interest is in the examination of the effect of quality value
function pattern on expected quality value and consumer quality loss.
The procedures for the establishment of the quality value

function

depend on a specific product quality performance and other conditions,
which will not be discussed at this point.
Product quality actually varies over a range of probability distribution.
Figure 3-3 illustrates the pattern of the nominal-the-best type of quality
characteristics. In this figure, A is the specification for a uniform quality
distribution,

A=(b-a)/2 (b and a are the upper and lower bounds for

quality variation, respectively). Oj, o 2 , and a 3 are the standard deviations
corresponding to the three normal distributions shown and 03 > o 2 > o"i.
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Figure 3-3 Product Quality Variation

Similar product quality distributions are also used in the study of the
process in terms of the process capability ratio (PCR). The quality
characteristic possesses both upper and lower specification limits (USL
and LSL, respectively). The diagram shows the 6a 3 spread of the product
quality distribution. \i is the population mean or the consumer quality
target value in the nominal-the-best
Items that perform

type of quality

characteristics.

in the region between LSL and USL are considered as

conforming. No quality loss for either consumers or producers would be
accounted for by these conforming parts.
This traditional method of product quality

specification

has been

challenged by the Japanese industry since the 70's. The Japanese suggest
that the emphasis of quality control activities should not be limited to
the manufacturing

process, but on the product design to minimize

deviation of product quality from the target value. In other words,
quality loss is a continuous function in the range of quality specification.
The more the deviation from the target value, the larger the loss will be.
As a result of this procedure, if the quality deviation is only 3a!, not 3a 3 ,
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the parts inside the limits shown by

LSL' and USL' would

result in a

significant reduction of the consumer's quality dissatisfaction. This new
definition
products

of product quality variation has improved
and has strengthened

the ability

the quality of

of Japanese products

to

penetrate international markets and compete strongly.
According

to

consumer

discrimination

properties,

the

cumulated

distribution function is more useful in capturing the consumer expected
quality value under a variety of quality characteristics than the direct
use of quality distribution pattern, especially in the asymmetric type of
quality characteristics. The product quality distributions in Figure 3-3 are
transformed

into

the cumulated

probability

distributions,

shown

in

Figure 3-4.

Figure 3-4 Cumulated Probability Distributions

There are several notations used in Figure 3-4. (1) The vertical and the
horizontal

axes represent

the cumulated probability

and the quality

deviation from the target value, respectively. (2) The cumulated uniform
probability

distribution

F(u)

probabilities between 0 and

is

a

straight

line

corresponding

to

1. (3) The absolute first order central
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moment, S = Iz - p. I, is used to measure the deviation from the consumer
quality target value in the case of the nominal-the-best type of quality
characteristics. (4) FOh), F(n 2 ) and F(n3) are the cumulated distribution
curves corresponding to the normal distributions, / ( n j ) _ N(u,, 0\2), / ( n 2 ) ~
N(|i, a 2 2 ) and / ( n 3 ) „ N(p, a 3 2 ). (5) In the nominal-the-best type of quality
characteristics, the deviations with the same distance on both sides of the
quality target value have the same effect on consumer dissatisfaction or
consumer quality loss. The cumulated probability is the sum of two-tailed
probability with the same deviation from
cumulated

diagram

drawn for

the nominal-the-best

characteristics can be expanded
characteristics,

the

the target value. (6) The
type of

quality

to the other three types of quality

larger-the-better,

the

smaller-the-better

and

asymmetric types.
In the following, an example is used to illustrate the effect of reduction
of product quality deviation from the target value on quality competition.
Assume that a 3 = 3ax and a 2 = 2 a l t as shown in Figure 3-4. If the quality
deviation from the mean is a j

on the horizontal axis, it crosses the

cumulated probability distribution line of specification

1 (F(ni)) at the

point ( a j , 0.317). It means that 68.3% of product quality is located in the
region between Oj and -Oj, and 31.7% of product quality is outside the
region. In the same way, it can be found that 38.3% of product quality in
specification 2 (F(n2)) is set in the same region, 25.9% for specification 3
(F(n3)) and 11.1% for uniform

distribution, respectively. When the

deviation is 3a j , 0.25% of product quality in specification 1 is outside the
acceptable region between +3oj and -3aj, 13.4% for specification 2, 31.7%
for specification 3, and 66.7% for uniform distribution, respectively. The
uniform distribution is the upper bound for outside the acceptable region,
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or the lower bound for inside the acceptable region. Keep in mind that
when specification

limit for uniform distribution is set to 6a 3, the

cumulated probability for outside the specification between +3a 3 and 3 a 3 is 0, but about 0.25% for the normal distribution. Obviously, the
consumer will select product

1 which provides the smallest quality

deviation.
Generally, the uniform distribution can be considered as a baseline
system for the specification of product quality distribution. Shown in
Figure 3-5, the uniform density function is
1
b-a'
0 ,

/(x) =

a<x<b
otherwise

where f(x) _ uniform density function;
a, b - the lower and the upper bounds for uniform distribution,
respectively.
The quality specification, A, for uniformly distributed quality is

A = (b-a)/2

/(x) il

a

A 0

A b

X

Figure 3-5 Uniform Density Function
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It is possible to find a small range, A 0 , such that the consumer is
indifferent

for the quality variation within this range A 0 . In other words,

the consumer randomly picks up a product within the range A0 without
any change in his utility. The consumer will suffer a quality loss if the
specification limit is bigger than A 0 . In general, the actual interval of the
product quality variation is
A = QA0

( 3.2.1-2 )

where A _ the actual interval of quality variation that would result in
consumer quality discrimination;
A0 _ quality indifference interval;
Q, _ coefficient, Q > 1.
If current technology development and manufacturing processes make
the indifference quality interval A0 possible, the coefficient Q = 1 and the
consumer would have no loss for the quality interval A 0 . If the producer
provides products within this quality specification, he does not suffer any
loss. Any attempt to tighten up A0 will not be beneficial. However, in
most

cases, Q »

1 and the quality interval A is much larger than the

ideal interval A 0 .
The probability that a product works is denoted by p. (1- p) is the
probability of the product failure to work. Assuming p is a no increasing
concave function of absolute value of A.

p = /(A)

( 3.2.1-3 )

A -> A0, p -> 1
In the range [|A|, A0],
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3/(A)/3(-|A|) = /'(A) > 0, /"(A) < 0

( 3.2.1-3' )

Equation (3.2.1-3') means that the probability of conforming rate, p, is
closer to 1 when the product quality specification, IA|, becomes smaller.
The traditional on-line quality control is focused on equations (3.2.1-3)
and (3.2.1-3') for product quality improvement.
In the following, we discuss the consumer quality loss for a workable
product. The effect of a nonconforming rate on the consumer quality
utility will be described in Chapter 6. We define T as the consumer
quality target value, and a as quality deviation from T, i.e.,

a = z - T

in the smaller-the-better type

( 3.2.1-4 )

a = T - z

in the larger-the-better type

( 3.2.1-4' )

a = lz - Tl

in nominal-the-best type

( 3.2.1-4" )

where z - actual variation of quality characteristics, unit.
In the nominal-the-best type of quality characteristics, z takes the
value either smaller or larger than the T value. Since the quality
deviations which are symmetric on either side of the quality target value
have the same effects on consumer quality loss, an absolute value lz-u.1
(i.e. Iz-TI) is used to express the symmetric effects. However, if the mean
value of the product quality distribution is not consistent with the target
value, it can be described in the case of the larger-the-better type or the
smaller-the-better type of quality characteristics.
In the following, we will discuss three typical quality value functions
with constant, decreasing and increasing quality marginal values in the
nominal-the-best type of quality characteristics.
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Linear quality value function is determined by the following formula:
w = wH - ^ a

( 3.2.1-5 )

= wH - k^z - u.1

( 3.2.1-5' )

where w H _ the value corresponding to the highest quality, $;
w _ the value corresponding to the actual quality realized, $;
kj_ constant quality loss coefficient, $/unit;
\i _ mean value of quality distribution, unit.
The two formulas, (3.2.1-5) and (3.2.1-5'), are equivalent. The use of
these two equations depends on the specific situation. However, quality
variable a might be more convenient to explain the quality deviation
from the quality target value. Figure 3-6 shows the relationship between
w and a as well as w and z.

WH
Lt = 0

WL

+A Z
Figure 3-6 Relationships Between w and a, w and z

Two quadratic quality value functions, one with decreasing and the
other with increasing marginal quality values, are established in the
nominal-the-best type of quality characteristics. The quadratic quality
value function with decreasing marginal value is
50

w = wH - k 2 a2

( 32.1-6 )

= w H - k2(z - ,1)2

( 3.2.1-6' )

and the quadratic quality value function with increasing marginal quality
value has the following form
w = wL + k 3 (a - A) 2
= w L + k3(lz - u,l - A)2

a <A

( 3.2.1-7 )

z<A

(3.2.1-7')

where w L - the quality value corresponding to the lowest quality, $;
k 2 , k 3 - quality loss coefficients, $/unit2;
A - quality variation range, unit.
The quality loss coefficients k 1} k 2 and k 3 in the above equations
be determined by setting

can

a = A in equations (3.2.1-5) and (3.2.1-6), and

a = 0 in equation (3.2.1-7), as shown below:

kl = (wH - wL)/A

( 3.2.1-8 )

k 2l k 3 = (w H - wL)/A2

( 3.2.1-9 )

Similarly, the quality value function for the asymmetric type of quality
characteristics is
w = w H - knlzj - \i\

z<|x

(3.2.1-10)

w = wH - k 12 lz 2 - u.1

z>u,

(3.2.1-10')

where k n , k 12 - quality loss coefficients for the two sides, $/unit;
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z 1? z 2 - actual deviation of quality characteristics in two sides, unit.
Expected quality value (EQV) depends on the shape of the consumer's
quality value function and the quality distribution for a given type of
product. In mathematical form, it is

EQV = E[/(w)]

(3.2.1-11)

In the discrete case:
EQV = I/(Wi)Pi
and in the continuous case:

EQV = J/(w)<Kw)dw
where /(w) _ consumer quality value function, $;
/(wj) _ value of quality event i, $;
Pj _ probability associated with quality event i;
<l>(w) _ probability density function of quality characteristic
distribution.
We

assume

that

there

is

no

substantial

difference

in

quality

preferences and beliefs among groups where consumers are relatively
homogeneous.
Average consumer quality loss (ACQL) is defined as the average of
consumer quality loss for a given product (or expectation of consumer
quality loss under the quality distribution for a given product),
ACQL = E(CQL) = wH - EQV

( 3.2.1-12 )

Quality variation observed by the consumer is closely related to the
degree of availability

of quality information.
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Quality information

is

available for all agents, consumers and producers, and quality variation
only

involves

inherent

product

quality

variance

in

the

perfect

competitive conditions. In the real world, the market is not perfect, and
complete information is not available. The consumer needs to gather
information to reduce or avoid quality loss. As Roberts and Urban [1988]
suggest, consumers can only approximately evaluate a new product with
an uncertainty
information

which includes

the inherent product variability

and

uncertainty.

The degree

of information

availability

determines

the pattern

of

consumer product selection. If no information, including any previously
related information, is available, consumers would choose a product
randomly from a set of totally substitutable products. If some imperfect
but unbiased information is available, consumers use the information to
assess the product quality (see Robert and Urban [1988]).
x = xp + ej

6i _ N(0, a2Ei)

E(x) = E(xp) + E(Ei) = ^

( 3.2.1-13 )
( 3.2.1-14 )

a(x) = a(x p ) + o(ej)

( 3.2.1-15 )

a 2 = a 2 p + a 2 ei

(3.2.1-16)

where x - consumer assessment about product quality;
x p - inherent product quality;
ej - information about product quality. xp and 6{ are independent.
If some of the information sources are somewhat biased, they could
generate the information risk. Consumers could not correctly estimate the
product quality and would have a greater quality loss resulting from the
information

sources.
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x = Xp ± ej

£i

„ N(uei, a2Ei)

( 3.2.1-17 )

E(x) = E(xp) ± E(ei) = [iv± u£i

( 3.2.1-18 )

a(x) = a(x p ) + a(6i)

( 3.2.1-19 )

a2=a

2
p

+a

2

( 3.2.1-20 )

ei

Total quality variance, a 2 , is the sum of two independent components as
follows:
a 2 = ai2 + a p 2

(3.2.1-21)

where aj 2 _ quality information variance;
a p 2 _ inherent product quality variance.
Under

conditions

of

perfect

information,

quality

information

uncertainty equals zero, a 2 = a p 2 . In other situations, consumers use
magazines, advertisements, retail salesmen and friends as information
sources to reduce uncertainty of imperfect quality information. Consumer
risk also could be reduced through the information obtained either by
buying the advertised product that a firm uses as an implicit signal to
affect consumer decision making, or by direct search. Urban et al. [1990]
point out that word-of-mouth may have positive or negative effects on a
consumer's product assessment. The effect of information on total quality
variation should be carefully examined.
Furthermore, the total quality uncertainty is also associated with the
stage of market entrance of the product as well as the period in a
product's life cycle. Product reputation also affects the shape of consumer
total quality information. For instance, even though another company's
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products have the same inherent quality level as a highly

reputed

product has, consumers prefer the latter because its quality reputation
reduces the risk of consumer decision making under quality information
uncertainty. The company can greatly benefit from consumer preference,
especially for new products. However, the consumer evaluates product
quality

from

the

available

information

which

may

be

biased

and

imperfect. For tractability and without significant loss of generality, we
will discuss the product quality in the case of unbiased information. If
the condition is changed, we will mention it.
Since the quality of a certain product follows a pattern of probability
distribution, the consumer faces an uncertainty of product quality in
buying

a desired product. Product quality variation can be treated as a

special risk. Consumer behavior and decision making under quality risk
can be described by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
We assume that the consumer obeys the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility axioms. Consumer behavior under quality risk is shown in Figure
3-7. The vertical axis in this figure represents consumer utility while the
horizontal axis represents certainty equivalent in terms of money value.
The patterns of consumer utility functions for product quality variation
can be linear, concave, convex and other specific forms with respect to
consumer behavior under risk neutral, risk aversion, risk taking and risk
portfolio, respectively.
Specifically, we assume in Figure 3-7 that: (1) The consumer utility
corresponds

to the specification

of product quality value

variation,

located in the region |i ± A (A = 3a). (2) The certainty equivalents of the
highest and the lowest product quality are w H and w L ,
whose initial values

respectively,

are determined by consumer quality value function.
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Figure 3-7 Consumer Behavior under Quality Risk

3.2.2

Consumer Behavior Under Quality Risk Neutral

We employ the concepts of the conventional consumer behavior theory
to explain consumer quality loss. The consumer utility function suggests
that (1) utility is measured in monetary units, (2) utility function is
strictly increasing, and (3) utility function is continuous with continuous
first and second order derivatives.
A person is risk neutral relative to a quality variation if the utility of
the expected value of the quality equals the expected utility of the
quality, i.e.

U[E( Wi ] = E[U(Wi)]

( 3.2.2-1 )

Obviously, a risk neutral person relates only to the expected quality
values and is not sensitive to the quality risk. The expected quality value
can be calculated

by using certainty equivalents

without using the

preference (utility) curve.
We define a utility value transfer operator, V, as follows:
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V[U(c/( Wi ))] =c/( Wi )

( 3.2.2-2 )

V[U( Cl /( Wi )) + U(C2/(Wj))] = C l /( W i ) + c2/(Wj)

( 3.2.2-2' )

IfU, and Uj are independent
V[U i (c 1 /(w i ))U j (c 2 /(w j ))] = c 1 /(w i )c 2 /(w j )

( 3.2.2-2" )

where c, C! and c 2 are coefficients.
Applying the above rules on equation (3.2.2-1), then
V{E[U(Wi)]} = V{U[E(wj)]}= E(Wi)

( 3.2.2-3 )

The expected utility value under quality neutral equals the expected
quality value. The reason for using utility value transfer operator V is to
avoid tedious discussion of the features for a specific consumer utility
function, and concentrate on the results derived from the general utility
function

properties.

Equation (3.2.2-1) implies that the consumer has a linear utility
function

U = b L + bj(w - wL)
= b L + (b H -b L )(w - w L )/(w H -wL)
From equation (3.2.1-8),

(wH -wL) = kjA

U = b L + (b H -b L )(w - wL)/(k!A)

( 3.2.2-4 )

where w _ certainty equivalent value, $;
b L _ intercept factor of utility function, corresponding to the
certainty equivalent w L , V[bL] = wL;
b H _ the utility corresponding to the certainty equivalent w H ,
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V[bH] = wH;
bj _ the constant slope of utility function, fy = (b H -b L )/(w H -w L ).
For linear quality value function,
w= w H - kja
dw/d(-a) = k2 > 0

( 3.2.2-4' )

We use the negative deviation value (-a)

to indicate that quality

deviation from the target value is smaller when (-a) becomes larger.
Taking partial derivative of (-a)
equation (3.2.2-4'),

for equation (3.2.2-4) and using

we have,

3U/3(-a) = (3U/8w)(8w/3a)
^(bn-bLj/CM)
= (b H - bL)/A
U

/

\

1_
-A

A

1

0

1
1
+A

Figure 3-8 Relationships Between U and a, U and z
in Nominal-The-Best Type of Quality Characteristics

The above equation implies that under quality neutral conditions, the
consumer's marginal utility change is fixed with respect to one unit
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change in quality deviation when consumer quality value is linear. The
positive rate means that when the deviation is closer to the target value,
the utility of the consumer increases proportionally. The estimation of the
expected utility value can be made through the estimation of expected
quality value under quality neutral.
Similarly, for concave and convex quadratic quality value functions, we
have
3U/3(-a) = 2a(b H - bL)/A2 > 0, U a " < 0

( 3.2.2-5 )

3U/3(-a) = 2(A - a)(b H - bL)/A2 > 0, U a " > 0

( 3.2.2-5' )

i.e., consumer marginal quality utility is decreasing and increasing with
reduction of quality deviation, respectively. Therefore, consumer utility
under quality neutral is closely related to the properties of the quality
value function.
There are two ways to compute expected quality value, one of which
employs the probability distribution of product quality and the other
uses the cumulated distribution of product quality. Whichever method is
used, quality deviation, a, is adopted to capture the quality deviation
from the quality target value. Since the certainty equivalent value is the
function of quality deviation, we will examine the relationship between
the expected quality value (i.e. the expected utility value) and the quality
variation.
Normal and uniform distributions for product quality will be employed
to derive their expected quality values in the case of the nominal-thebest type of quality characteristics. For a normally distributed quality
characteristic, the expected quality value, EQVn, is
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[1]

EQV n = w H -0.8k!a n

( 3.2.2-6 )

For the uniform distribution of product quality, the expected quality
value, EQVU, is [2]

EQV U = wH - k!(b - a)/4
( 3.2.2-7 )

= wH - 0.866k! a u

fl]

EQVn = E(w H -k 1 |z-n|) = w H -k 1 E(|z-|i|)

E(|z-u|)=2f ^ ^ j ^ L - E X P - i l ^ J ^ i d z
-vzita

Jn

z-u.

a

= t

E ( | z - n | ) = 2/0"°-^=EXP(-l-)dt
2

=^/~tEXP(-l-)dt

rr

— °°

EQVn = E(w H -k 1 |z-|i|) = w H -0.8k 1 a
[2]

EQV^WH-k^z-nl)

E(|z-u|)=2|

(z-i±i)J^dz
2 'b^a

^(a+b)/2

z - (a + b)z b
_b-a
(a+b)/2
4
b-a
b-a
EQVU= w H - k ^ z - n|) = w H - k r
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If (b-a)/2 = A = 3a n , where a n is the standard deviation corresponding
to the normal distribution, then
EQVU = wH -1.5k!an

In comparison

of equation

( 3.2.2-8 )

(3.2.2-6)

and equation

(3.2.2-7), the

product quality with a uniform distribution results in a larger consumer
loss. The expected quality value for a uniform distribution can be
considered as a lower quality bound for the expected quality value of
any shape of product quality distribution, while the highest quality
value,

w H , is the upper bound with the exception of the larger-the-

better and the smaller-the-better types of quality characteristics with
convex quality value function.

E(wu) <= E(wj) < wH

( 3.2.2-9 )

where E(w u ) _ expected quality value of product quality with a uniform
distribution, $;
E(wj) _ expected quality value of product quality with the
distribution pattern i, $.
It is found that the expected quality value, or the expected utility
value under risk neutral, is located somewhere from the quality target
value in the nominal-the-best type of quality characteristics.
We define the absolute ratio of average consumer quality loss, r, for
any probability distribution i to the corresponding uniform distribution
for a given product as:
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r = (wH - EQVi)/(wH - EQVU)

( 3.2.2-10 )

For linear quality value function,
EQVU = (wH+wL)/2
then

EQV l i n e a r = wH - r(wH - w L )/2
= (1 - r/2)wH + (r/2)wL

Let

r/2 = p
EQV l i n e a r = (1 - p)wH + pwL

( 3.2.2-11 )

Equation (3.2.2-11) is not related to parameters of any product
quality distribution and is very convenient to compute the expected
quality value for normal quality distribution
mathematically

or computed

approximately

if r can be derived

for linear quality

value

function. For example, the absolute ratio of average consumer quality
loss and the expected quality value for a normal distribution are,
respectively,

r = 0.8/1.5 = 0.5333
EQV n = 0.733wH + 0.267wL

( 3.2.2-12 )

For concave and convex quadratic quality value functions in nominalthe-best type of quality characteristics with normal distribution, the
simplified

computational

equations

respectively
EQVU (concave) = wH -3k 2 a 2
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are

derived

in

the

following,

= w H - 3(wH -w L )a 2 /A 2
= wH - 3(wH -w L )a 2 /9a 2
= w H - (wH -w L )/3
EQVU (convex) = wH -6k 3 a 2
= wH - 6(wH -w L )a 2 /A 2
= wH - 2(wH -w L )/3
EQV c o n c a v e = (1 - r/3)wH + (r/3)wL

( 3.2.2-13 )

EQV c o n v e x = (1 - 2r/3)wH + (2r/3)wL

( 3.2.2-14 )

While in the larger-the-better and the smaller-the-better types of
quality

characteristics

with

normal

distribution,

the

simplified

computational equations are, respectively
EQV c o n c a v e = (1 - r/3)wH + (r/3)wL

( 3.2.2-15 )

EQV c o n v e x = (1 - 2r/3)wH + (2r/3)wL

( 3.2.2-16 )

We define the relative ratio of average consumer quality losses for
any two products with similar quality distribution patterns as
r nm = (w« - EQVn)/(wH - EQVm), a n 2 > a m 2

( 3.2.2-17 )

where r n m - the relative ratio of average consumer quality losses;
w H - the highest quality value for both products n and m, $;
EQV n , EQVm - expected quality values for products n and m,
respectively, $;
°n2> a m 2 " quality distribution variances for products n and m,
respectively.
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The difference between average consumer quality losses for the two
products, d nm , is
d nm = ACQLn - ACQLm = - dmn

( 3.2.2-18 )

where ACQLn and ACQLm correspond to average consumer quality losses
for products n and m, respectively.
Now we use a cumulated quality distribution to compute the above
indeces. Assume that A'= a l s a 2 = 2 a l f a 3 = 3a!. a 1 ? a 2 and a 3 are the
standard deviations for the normal quality distributions f(n\),

/ ( n 2 ) and

/ ( n 3 ) , respectively. A is the specification, A = (b-a)/2, for the uniform
distribution. There are a total of 9A' equal intervals between w H and w L .
For each small interval A', the middle quality value is used to compute
the loss for the interval. For example, the middle quality value in the
third interval (3A') is
[(w H - 2ka 2 ) + (wH - 3ka!)]/2 = (wH - 5koi/2)
Thus, the middel quality value for interval i is
mi = [(wH - (i-l)ka!) + (wH - i k a ^ / 2 = (wH - (2i-l)ka!/2)
The expected quality values in the nominal-the-best type of quality
characteristics are computed with cumulated distribution as follows.

EQV = £ 8 ^
i=l

where 8\- the cumulated probability for interval i;
mj - the middle quality value for interval i.

64

Therefore, the expected quality values for the above three quality
specifications specifically are:
E ( w n l ) « 0.6826*(w'-(ka!)/2)

+0.2718*(w'-(3ka!)/2)

+0.0456*(w,-(5ka1)/2)
« wH - 0.863ka!
E(w u l ) = wH - 1.5k a!
T1 = 0.575
E(w n 2 ) « 0.383*(w'-(ka1)/2) +0.2998*(w'-(3ka!)/2) + ...
+0.0124*(w'-(llka 1 )/2)
» wH -1.6263kai
E(w u2 ) = wH - 3ka!
r 2 = 0.5421
E(wn3) » 0.2686*(w'-(ka 1 )/2) +0.2386*(w'-(3ka 1 )/2) + ...
+0.0076*(w'-(17ka1)/2)
» w H - 2.4132kaj
E(w u3 ) = wH - 4.5kaj
r 3 = 0.5362

Compared
deduction

to
and

equation

(3.2.2-12),

approximate

the

two

methods,

computation,

are

consistent.

theoretical
0.533

is

assigned to parameter r to calculate the expected quality value for the
product quality with a linear quality value function.
The relative ratio of consumer quality loss for the nominal-the-best
type is
r 21 = 6k 1 a 1 /3k 1 a 1 = 2
r 31 = 9k 1 a 1 /3k 1 a 1 = 3
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r„ = l
rii :r 2 1 :r 3 1 = a ! : a 2 : a 3 = 1 : 2 : 3
The difference of consumer quality losses for the nominal-the-best
type is
d 21 = d2 - d! = 0.8kj(a 2 - a 2 ) =1.6kiai
d 31 = d3 - d t = 0.8k!(a 3 - aO = 2.4k!©!

The quality value functions (QVF), expected quality value (EQV) and
average consumer quality discrimination (ACQL) for normal distribution
for three types of quality characteristics are computed and shown in
Table 3-1.

Assuming that the quality specification range, A(A=3a in the

nominal-the-best type of quality characteristics and A = 6 a in the largerthe-better and the smaller-the-better types of quality characteristics),
and the quality value difference between the highest quality value and
the lowest quality value, w H -w L , are the same for linear, concave and
convex quality value functions, it can be shown that

EQV convex < EQVlinear < EQV concave

( 3.2.2-19 )

ACQLconvex > ACQLijnear > ACQLconcave

( 3.2.2-2U )

As shown in Table 3-1, the form of consumer quality value function
affects the values of EQV and ACQL significantly.
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Table3-1: QVF, EQV and ACQL for Normally Distributed
Quality Characteristics
Type of quality
characteristics

linear

convex

concave

The nominal
-the-best

QVF
EQV
AOQL

WH - kjlz - ul
WH - 0.8kja
0.8^0

wH - k2a2
k2a2

L + k3(lz - ul - A) 2
w L + k 3 (a 2 -1.6Aa + A2)
w H -WL-k 3 (a 2 -1.6Aa+A 2 )

The larger
-the-better

QVF
EQV
ACQL

wH - MT-z)
wH - ^(T-n)
ki(T-u)

w H - k 2 (T-z) 2
w H -k 2 (a 2 +(T-|i) 2 )
k 2 (a 2 + (T-|i)2)

w L + k 3 (T-z-A) 2
w L +k 3 (a 2 +(T-n-A) 2 )
w H -w L -k 3 (o- 2 +(T-u-A)2)

The smaller
-the-better

QVF
EQV
ACQL

wH-ki(z-T)
wH - k ^ - T )
ki(n-T)

w H - k 2 (z-T) 2
w H -k 2 (o 2 +(u-T) 2 )
k 2 (a 2 + (n-T) 2 )

w L + k3(z -T -A) 2
w L +k 3 (a2+(u-T-A)2)
w H -w L -k 3 (CT 2 +(u-T-A) 2 )

W

H • k2(z - | i ) 2

W

It is clear that quality characteristics in the larger-the-better type have
similar qualitative and quantitative properties as those in the smallerthe-better type of quality characteristics. In the larger-the-better type of
quality characteristics EQV and ACQL computed with linear quality value
function depend only on the mean value of quality distribution and are
not affected by the quality variance.

However, EQV and ACQL computed

with nonlinear quality value functions depend not only on the mean
value of the quality distribution but also on the variance of quality
distribution.

Consumers

with

concave

quality

value

function

prefer

products with small quality variance since the larger the variance, the
larger the consumer quality loss when the mean of quality distributions
stays the same.

Consumers with convex quality value function will select

the product with the larger variance because it provides some products
with

higher

quality

if

these

quality

distributions

have

the

same

distribution mean. The larger the variance, the smaller the quality loss to
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the consumer with convex quality value function in the larger-the-better
and the smaller-the-better types of quality characteristics. But in the real
world, such a consumer behavior is not common.
Table 3-2 lists EQV and ACQL values for uniformly distributed quality
characteristics. The indexes of absolute ratio of consumer quality loss, r,
relative ratio of average consumer quality loss, r n m ,
difference, d nm ,

and

quality loss

are shown in Table 3-3 assuming u.n=u.m. It can be shown

that

r

ooncave *^ ^linear "^ rconvex

v ^•^•^'^^

)

The ratio r can be substituted into equations (3.2.2-11), (3.2.2-15) or
(3.2.2-16) to obtain a simple computation of EQV,. The relative ratio, r nm ,
and quality loss difference, d nm , indicate that EQV and ACQL with linear
quality value function

are only related to the mean of the quality

characteristics distributions in the larger-the-better and the smaller-thebetter types of quality characteristics.

The EQV and ACQL values for

concave quality value function vary with quality variance; the larger the
variance, the higher the quality discrimination.

This conclusion is always

consistent without consideration of the type of quality characteristic.
However, this conclusion is not held for convex quality value function in
the cases of the larger-the-better and the smaller-the-better types of
quality characteristics.
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Table 3-2:

EQV and ACQL for Uniformly Distributed Quality Characteristics

Type of quality
characteristics

linear

concave

convex

Nominal
the best

EQV WH - l . s ^ a
ACQL l.Skja

w H - 3k 2 a 2
3k 2 a 2

The larger
the better

EQV w H -kjOT-u)
ACQL ki(T-u)

w H - k 2 (3a 2 +(T-u)2) w L + k 3 (3a 2 + (T-u-A) 2 )
k 2 (3o 2 +(T-u) 2 )
w H - w L - k 3 (3a 2 + (T-U.-A)2)

The smaller
the better

EQV w H - M u - T ) w H - k 2 (3a 2 +(u-T) 2 ) w L + k 3 (3a 2 + (u-T-A) 2 )
ACQL ki(u-T)
k 2 (3c 2 + (u-T) 2 )
w H - w L - k 3 (3a 2 + (u-T-A) 2 )

WH - 6k 3 a 2
6k 3 a 2

Note: a 2 is the variance corresponding to the normal quality distribution.
Table 3-3: Indexes for Three Types of Quality Characteristics
( a 2 n > a 2 m , \in = \im)
Type of quality
Characteristics
The nominal
-the-best

The smaller
-the-better

on

distributions

the
with

convex

concave

r
nm
d
nm

0.533
>1
0.8k1(an-am)

r
r
nm

1
1
0

1.083
0.833
>1
<1
k 2 ( o 2 n - a 2 m ) -k 3 (a 2 n - a 2 m )

r
r
nm

1
1
0

0.833
5 1

r

The larger
-the-better

Based

linear

above

0.333
>1
k

2(<*2n " <*2m)

0.633
>. 1
3.8k 3 (a 2 n -a 2 m )

1.083
<, 1
2
2
k2(° 2 n " ° 2 m) -k 3 (a n - a m )

analysis

the same mean

and

the

value of

assumption
quality

of

quality

characteristics,

the

following conclusions can be made under quality risk neutral conditions.
1. Consumer quality value function
carefully evaluated.

for deterministic quality should be

EQV and ACQL resulting from quality variation will
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be overestimated
correctly

or underestimated if quality value function

is not

determined.

2. Consumer quality discrimination always exists if there is variation in
product quality. Average consumer quality loss, ACQL, is the difference
between the highest quality value and the expected quality value.
3. In

the

nominal-the-best

and

asymmetric

types

of

quality

characteristics, consumers always favor the product with small variance
regardless of which pattern of the quality value function is employed.
4. In the larger-the-better and the smaller-the-better types of quality
characteristics, consumers with linear quality function are only concerned
with the mean value of product quality distribution.
value function

Concave quality

possesses the tendency for the consumer to make a

decision in favor of the product with smaller quality variance.

In

contrast, consumers with convex quality value function will choose the
product with higher quality value and ignore its larger variance.

3.2.3 Consumer Behavior Under Quality Risk Aversion
The wider the quality distribution spreads, the more risk the consumer
faces1 in decision making on a choice of products from a number of
available products. In the real world, consumers are usually observed to
be risk averse in most cases. Consumer quality risk is caused by (1)
quality variation in a certain type of product, (2) quality variation across
products, and (3) imperfect quality information. A person is a quality risk
averter if the utility of the expected value of the quality is greater than
the expected value of its utility, i.e.

U[E(Wi)]>E[U(Wi)]

(3.2.3-1)
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Assuming equations (3.2.3-1) hold within the domain of the utility
function, the consumer utility function is strictly concave if the following
condition is satisfied
dU/dw > 0, d 2 U/dw 2 < o

The consumer utility function

( 3.2.3-2 )

under quality aversion is a concave

curve in comparison with the straight line utility under quality neutral.
The consumer utility function depends on (1) the degrees of quality
aversion, (2) the probability distribution pattern of the product quality,
and (3) the form of the quality value function. Clearly, a specific utility
function for a given product can be drawn on the basis of consumer
behavior.
First of all, we examine the consumer quality utility value changes
corresponding to the change in quality deviation. We must keep in mind
that this analysis only gives us a partial picture of the effect of quality
activity on consumer decision making under the assumption of other
conditions being constant.
Based on the consumer behavior under quality aversion, the utility
function is strictly concave over the domain of product quality variation.
The expected quality value would not be linearly related to the quality
deviation from the target value.
The

relationship

between

the

consumer

utility

and

the

quality

deviation under the quality aversion in nominal-the-best type of quality
characteristics is shown in Figure 3-9. (This relationship can be derived
for other types of quality characteristics.) The utility value derived from
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quality deviation a is less than the value under the quality neutral
conditions. Curve U a is located below U n . Mathematically, the relation
could be written as follows in accordance with the properties of the
utility and certainty equivalent functions given before. For linear quality
value function:
d 2 U a /dw 2 < 0

U a = /(w)

( 3.2.3-3 )

From equation (3.2.2-4')
w = /(a)

3wa/3(-a) = kj
( 3.2.3.-4 )

U a = /(w(a))
3U a /3(-a) = (3U a /3w)(3w/3(-a))

= k^LySw

( 3.2.3-5 )

d 2 U a /d(-a) 2 = k!a 2 U a /(3wa(-a))
= k 1 a[(8U a /3w)(3w/a(-a))]/8w
= k 1 2 3 2 U a /3w 2 <0

( 3.2.3-6 )
U
1 i^
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Figure 3-9 Relationships Between U and a, U and z under Quality
Aversion in Nominal-The-Best Type of Quality Characteristics
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Based on the conditions given before, equations (3.2.3-5) and (3.2.3-6)
illustrate that: (1) The slope means the closer the quality deviation from
the quality target value, the higher the consumer utility. (2) The marginal
quality utility decreases when quality deviation reduces by the same
amount of units. This implies that consumers are less and less sensitive to
quality

improvement.

(3) When

quality

deviation

tends

to 0,

the

certainty equivalent value will be the target value and consumer utility
will reach the highest point, that is when dUa/dw = 0, then dUa/d(-a) = 0
and U(a=0) = U H . (4) The marginal quality utility is lower than the fixed
marginal quality utility under quality neutral conditions.
Equation (3.2.3-6) proves that: (1) Utility function is strictly concave
and has a maximum point at a = 0 against quality deviation under quality
aversion. (2) Utility function is continuous with, at least, first and secondorder derivatives with respect to quality deviation (-a).
For concave and convex quadratic quality value functions, respectively,
we have

U a =./(w)

d 2 U a /dw 2 < 0

w = wH - k 2 a 2

3w/3(-a) = 2k2a

3U a /a(-a) = (3U a /3w)(3w/3(-a))
= 2k 2 a3U a /3w > 0

( 3.2.3-7 )

-2k 2 3U a /3w < 0, 4k 2 2 a 2 3 2 U a /3w 2 < 0
d 2 U a /d(-a) 2 =-2k 2 3U a /3w + 4k 2 2 a 2 3 2 U a /3w 2 < 0
w = wL - k 3 (a-A) 2

( 3.2.3-8 )

3w a /3(-a) = 2k3(A - a)

3U a /3(-a) = (3U a /3w)(3w/3(-a))
= 2k3(A - a)3U a /3w > 0
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( 3.2.3-9 )

2k 3 3U a /3w > 0, (2k3(A - a)) 2 3 2 U a /3w 2 < 0
d 2 U a /d(-a) 2
= 2k 3 3U a /3w + (2k3(A - a)) 2 3 2 U a /3w 2
If 2k 3 3U a /3w + (2k3(A - a)) 2 3 2 U a /3w 2 > 0, d 2 U a /d(-a) 2 > 0

( 3.2.3-10 )

If 2k 3 3U a /3w + (2k3(A - a)) 2 3 2 U a /3w 2 < 0, d 2 U a /d(-a) 2 < 0

( 3.2.3-10' )

Compared to the patterns in Figure 3-8, the relationship between U and
a as well as the relationship between U and z are nonlinear and may be
expressed as a curve with higher order derivatives in quality aversion
when the shape of quality value function is concave. For the convex
quality value function, the consumer has the higher degree of quality
aversion so that his utility

shows the properties

of risk

aversion,

otherwise, the consumer is actually a quality risk taker. Curve z a in
Figure 3-9 tells us that one unit change in quality deviation results in a
more rapid change in consumer utility than the utility change under
quality neutral. In other words, if the product quality decreases, the
consumer will face more quality loss than that estimated under quality
neutral. It should

be pointed

out that the certainty

equivalent of

expected utility under quality aversion is less than that in quality
neutral.
However, we cannot draw the final conclusion from the above analysis.
The consumer utility obtained from product quality performance should
be put into the total consumer utility function which associates consumer
assets, budget, product price and information uncertainty.
The expected utility value (EUV) under quality neutral equals the
expected quality value (EQV) which is related to the pattern of quality
value function

and the quality probability distribution. The consumer
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utility function under quality aversion is associated with the consumer's
assets.

It is logical to assume that many decision makers would feel they

ought to pay less for quality premium against a given risk when they
have greater assets.

But in quality risk analysis we do not make such an

assumption, i.e., we do not assume the utility is decreasing, constant or
increasing risk aversion to limit our discussion in this section.
The consumer usually employs the same utility function to evaluate a
number of products. Different

income groups possess different

utility

functions. The higher the product price, the more sensitive the consumer
attitude toward quality risk.
The consumer's budget for purchasing a product is a function of his
assets. For the sake of simplicity, it is rational to assume that the
consumer's budget is positively related to his assets. That is, the greater
the assets the larger the budget.
desired

product

in

a brand

The consumer is able to search for a
of products

subject

to his

budgetary

constraint. The budget is an increasing function of his assets

B(x) = /(x)

(3.2.3-11)

3B(x)/3x = /'(x) > 0

( 3.2.3-11' )

where B(x) - budget for purchasing a product, $;
x - consumer's assets, $.
A total quality risk premium for inherent product quality variation and
information
expected

uncertainty

quality

value

is
and

defined

as

the

the certainty

aversion.
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difference
equivalent

between
under

the

quality

R = E(w) - C(w)

( 3.2.3-12 )

where R - quality premium, $;
E(w) - expected quality value, $;
C(w) - certainty equivalent under quality aversion, $.
It should be noted that the total quality risk premium which contains a
different meaning from the traditional insurance premium is the utility
adjustment under quality reversion. The consumer adjusts his preference
to account for the cost of future product repairs, time waste, information
availability, the cost of serving warranties, consumer moral hazard, etc..
Quality premium is another type of consumer quality loss under quality
risk aversion.

C(w)= E(w) - R

( 3.2.3-13 )

The inherent meaning contained in the certainty equivalent C(w) is the
implicit expected utility value for the product under risk aversion.
Quality risk premium depends

on the consumer's

assets and

the

pattern of product quality value.

R = R(x, w)

R«E(w)

( 3.2.3-14 )

Assume that the consumer with assets x, budget B(x) and utility
function U(x) is indifferent between facing a risk to buy a product with
quality variation and receiving a value at the non-random amount E(w) R. Formula (3.2.3-1) can be expanded as the following comprehensive
equation under risk aversion
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U[x - B(x) + E(w) - R(x,w)] = E[U(x - B(x) + w)]

( 3.2.3-15 )

E(w) = wH - ACQL
= wH - P

( 3.2.3-16 )

where p - average consumer quality loss under risk neutral, $.
Let

a = w - E(w)

( 3.2.3-17 )

E(a) = 0

Let

a 2 = (w - E(w))2

( 3.2.3-18 )

E(a2) = o2ro

( 3.2.3-19 )

y = x - B(x) + E(w)
U[x - B(x) + E(w) - R(x + E(w), x - E(w))]
= E{U[ x - B(x) + E(w) + w - E(w)]}
U(y - R) = E[U(y + a)]

( 3.2.3-20 )

Expanding U around y on both sides of equation (3.2.3-20). (see Pratt
[1964].)
U(y - R) = U(y) - RU'(y) + /(R 2 )
E[U(y + a)] = E[U(y) + aU'(y) + 0.5a2U"(y) + /(a3)]
= U(y) + 0.5a2wU"(y) + E[/(a3)]
Assuming that the third order of a is of smaller than a2^ and the / ( R 2 )
is ignored
R = 0.5o-V(y)
= 0.5oV[x - B(x) + E(w)]

77

( 3.2.3-21 )

Since - B(x) + E(w) is small compared with x, then
R = 0.5aV(x)

where r(x)

-

a

measure

( 3.2.3-22 )

for

consumer

consideration of consumer assets effect.

attitude

toward

risk

in

A measure of absolute risk

aversion, r(x), is defined as:

r(x) = - u"(x)/u'(x)
If

( 3.2.3-23 )

r(x) = 0, risk neutral
r(x) > 0, risk aversion
r(x) < 0, risk taking

where u(x) - a utility function for money value.
Quality risk premium has a form similar to that in traditional consumer
theory under risk aversion, which is approximately r(x) times half the
variance of product quality value, a 2 m .

The value of a2a can be computed

by equation (3.2.3-19). The consumer quality loss under risk aversion is
simply the sum of the quality loss under risk neutral and the quality risk
premium.
We are more interested in the expected utility value rather than the
specific utility function form.

By using the value operator V, equation

(3.2.3-15) becomes
U[x - B(x) + E(w) - 0.5o-V(x)] = E{U[x - B(x) + w]}
x -B(x) + E(w) - 0.5aV(x) = V{E[U(x - B(x) + w)]}
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( 3.2.3-24 )

When r(x) = 0, equation (3.2.3-24) becomes the expected utility value
under risk neutral, see equation (3.2.2-3).
Table 3-4 shows the relationship between the variance of quality value
distribution,

o2a,

and the variance of product quality characteristics

distribution, a 2 . It indicates that the quality premium is only related to
the variance of quality characteristic distribution for linear quality value
function.

However, the quality premium is associated

with

variance

and

characteristics

the

squared

mean

value

of

quality

squared

distribution, as well as the product of the variance and the mean in the
cases

of

the

larger-the-better

and

the

smaller-the-better

concave and convex quality value functions,

types

for

which means that the

contribution of variance and mean value of product quality distribution
on the premium cannot be separated.
The actual variance of product quality distribution is usually so small
that the effects of the terms more than the second order of o on the risk
premium can be ignored. The simplified relationship between o 2 and a2m
is shown in Table 3-5.
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Table 3-4: Relationship Between a2a and a 2 for Normally Distributed
Quality Characteristics
Type of quality
characteristics

linear

concave

convex

The nominal
-the-best

0.36k 2 ja 2

2k 2 2 a 4

k 2 3 (2a 4 +1.44A 2 a 2 )

The larger

kV2

2k 2 2 a 2 (a 2 +2(T-u) 2 8a(T-u)/V2n)
- 2k 2 2 a 2 (a->JT(T-u.)) 2

2k 2 3 a 2 (a 2 +2(T-u-A) 2 8a(T-u-A)/V2ji)
« 2k 2 3 a 2 (a-A/2(T-u-A)) 2

-the-better
The smaller

2k 2 2 a 2 (c 2 +2(n-T) 2 +
8a(T-u)/^2¥)
«2k 2 2 a 2 (a+VT(a-T)) 2

k2^2

-the-better

2k 2 3 a 2 (a 2 +2(u-T-A) 2 +
8a(u-T-A)/V2i)
» 2k 2 3 a 2 (a+V2(n-T-A)) 2

Table 3-5: Relationship Between a 2 m and a 2 for Normally Distributed
Quality Characteristics in a Simplified Form
Type of quality
characteristics
The nominal
-the-best
The larger
-the-better
The smaller
-the-better

linear

concave

0.36kV 2

convex
1.44 k 2 3 A 2 a 2

kV2

4k 2 2 a 2 (T-u) 2

4k 2 3 a 2 ((T-u-A) 2

k2l0-2

4k 2 2 a 2 (u-T) 2

4k 2 3 a 2 (u-T-A) 2

The expected utility value under quality aversion is lower than that
under quality neutral. It means that the consumer is actually more
sensitive to product quality variation. The expected quality value for the
product quality with uniform distribution is the lower bound for the
expected quality value of the product with any other distribution under
quality aversion. The upper bound changes to the expected quality value
of that distribution under the quality neutral.
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C(wu)a < C( Wi ) a < E( Wi ) n

( 3.2.3-25 )

where C(w u ) a _ expected quality value of uniform quality distribution
under quality aversion, $;
C(wj) a _ expected quality value of quality distribution pattern i
under quality aversion, $;
E(wj) n _ expected quality value of quality distribution pattern i
under quality neutral, $;
R u _ the risk premium for uniform quality distribution, $.
The absolute ratio of certainty equivalences for a quality distribution to
uniform distribution under the quality aversion is written as follows

r a = (wH -C( Wi ) a )/(w H -C(wu)a)

( 3.2.3-26 )

Based on the following rules

min(a/c, b/d) < (a + b)/(c + d) < max(a/c, b/d)
1 > a/c, b/d > 0;

( 3.2.3-27 )

d > b; c >a

we can find that
r a = (wH-C(Wi)a)/(wH-C(wu)a) = (w H -E(w i ) n +R i )/(w H -E(w u ) n +R u )
r a < max((wH - E(wj)n)/(wH - E(w u ) n ), Rj/Ru)
Ri/R u = o V a 2 u = 1/3,

1/3 < r n

r a < max(rn, 1/3)
r a < rn

( 3.2.3-28 )
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where r a _ absolute ratio under quality aversion;
r n _ absolute ratio under quality neutral;
E(w u ) n _ expected quality value of uniform distribution for a
product under quality neutral; $;
Ri _ the expected equivalent value of the risk premium for
other distribution patterns, $.
Equation

(3.2.3-28)

characteristics

is valid

regardless

of

the

forms

of

quality

distribution.

For linear quality value function, the simplified calculation equation for
C(wi i n e a r ) a with nomal distribution is

C(w u ) a = (wH + wL)/2 - Ru
C(w l i n e a r ) a = (1- r a /2)w H + (r a /2)(w L - 2RU)
Let

r a /2 = P
C(w l i n e a r ) a = (l-p)w H + p(wL - 2RU)

( 3.2.3-29 )

For concave and convex quadratic quality value functions in nominalthe-best type of quality characteristics with normal distribution, the
simplified computeral equations are, respectively

C(w c o n c a v e ) a = (1 - r a /3)w H + (r a /3)(w L -3R u )

( 3.2.3-30 )

C(w c o n v e x ) a = (1 - 2r a /3)w H + (2r a /3)(w L -3R u /2)

( 3.2.3-31 )

While in the larger-the-better

and the smaller-the-better

quality characteristics, the simplified equations are, respectively
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types of

C(w c o n c a v e ) a = (1 - r a /3)w H + (r a /3)(w L -3R u )
C(w c o n v e x ) a = (1 + 2r a /3)w H - (2r a /3)(w L -3R u /2)

( 3.2.3-32 )
( 3.2.3-33 )

The relative ratio of certainty equivalences for two same functional
products with the same functional characteristics and distribution form
under quality aversion becomes

<*2n ^ <* 2 m

(rnm)a= (wH " C(w n ) a )/(w H - C(w m ) a )

( 3.2.3-34 )

= (rn/rm)a(wH - C(w un ) a )/(w H - C(w um ) a )
= (wH -E(w un ) n + R un )/(w H - E(w um ) n + R um )
Run/Rum =ffVo 2 m.

(^.Ja =

J

From equation (3.2.3-27)
(w H -E(w un ) n +R n )/(w H -E(w um ) n +R m )>
min((w H -E(w un ) n )/(w H -E(w um ) n ), R un /R um ), Run/Rum ^ (rnm)n
v r nm/a — \ r nm/n

where (r n m ) a _ relative ratio under the quality aversion;
(rnm)n - relative ratio under quality neutral;
C(w n ) a _ expected quality value for product n under quality
aversion, $;
C(w m ) a _ expected quality value for product m under quality
aversion, $;
Run -

tne

Rum -

me

risk premium for product n, $;
"sk premium for product m, $.

The relative difference defined in the previous section is revised under
quality aversion.
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° 2 n ^ °2m
(dnm)a = C(w m ) a - C(w m ) a

( 3.2.3-35 )

= E(w m ) n - E(w n ) n + Rn - R m
(dnm)a - (dnm)n

In comparison of the coefficients and the ratios under quality neutral
and

quality aversion, the following results can be obtained
r a < rn

( 3.2.3-36 )

(r n m)a * (rnm)n

( 3.2.3-37 )

(ACQL)a>(ACQL)n

( 3.2.3-38 )

(d m n )a * (d m n)n

( 3.2.3-39 )

Since theoretical deduction can be nicely done under quality neutral,
the above formula can be employed to set the lower and upper bounds
for expected quality value, consumer quality loss, absolute and relative
quality loss ratios, and relative quality difference under quality aversion.
Generally

speaking, the relative

systems (relative ratio and relative

difference for quality loss) are more useful than the absolute systems
(absolute ratio of quality losses). The consumer usually makes his
decision on the basis of comparison of relative quality loss in selection
from a brand of products.
The expected utility value (EUV), average consumer quality loss (ACQL)
and the relative quality loss under risk aversion are shown in Table 3-6
under the assumption that all probability distributions are normal with
the same mean value.

The EUV under risk aversion is smaller than that
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under risk neutral, while ACQL is larger in this situation.

The consumer

is more sensitive to quality variation, such that he will choose the
product which provides the highest utility from a set of
products.

available

Even for the convex quality value function, the degree of

tendency for favoring

larger quality variance under risk neutral is

noticeably reduced in risk aversion.

The relative quality loss indices in

nominal and asymmetric types of quality characteristics are ranked as

v"nm/convex ^ '"nm/linear ^* vanm-'concave

' J.^.J-4U )

while in the larger-the-better and the smaller-the-better types of quality
characteristics, they are in the order

'"nm/concave ^ v"nm/linear ^ vOnnvconcavc
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' •J-^-3-4-1 )

Table 3-6 d n m , EUV and ACQL in Three Types of Quality CharacteristicDistributions

dnm

Nominal
the best

EUV
AOQL

The smaller
the better

d

k

nm

EUV
ACQL

nm

EUV
ACQL
d

The larger
the better

O.Skja+O.lSkV^x)

EUV
ACQL

d

Nominal
the best

WH-O.SkiCX-O.lSk^cr^x)

k l ("n-Hm )+0.5k 2 ! (a 2 n -a 2 m )r(x)
w H -k 1 (T-u)-0.5k 2 1 a 2 r(x)
k 1 (T-u)+0.5k 2 1 a 2 r(x)

dnm

The larger
the better

linear
0.8k 1 (o n -a m )+0.18k2 1 (a2 n -a 2 m )r(x)

nm

EUV
ACQL

l(^n-^m)+0-5k2l(^2n-^2m)r(x)
w H -k 1 (u-T)-0.5k 2 1 o 2 r(x)
k^u-TJ+O.Sk2^2^)
concave
k2(<* 2 n-° 2 m)+k 2 2 (aVa4 m )r(x)
WH-k 2 a 2 -k 2 2 a 4 r(x)
k 2 a 2 +k 2 2 a 4 r(x)
k2(^ 2 n-^ 2 m+(T-u n ) 2 -(T-u m ) 2 )+0.5k 2 2 (a 2 con -a 2 com )r(x)
w H -k 2 (a 2 +(T-u) 2 )+0.5k 2 2 a 2 t o r(x)
k 2 (a 2 +(T-u) 2 )+0.5k 2 2 a 2 m r(x)

EUV
AOQL

k 2 (a 2 n -a 2 m +(n n -T) 2 -(u m -T) 2 )+0.5k 2 2 (a 2 c o n -a 2 ( o m )r(x)
w H -k 2 (a 2 +(n-T) 2 )+0.5k 2 2 a 2 ( O r(x)
k 2 (a 2 +(u-T) 2 )+0.5k 2 2 o 2 ( 0 r(x)

Nominal
the best

dnm
EUV
ACQL

convex
3.8k3(a 2 n -a 2 m ) + k 2 3 [(a4 n -a4 m ) + 0.72A 2 (a 2 n -a 2 m )]r(x)
w H -3.8k 3 a 2 -k 2 3 (a 4 +0.72A 2 CT 2 )r(x)
3.8k3CT2-k23(a4+0.72A2cj2)r(x)

The larger
the better

dnm
EUV
ACQL

-k 3 (a 2 n -a 2 m + (T-u n -A) 2 -(T-u m -A) 2 )+0.5k 2 3 (a 2 c o n -a 2 ( O m )r(x)
w L +k 3 (a 2 +(T-u-A) 2 )+0.5k 2 3 a 2 to r(x)
w H -w L -k 3 (a 2 +(T-u,-A) 2 )-0.5k 2 3 a 2 (0 r(x)

The smaller
the better

dnm
EUV
ACQL

-k 3 (a 2 n -a 2 m +(u n -T-A) 2 -(u m -T-A) 2 )+0.5k 2 3 (a 2 ( o n -a 2 w m )r(x)
w L +k 3 (a 2 +(u.-T-A)2)+0.5k23a2(Or(x)
WH-w L -k3(a 2 +(u-T-A) 2 )-0.5k 2 3 a 2 (0 r(x)

dnm

The smaller
the better
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3.3

Relative Quality Risk Attitude and Price Effect

3.3.1 Relative Quality Risk Attitude and Potential Quality Tendency
In the previous sections, we have discussed the Pratt-Arrow classic
approach on consumer attitude toward quality risk.

It is shown that this

approach can well describe consumer behavior and decision

making

under risk in some situations. Compared with the strength of consumer
quality value function under quality certainty, this classic concept of
consumer attitude toward risk may not be able to explain consumer
behavior clearly in some cases.
Dyer and Sarin [1982] pointed out that von Newmann-Morgenstern
utility function confounded the consumer's risk attitude with the strength
of his preference,

and they proposed

an approach

of relative risk

aversion which was used to separate the effects of risk from strength of
preference in a choice situation.

Although this approach may not be

consistent with Pratt and Arrow's definition of classic risk aversion over
a range, the interest is focused on the relationship between choices under
conditions of risk and certainty.'

As we have shown the results derived in

risk neutral and risk aversion for various types of quality characteristics,
the Pratt-Arrow definition of classic risk attitude may not be appropriate
to describe the inherent tendency of the consumer's product selection. It
should be noted that in nominal-the-best type of quality characteristics,
the consumer is only concerned with quality variance regardless of his
quality value function. Since the quality value function is symmetric in
both sides of the mean value within the domain of actual quality
variation, it violates the assumption of monotonical increase for quality
value function. Thus, the following discussion does not apply to the cases
of nominal-the-best and asymmetric types of quality characteristics.
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We have assumed that both the von Neumann-Morgenstern

utility

function u(w(a)) and the quality value function q(a) are monotonically
increasing in (-a) and continuously higher order differentiable. By using
the coefficient of value satiation defined by Dyer and Sarin, one has
dq(a)/d(-a) = q'(a), d 2 q(a)/d(-a) 2 = q"(a)
m(a) = - q"(a)/q*(a)

( 3.3.1-1 )

m(a) = 0 indicates constant marginal quality value, and m(a) > 0 and
m(a) < 0 correspond to decreasing and increasing marginal quality values
at -a, respectively.
Dyer and Sarin state that an individual acts as relatively risk neutral,
relatively risk aversion, and relatively risk prone, if

m(a) = r(a)

( 3.3.1-2 )

m(a)<r(a)

(3.3.1-3)

m(a) > r(a)

( 3.3.1-4 )

In the above formulas
r(a) = - u"(a)/u'(a)

( 3.3.1-5 )

First, we employ the above definition

to examine the relationship

between the utility and the strength of quality value function in the
classic risk neutral, d 2 u/dw 2 = 0.

For linear quality value function

w = w H - kja
m(a) = r(a) = 0
For concave quality value function
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w = wH - k 2 a 2
m(a) = r(a) = 1/a > 0
For convex quality value function
w = w L + k3(a -A)2

(A £ &)

m(a) = r(a) = -1/(A - a) < 0

Therefore, with respect to the strength of quality value function in
classic risk neutral, the consumer is relatively risk neutral for the above
three types of quality distribution. We further

define

an index of

potential risk tendency for quality value function in the case of relative
risk neutral as follows:

I = 0.5(v(w+h) + v(w-h)) - v(w)

( 3.3.1-6 )

where I - index of potential risk tendency;
v(w) - quality value function, $;
h - small interval of quality value variation around w, $.
Expanding v around w, one has
I = 0.5[v(w) + hV'(w) + h2v"(w)/2 + 0(h3) +
v(w) - hV'(w) + h2v"(w)/2 + 0(h3)] - v(w)
= hV'(w)/2

The quality value function

( 3.3.1-7 )

is defined

to be absolute risk neutral,

potential risk aversion and potential risk taking when the index I = 0, I >
0 and I < 0, respectively, under the condition of relative quality neutral.
For the above case, the linear, concave and convex quality value functions
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are absolute quality risk neutral, potential quality risk aversion and
potential quality risk taking. In Table 3-1, the expected quality value (or
expected utility value) with linear quality value in the larger-the-better
type of quality characteristics (or the smaller-the-better) is related to the
quality

mean value, and not sensitive to product quality

Meanwhile,

the

expected

quality

values

with

both

the

variance.
decreasing

marginal quality value function and the increasing marginal quality value
function are sensitive to the change in both mean values and variances of
quality distributions. In terms of the above definitions the consumer in
this situation is classified as absolute risk neutral, potential risk aversion
or potential risk taking with respect to his relative risk neutral. These
distinctions are not meaningful

in the condition of non-relative risk

neutral, because the utility function may over- or under-componsate the
potential effect of quality value function on the expected utility value.
The above concept can also be used to describe the attitude toward
quality variation among consumers. For instance, the concave quality
function, loosely speaking, can be employed to illustrate the consumer
attitude under quality risk aversion, if the consumer quality

value

function is linear or convex. It would have been nice if it was possible to
have expected quality value depend only on the mean and variance of
the quality distribution. However, it is not the function to describe the
behavior of the consumer quality aversion, if consumer quality value has
the same degree of concavity as the utility function. Therefore, it does not
help to argue that Taguchi's concave loss function is the decreasing risk
aversion case whether for consumer or producer (see Tang and Tang
[1989]).
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In the classic risk aversion case, as can be seen from equations (3.2.35) to (3.2.3-101) in section 3.2.3, r(a) for three types of quality value
functions are as follows
r(a) = - k 1 (3 2 U a /3w 2 )/(8U a /aw)

> m(-a) = 0; for linear

r(a) = 1/a + 2k 2 a(3 2 U a /3w 2 )/(au a /9w)

> m(-a) = 1/a;

for concave

r(a) = -1/(A - a) + 2k3(A - a)(3 2 U a /8w 2 )/(3U a /8w)
> m(a) = -1/(A - a); for convex

Therefore, any concave utility function over the range of quality values
is relative quality aversion for an individual consumer with any of the
three types of quality value functions. If a decision maker employs a
utility function to determine the choice of product, he has to account for
the effect of strength of quality value function on his utility. For example,
quality aversion usually would appear as a decreasing quality aversion
when quality variation decreases, which implies that the degree of
quality aversion and the quality premium decrease as quality improves.
The reason for such an attitude toward quality is that, as the quality
variation

is reduced, the consumer behaviors

become less

sensitive

toward quality risk. Assume that the consumer possesses a decreasing
quality aversion such that

U = ln(2A - a)

A/2 > a

dU/d(-a) = 1/(2A - a)
d 2 U/d(-a) 2 = - 1/(2A - a) 2
r(a) = 1/(2A - a) > 0
If

w = wH -k^a
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r(a) > m(a) = 0
w = wH - k 2 a 2

If

r(a) < m(a) = 1/a
w = wH - k3(A - a) 2

If

r(a) > m(a) = -1/(A - a)

Compared with the strength of quality value function, the consumer is
relative quality risk neutral, relative quality risk prone, or relative
quality risk averse, if his quality value function is linear, concave, or
convex, respectively. We can arrive at similar conclusions in classic risk
aversion without using any specific von Neumann-Morgenstern

utility

function. Any concave utility function in classic risk aversion with respect
to the strength of linear quality value function

illustrates that it is

relative risk aversion. Any concave utility function in the classic sense of
Pratt's definition with respect to the strength of concave quality value
functions

is respectively relative risk neutral if the degrees of two

concave functions are the same, is relative risk averse if the degree of
utility function concavity is higher than quality value function, or is
relative risk prone if the degree of utility function concavity is lower
than quality value function. The same conclusions can be made for the
strength of convex quality value function.
One of the purposes of introducing relative risk attitude is to simplify
the complex problems in practical application without any violation of
basic assumptions about consumer behavior and decision making under
risk.

If we consider the attitude of the consumer's quality aversion as

the major behavior in quality activities, only those utility functions which
possess a higher degree of concavity than the strength of quality value
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function could be considered in the case of relative risk aversion. With
this explanation, Taguchi's loss function may not be adequate to describe
the consumer (producer) behavior under risk aversion.

3.3.2 Price Effect, Price/Quality Substitution and Budget/Quality Dilemma
Price reflects

the product market value in a perfect

condition. The quality discrimination resulting from

competition

quality variation

destroys the implication of unique price for a certain product under
perfect competitive conditions.

If one could buy a product at the price

determined by its quality, no quality discrimination (or quality loss)
would appear. No quality activity without consideration of the quality/
price effect is complete.

The difference in prices among a number of

product brands will definitely

affect

consumer

decision

making on

product quality choice.
Assume consumer utility is a decreasing and convex function of price
such that
U'p(a, p) < 0, U"p(a, p) < 0

( 3.3.2-1 )

Assume that the consumer employs the same utility function to assess
product qualities in a set of products such that a specific utility function
discussion can be ignored.

The consumer's expense in purchasing a

product is actually equal to the product price he paid other than his
budget. The higher the budget, the more products the consumer can
search in a wider price range. If prices for the searched products are the
same, there is no budget saving effect and consumer decision making
only depends on the quality advantage and other product features. The
93

effect of price (or the budget saving effect) cannot be ignored if prices
are not the same. It is observed that the lower the consumer's assets, the
more significant the price effect will be. It is rational to assume that the
consumer becomes decreasingly price averse with higher assets. Budget
saving is negatively related to the price.
The general expected quality utility value, equation (3.2.3-24), is
quoted here again,
V{E[U(x - B(x) + E(w) - R)]} = x - B(x) + E(w) - 0.5o2mr(x)

The following equation is used to establish the indifferent curves of an
individual consumer quality utility. Assuming the consumer assets and
budget are fixed in the short-term, quality information is imperfect but
unbiased, and price and quality deviation are treated as variables, then
U[x + (B(x) - /(p)) + (E(w) - 0.5o-V(x))]
= U[x + (B(x) - /(p) + (w - P - 0.5oV(x))]
= U[x + B(x) - /(p) + /(&)] = U(G)

( 3.3.2-2 )

3U/3G = U'G > 0

au/8p = u,p = -u , G /' p <o
8U/3(-a) = U'a = U' G /' a > 0

u" p <o
U" a <0

( 3.3.2-3 )
( 3.3.2-4 )

dU = U'pdp + U'ad(-a)
Let dU = 0
dP/d(-a) = - uyu-p = / y / ' p
By following the definition made by Cooper [1984], the price/quality
marginal rate of substitution, MRS, is
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MRS p a = dp/d(-a) = - U' a /U' p

( 3.3.2-5 )

where G - function of price and quality deviation, G = A-/(p)+/(&);
/(&)» /(p) - quality and price functions, respectively
and the quality premium, $;
U' a , U'p - the consumer marginal utility of quality and price,
respectively;
/V/'p"

me

marginal value of quality and price functions,

respectively.
Equation (3.3.2-3) indicates that if quality deviation remains constant,
consumer utility decreases with an increase in the product price. The
same conclusion can be made for equation (3.3.2-4) if the quality
deviation increases. Changing p and product quality deviation

(-&)

simultaneously to keep U value no change, we can get an indifferent
curve u1# When both price and quality vary simultaneously along with Uj,
consumer utility does not change. The consumer is indifferent for two
pairs of prices and qualities at the curve Uj. Similarly, we can draw a
group of utility indifference curves under relative quality risk aversion,
such that U! < u2 < u3 < ... < un.
As mentioned in the previous sections, the consumer quality utility is
concave over the range of quality values under relative quality risk
aversion. That is:
d 2 U/dw 2 < 0, d 2 U/d(-a) 2 < 0
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For consistency, assume that consumers have the similar patterns for
price effect on consumer utility as the quality. We have observed that
consumers usually are price averse, which means that consumer utility is
a decreasing function over the price range. The higher the price, the more
the decrease in consumer utility.
Assume utility functions are quasi-concave against quality, the utility
indifference curves which describe the substitution relationship between
the price and the quality is concave toward the origin, shown in Figure 310. The utility indifference curve can be convex or linear. The patterns of
indifference curves depend on the consumer behavior toward quality and
price (see Cooper, 1984). The consumer is indifferent as long as utility
moves along the same curve. When price is constant, the higher the
quality, the better off the consumer, and vice versa.
We now use the following example to explain how a consumer makes a
decision to trade off

price and quality.
p
Po
L A\UI

Pa

\

Ph

V\

\T\

V\\

0

a:2

a-i

a

Figure 3-10 Substitution Between Price and Quality
As shown in Figure 3-10, curves uj, u 2 and u 3 represent an individual
consumer's utility in the order of satisfaction, i.e. Uj < u2 < u 3 . Y and X
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axes represent product price p and quality deviation a, respectively. With
respect to an indifference curve, an individual consumer is indifferent to
paying a higher price for higher quality, or paying a lower price for lower
quality. However, the individual is better off if he buys a higher quality
product but pays the same price. The individual is worse off if he buys
the same quality product but pays a higher price. For example, an
individual wants to buy a TV set. Model A possesses quality deviation &x
and is priced at P a . Point A on the indifference curve u 2 is the utility
provided by model A. Meanwhile, the individual may buy model B at
price P b with quality deviation a l s or model C at price P c with quality
deviation a 2 . Model A is unable to compete with model B in price and to
compete with model C in quality. Obviously, the individual will not buy
model A. He is indifferent to buying model B or model C. The final
decision will depend on his budgetary constraints. If the consumer
budget is less than p c , the consumer will be better off to buy model B
instead of model C.
Therefore, we can derive some strategies of price/quality effects to
influence the costumer's decision making: decreasing the price if other
competitive products have the same quality level or improving

the

quality to gain a competitive advantage. When a producer intends to
increase price and quality simultaneously, he should make sure that the
positive benefit from an increase in product quality would cover or
exceed the negative price effect resulting from price increase. Otherwise
he would face the risk of losing potential customers and market shares in
a

competitive

environment.

A

product

possesses

the

strongest

competitive advantage if it is in the position with the highest quality and
the lowest price among a set of competing products.
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The decision to purchase a product is constrained by the consumer's
budget. The quality utility, with the property of diminishing marginal
utility, implies that consumer satisfaction

from product quality must

increase as the budget allocation increases. A rational consumer seeks to
maximize

his utility resulting

from

product

quality

subject

to his

budgetary constraints. In equation (3.3.2-2), consumer assets are no
longer fixed, but vary over the longer-term. If the assets increase,
consumer indifferent utility curves will be relatively steep compared to
his previous standing, shown in Figure 3-11. Curves u'j, u' 2 , u'3 ...u'j
represent the new individual utility and are ranked in the order of
satisfaction u\ < u'2 < u'3 ... < u',.
There

is

improvement

an
is

interesting

budget/quality

accompanied

with

effect

price

that

increase

when

along

quality
the

new

indifference curve, the consumer is willing to pay a higher price for
quality improvement than before. In other words, the consumer now
pays several extra unit of price to compensate for the gain of a single unit
of product quality. Thus, in this sense, when the consumer's budget
increases, product quality is more important to the consumer than before.
In comparison with previous indifferent curves, there is a point I, the
intersection of two curves, at which consumer utility is independent of
budget change. We call this point I "saturation point." The consumer is
willing to pay a higher price for the product quality above the saturation
point, but would like to pay a lower price for the product quality below
the point I. However, these two families of indifferent curves cannot be
used to describe a consumer quality utility simultaneously. Mussa and
Rosen

[1978],

Cooper

[1984],

Srinagesh

and

Bradburd

[1989]

demonstrated that monopolistic market segmentation is profitable if the
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characteristics of heterogeneous consumers utility can be distinguished
by different product qualities.
If the consumer's budget decreases to the previous level,
utility indifference

the consumer

curve u+ lies between the above two

indifference

curves. In the price range above the saturation point I, the curve u+ is
closer to the curve u corresponding to the lower budget. But in the price
range below the saturation point I, the curve u+ is closer from the curve
u' corresponding to the higher budget. It is called budget-price dilemma.
The unreversed effect, shown in the dark area in Figure 3-12, is called
quality resistance. With the change in the consumer income over time,
the preference of quality/price is changed to higher quality with higher
price and lower quality with lower price. The producer must improve the
product quality continuously to meet the consumer preference change
and compete with rivals in quality, or he may adopt the alternative
strategy to reduce the product price. The product with no change in
quality and price would not gain any advantage in competition and would
be forced out of the market when other conditions would change.
The explanation

for

the budget/price dilemma in practice is that

consumer taste and enjoyment from product quality performance change
in the income-up period. The consumer is no longer the previous
consumer because his taste and expectation for both price and quality are
not the same as before. This dilemma is different

from

the other

phenomena that the outcome is reversible when the conditions change
back to the original state. When the income decreases to the previous
level, the consumer taste and attitude quickly respond to this change in
the range above the saturation point I. Below the saturation point,
consumer response to the change in budget is very slow. This is called
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quality

resistance.

Quality

resistance

may

be used

to explain

the

phenomena that some consumers account for quality effect more than
price effect in the lower price range, but opposite in the higher price
range when their income is down. Therefore, the producer prefers to
adopt the strategy for higher quality with higher price rather than to
decrease quality with lower price from the present quality position,
because the latter is more risky

to him due to consumer

quality

resistance. Quality improvement is always required whether the economy
is booming or is in a recession. In general theoretical development, the
quality indifference curves and analysis correspond to a single period of
time. Hence, the effect of the quality resistance can be ignored. The above
illustration

of substitution

between

price and quality

by using

the

indifference curves is based on the assumptions that other conditions are
kept constant.

Figure 3-11 Relationships Between Price and Quality
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Figure 3-12 Quality Resistance Due to Income Decrease

We define consumers as quality lover, quality neutral and price lover if
the price/quality marginal rate of substitution, MRSpa, is greater, equal,
or smaller than 1. In practice, a linear weight function is employed to
replace

the nonlinear

function

of price/quality

substitution

over a

smaller quality range, such that

MRSpa = dp/d(-a) = - U'a/U'p = / V / ' p
( 3.3.2-6 )

= (1-TI)/TI

where TJ - weight for price effect on product quality selection.
We discuss consumer choice on two products which are different in
price, quality mean values, quality variances and quality

premiums

under risk aversion. (It is easy to expand to n products.) Quality loss is
divided into two parts, one of which is the loss due to product quality
variation and the other due to quality premium.

The consumer searches

for a product from two types of products, based on the criterion of which
product is able to provide higher utility.
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V1{E[U(x-B(x)+E(w1)-R1)]} = x-B(x)+wH-Pi-0.5a(Ol2r(x)

(3.3.2-7)

V2{E[U(x-B(x)+E(w2)-R2)]} = x-B(x)+wH-p2-0.5a(o22r(x)

( 3.3.2-8 )

Pi = / l (81,0-1)

(3.3.2-9)

P2 = /2(8 2 ,a 2 )

(3.3.2-10)

where / ( 8 , a) indicates quality loss from the quality variation which is
related to the difference between the quality target value and the quality
mean, 8, and the quality variance, a 2 . This quality loss is independent of
its location in linear quality value function. The quality premium cannot
be separated into effects of quality mean value and quality variance,
with the exception of the linear quality value function in which the
quality premium is only related to the variance of quality distribution.
Expense equals the price paid. The higher the price, the lower the
consumer utility when other conditions are constant. The budget savings,
a, for these two types of products are, respectively

o^ = B(x) - p!
a 2 = B(x) - p 2
B(x) = max(p!, pj)

( 3.3.2-11 )

where P], p 2 - prices for product 1 and product 2, respectively, $.
We define the product with both higher price and quality as the
superior product, whereas the inferior product is characterized with both
lower quality and price. Since different income groups may be engaged in
product quality search in the same set of products, it is observable that
the higher income group (i.e., more wealthy people) puts less weight on
price effect than the lower income group does in purchasing a superior
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product under budgetary constraints. In contrast, the high income group
may put higher weight on the price for an inferior product. For example,
the upper class people are willing to pay more for a high quality luxury
car, but are willing to pay less than the lower income group for a used
car. The weight for price effect is a function of the consumer's assets and
product quality,
Tl^rKxi)
3TI/3X

1 >ni> 0

(3.3.2-12)

= T]x < 0, rj x " > 0

( 3.3.2-13 )

where T|J - weight of price effect for income group i;
Xj - income and other assets for group i.
The weight for quality effect is (1- T\[). Thus, the consumer utility
function and the difference of the expected utility values, d, for these two
types of products are
U[(x + rj(B(x) - p) + (1 - n)(E(w) - R)]
= E{U[(x + n(B(x) - p) + (1 - TI)W] }

( 3.3.2-14 )

d = V2{[U(x + n(B(x) - P l ) + (1 - n)(E( Wl ) - R^]} V2{[U(x + n(B(x) - p) + (1 - n)(E(w 2 ) - R2)]}

( 3.3.2-14' )

= T|(p2 - P l ) + (1- ri)[p 2 - p! + 0.5r(x)(aco22 - a Ml 2 )]
= T|(P2 " Pl) + (I" Tl)[/2(82, 0-2) - /iCSi, OO +

0Mx)(Pa22-<Sal2)l

If the effects of quality target value differences and the variance on
quality loss can be separated from function / ( 8 , a), the above equation
becomes
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d = ri(p 2 - P O + (1- r|)[/ 2 (8 2 , o2) - / ^ S i , a{) + O ^ x X o ^ 2 - o^ 2 )]
= Tl(P2-Pi)+(l-Tl)[ci(/2(62)-/i(81))+
C2(/2(^2)-/i(Oi))+0.5r(x)(a co2 2 -a £0l 2 )]

( 3.3.2-15 )

where Cj - quality coefficients for quality losses, i=l, 2;
/i(8j) - the quality loss from difference between the mean value
and the target value for product i;
/i(Oi) - the quality loss resulting from quality variance of product

i;
r(x)

-

measurement

of

risk

attitude

toward

risk

for

von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function.
Note

that

the

consumer

total

quality

variance

contains

quality

information uncertainty and inherent product quality variance, as seen in
equation (3.2.1-21).
a 2 = Oi2 + o p 2 ,

The final form of the expected utility value difference is
d = T|(p2 - Pi) + (l-ri)[c l (/ 2 (8 2 )-/ 1 (8 l ))+c 2 (/ 2 (o i2 + c p2 )- fi(pn+ a p l ))
+ 0.5r(x)(oi22 - c u 2 + a p2 2 - o p l 2 )]
= nAp + (1- T])[A/(S) - A/(a) - Ar(x)a 2 J2]
= riAp + (l-Tt)Aq

(3.3.2-16)

where Ap - difference between prices, $;
Aq - difference between quality losses which include quality
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deviation (quality mean and variance) from the target value and
the quality premium, $.
For income group i
di = riiAp + (1- T|i)Aq

( 3.3.2-17 )

This is a very useful equation to capture the consumer's decision
making behavior in the choice of a product.
Based on the implication of equation (3.3.2-17), it is found

that

consumer quality decision making on product selection depends on price,
pattern of deterministic quality value function, consumer budget, quality
variation, quality premium (quality information uncertainty and inherent
product quality variance), and the consumer assets effect. All these
factors, to some extent, influence consumer decision making. Generally
speaking, these influences on consumer decision making can be classified
into two parts, as seen in equation (3.3.2-17), one of which is the price
effect and the other is the quality effect. The quality effect contains the
quality variation

and the quality premium. Equation

(3.3.2-17) also

suggests that a higher price should be compensated by higher quality to
meet consumer's requirements. When d = 0, the consumer is indifferent
for these two types of products.

When d > 0, the consumer is better off

either from price saving or from quality gain, or from both in the choice
of product 1. When d < 0, the consumer is definitely worse off in buying
product 1.
Consumer assets change with time, which depends on the situation of
economic development. When consumer

assets vary, the weight

for

quality/price effects, budgetary limit, consumer quality value function
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and quality premium will be altered. To better understand the time and
consumer assets effects on consumer utility, equation (3.3.2-14) is
rewritten as:
U = U[(x(t)+n(x)(B(x)-p)+(l-Ti(x))(E(w(x, a))-R(x, w))] ( 3.3.2-18 )
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Chapter 4 Consumer Quality Decision Making and

Information

Transformation
4.1 Properties of Consumer Quality Utility Function
In Chapter 3 we developed the consumer behavior under quality
variation and the consumer decision making model on product selection.
In this chapter we will discuss the properties of consumer multi-attribute
quality utility and its application on selection of multi-attribute products.

4.1.1

A Simplified Equation to Calculate Utility Value for Single Attribute

Quality
The expected utility value under quality risk aversion derived in
previous sections can be employed as a basis for mathematical modeling
performed in the following chapters. Since different
different

products provide

utilities for individual consumers, a consumer chooses the

product which provides the highest utility among a set of products.
However, in practice it is difficult to determine the specific form of the
utility function for any given product. Fortunately, we have set up the
general form for expected quality value under quality neutral conditions
and found it to be the lower bound for establishment of the formula in
other instances. If the quality utility function possesses the properties
that

are

continuous

and

higher

order-differentiable,

it

may

be

approximated by a quadratic function in the domain of quality variation
limitation. It should be noted that this local utility function (i.e. quality
utility only) does not account for price effect, consumer budget, quality
information uncertainty, difference in quality target value and consumer
attitude toward risk. Based on the properties of utility function under
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quality aversion, utility function can be expanded by the Taylor series as
follows:
U a = /(w-a)
= /(w) + (-a)/'(w) + (-a)2/"(w)/2! + ... + (-a)n/*(w)/n! + ...( 4.1.1-1 )
The the highest value of the quality utility, U H , can be obtained at a = 0.
If the terms higher than power 2 are ignored, then the above equation
becomes
U a = U H - (a)/'(w) + a 2 /"(w)/2!

( 4.1.1-2 )

E(Ua) = E[UH] - E[(a)/'(w)] + E[(a2)/"(w)/2!]
Using value operator V,
V[E(Ua)] = V(UH) - E(a)V[/'(w)] + E(a2)V[/"(w)/2!]
Under conditions of quality risk aversion
/"(w)/2! < 0
EUV = w H - C!E(a) - c 2 E(a 2 )

(4.1.1-3 )

where EUV - consumer expected utility value, $;
ci, c 2 - coefficients.
The first term in equation (4.1.1-3) is the highest utility value without
quality variation. The second term CiE(a) and the third term c 2 E(a 2 )
represent the quality deviation from the target value, and the quality
premium under quality risk aversion, respectively. For instance, a = Iz E(z)l in nominal-the-best type of quality characteristic distribution with
linear quality value function,
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E(a2) = E(lz - E(z)l2)
= E[(z -E(z))2]
= c2
E(a) = E(lz - E(z)l)
= 0.8a
EUV = w H - CjO.80 - c 2 a 2
Equation (4.1.1-3) is the general form of approximation of expected
quality value for the linear quality value function under quality aversion.
Any specific utility function can be approximately expressed by the
above quadratic

function.

The expected

utility

value under

quality

aversion is always smaller than the expected utility value under quality
neutral.

In other words, the quality loss is larger under quality aversion.

If we substitute the concave quadratic quality value function

into

equation (4.1.1-3), then equation (4.1.1-3) has the following form in
nominal-the-best type of quality characteristics
EUV = w H - C!E(a) - c 2 E(a 2 )

a= (z - n) 2

= w H -C!E[(z - n) 2 ] - c2E[(z - n)4]
Under quality neutral
EUV = wH - CjEftz - u.)2] = wH - CiG2
ACQL = w H - E(w) = c ^ 2

( 4.1.1-4 )

Meanwhile, the average quality utility value loss under quality neutral
in

the

larger-the-better

and

the

characteristics is
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small-the-better

types

of

quality

EUV = wH - C!E[(T - z )2]
= wH-c1[(T-u.)2+o2]
ACQL = Cj[(T - \i)2 + a2]

( 4.1.1-5 )

Taguchi and Taguchi et al. [1984, 1985, 1989] first introduced the
concept of quality loss function, which gave an insight of product quality
variation. The loss function contains a significant economic meaning to
guide

quality

control

activities,

contribution in many applications.

which

has

made

a

tremendous

Equation (4.1.1-4) and

equation

(4.1.1-5) have similar forms as Taguchi's loss functions. Taguchi's loss
functions inform the producers of how much benefit can be gotten from
product

quality

improvement.

However,

there

are

some

significant

differences between Taguchi's loss functions and the consumer quality
loss functions derived in this chapter:
1. Taguchi's loss function is derived from the producer's behavior; it
does not consider consumer behavior completely.
2. Taguchi's loss function is based on concave quadratic quality value
function,

and producer

attitude under quality risk

aversion

is not

considered.
3. Product quality variation results in consumer utility change. No
quality discrimination for the consumer means no loss for the producer.
4. Consumer quality loss function is based on the observable consumer
behavior for quality variation; that is, the consumer pays the same price
but may get different product quality in comparison with the highest
quality other consumers bought.
5. The consumer

assesses quality variation with consumer

quality

value regardless of the producer's cost. Quadratic loss function is a
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simplified function

and is easily employed in practice. However, the

pattern of quality value function has a considerable effect on expected
utility value and consumer quality loss.
6. Quality discrimination is tightly associated with price.
be no quality loss if different

There would

product qualities are associated with

different prices in light of consumer utility function.

Quality activities

are not meaningful without consideration of the price effect.
7. Total quality risk premium includes quality information uncertainty
and inherent product quality variation. Quality information can exert a
positive or a negative effect on reduction of quality risk.
why consumers

This can explain

are willing to pay some premiums to collect and search

quality information before purchasing a product.
8. Consumer quality loss function will underestimate society quality
loss (or gain) because it does not consider the producer's surplus in
quality activity (This will be discussed in Chapter 5). Therefore, consumer
quality loss function underestimates producer loss due to product quality
disadvantage. Taguchi's producer loss function

is not an appropriate

approach to illustrate society quality loss.
9. Consumer quality loss results from quality deviation (mean and
variance) from the target values.

Quality premium is also one kind of

consumer quality loss that results from
under

risk.

Consumer

behavior

under

consumer utility
quality

aversion

adjustment
is

a

more

appropriate approach for most consumers.
10. Consumer attitude toward quality risk is related to product price,
consumer's assets, income level, etc.
consumer

decision

making

under

Quality loss function should describe
various

situations

aversion, quality risk taking and quality risk neutral.)
Ill

(quality

risk

Application of equation (3.3.2-4) on consumer decision in choosing a
product needs sufficient

information, and the quality loss from both

effects of quality mean value and variance differences is confounded in
Neumann-Morgestern
application in practice.

utility

function.

It

limits

equation

(3.3.2-4)

From previous analysis, the linear quality value

function is the simplest form with the following advantages:
1. Price value can be incorporated linearly into quality mean value
function.
2. The quality loss resulting from quality variation is associated with
the mean value of quality distribution, which the consumer can easily
perceive. Quality premium is only related to the quality variance that
reflects consumer attitude toward quality risk.
3. The effects

of quality mean value and variance differences

on

quality loss can be separately computed. The effect of quality information
uncertainty is independent of other factor effects.
4. Any concave utility functions with respect to the strength of quality
value function reflect the consumer's relative risk aversion attitude.
5. Linear quality value function is more conservative than the concave
quality value function in calculation of consumer quality loss, and in
activities of quality improvement within the same quality value domain.
If the specific form of quality value function is unknown for a given
product, linear quality value function can be adopted easily.
6. Some nonlinear quality value functions

can be transferred

into

linear forms.
We use the linear form of quality value function and assume that the
consumer attitude is relative risk aversion. Quality premium is associated
with product quality variance.

Thus, equation (3.3.2-14') is simplified as:
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d = r|(p2 " Pi) + (1- "n)[/2(82> 02) " /i(8i. <*i) + 0.5rCx)(o„22 .
^l(P2-Pi)+(l-Tl)[ki(^i-^2)+0.5r(x)k 2 (o 2 2 -a 1 2 )]

2
a<al

)]

( 4.1.1-6 )

where pj, u.^ and Oj2 - the product price, the quality mean value and the
quality variance for product j , respectively; j = 1, 2.
The quality target value, T, can be written as:
T = n0 + 8

(4.1.1-7)

H0=max(|i2, nO

(4.1.1-8)

Compared with u.0, 8 is very small and can be ignored.
T = u0

(4.1.1-9)

0.5r(x) is assumed constant for an individual consumer and can be set
to 1 without the loss of generality in two product comparison.
Let

k : = p/T

(4.1.1-9' )

p/T = (wH - wL)/A
p/(TA) = (wH - w L )/A 2
k 2 = p/(TA)

( 4.1.1-9" )

d = il(P2"Pi)+(l-Tl)[(p/lio)(^i-^2)+P/(TA)(a22-a12)]

( 4.1.1-10 )

where A - the range of quality variation.
Equation (4.1.1-10) can now be easily employed to evaluate consumer
decision on product selection from a choice of products with different
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prices and qualities. If one has the specific quality value function, utility
function and other information, he should use equation (3.3.2-14') to get
accurate results.
In practice, the consumer usually needs to compare more than two
product qualities. The consumer may set up an ideal product which
possesses a zero quality loss and a price equal to the highest price in a set
of products. Each product is compared with the ideal product, and the
product with the highest utility value, the sum of quality effect and price
effect, will be chosen. Equation (4.1.1-10) becomes
di = H(p - Pi )+(1 - Ti)[(p/Uo)(|ii - u 0 ) - p/(TA)o-i2]

( 4.1.1-11 )

o02=0
where dj - product comparison between product i and the ideal product;
p, u.0, o"o2 " price, quality target value and variance of the ideal
product;
Pi, u.,, Oj2 - price, quality mean value and variance of the actual
product.

4.1.2 Multi-Attributes Quality Utility Function Properties
Consumers measure an overall product quality with subjective quality
attribute values, which may or may not be consistent with the product
component qualities. In microeconomics, utility functions are assumed to
be strictly quasi-concave, differentiable and increasing. Separability and
additive assumptions for utility function are usually the basis for model
establishment. We also employ these concepts in quality economics. A
strong separable quality utility function

and a weak separable utility

function in their argument are written as, respectively
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U = FE/A)]
or

i = 1, 2,..., n

U = FI/tC&L ..., a k ), / 2 (a k + 1 ,..., an)]

( 4.1.2-1 )
( 4.1.2-1')

The rate of quality substitution (RQS) is

RQS = F/'i/F'/'j = /V/'j

( 4.1.2-2 )

A utility function is strongly additive or weak additive if it can be
written as
U = Z/i(a)
or

i = l , 2 , ...,n

U = / ! ( a i , . . . , a k ) + / 2 (a k + 1 ,..., a n )

(4.1.2-3)
( 4.1.2-3')

The additive utility function has the property that all cross partial
derivatives equal zero, i.e.
a 2 U/Oai3aj) = 0

where

( 4.1.2-4 )

U _ the utility function expressed in terms of monetary unit, $;
F, / j _ increasing quality utility function;
aj _ quality deviation for component i, a =/(u,, a 2 );
/ i ( a ) - quality value in terms of quality deviation, $.

Weak separability means that the RQS for pairs of attribute qualities
within the same group are unaffected by attribute qualities outside the
group, while weak additivity means cross partial derivatives for pairs of
attribute qualities in different

groups are zero. Additivity of quality
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utility is a special case of separability. If each of the product quality
components is independent, the overall utilities are either separable or
additive. In many cases the consumer's

overall

utility is a linear

combination of the qualities of each component of the product. Assume
that each product component quality is normally and

independently

distributed. Then, the overall utility is the sum of individual component
qualities.
U = Si/iCAO + s 2 / 2 (a 2 ) + ... + s n / n (a n )

( 4.1.2-5 )

For instance, in the larger-the-better type of quality

characteristics

with linear quality value function, equation (4.1.2-5) has the following
form
U = ISitwHi - k H (Ti - Hi) - k2io-i2]
where

( 4.1.2-6 )

s} - weight for attribute quality i, Xsi = 1;
w

Hi " quality value corresponding to the best attribute quality i,

$;

kjj, k2j - quality loss coefficients, $/unit and $/unit2, respectively;
Tj, Hi and a2

- the target value, mean value and variance for

quality attribute i distribution, respectively.
Equations (4.1.2-3) to (4.1.2-5) imply that the overall quality can be
decomposed

into

a number

of

components

which

are

linearly

or

approximately linearly related to the overall quality. Thus, the overall
quality utility in most cases can be expressed in the additive form. The
utility derived from a product quality is the sum of the utility derived
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from the individual attribute qualities. The marginal quality utility for
attribute

Xi is determined by the quality deviation of xj alone and

independent of the quality of any other attribute. The overall quality of a
product consists of a number of independent component qualities; if
other quality components remain constant, the marginal quality utility
for component x} increases when quality deviation a, decreases.
In some cases, the overall utility function for a product may be a
nonlinear function of the n quality components.

U = F[ X l ( a i ), x 2 (a 2 ), ..., x n (a n )]

( 4.1.2-7 )

A conventional approach usually uses a linear function of the x; in its
domain to approximate the nonlinear function. Assume £1f £ 2 , £ 3 , ... £n are
the nominal dimensions associated with the components x lf x 2 , x 3 , ... x n .
By expanding equation (4.1.2-7) in a Taylor series about £1, £ 2 , £ 3 , ... £ n ,
we obtain the consumer utility over the average
U = Etgfo, fe, $3l ... $n) + S(x, - $i)aF/8xi l a

%2<

53, ... ftn + C}

E[i(xi-^i)aF/axii41i^^...^] = o

where C represents the higher order terms. Neglecting the terms of
higher order, then

U-Efgfo.Sjs,^,...^)]

(4.1.2-8)

For example, if U = E(yz) in the larger-the-better type of quality
characteristics with linear quality value function
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U = E[g($ 1 ,$ a ,S 3 ....Sn)]
= (wHy - ACQLy)(wHz - ACQL2)
= [wHy " k l y (T y - Hy) - k 2 y a y 2 ][w H z - k l z (T z - \iz) - k 2 z a z 2 ]
( 4.1.2-9 )
If the attribute or component qualities can be substituted with each
other, the overall utility is either separable or weakly separable. Some
nonlinear separable utility functions
additive forms

without difficulty.

can be transformed
Therefore,

producers

into linear
are able to

distinguish how much each of the attribute qualities affects the consumer
overall quality utility.
For some special quality assessment, the weak separable and weak
additive definition for consumer quality utility may be used to expose
the relationship between the overall utility and the individual attribute
qualities. For instance, the utility resulting from a reliable system quality,
or a uniform quality control system, may have the following forms

or

U = F[min(a lf ..., a k ), max(a k+1 ,..., a n )]

( 4.1.2-10 )

U = Ul + U2 = Ssi/jC&i) + min(a k+1 ,..., a n )

( 4.1.2-11 )

The system quality or subsystem quality does not depend on the sum
of individual component quality, but on the worst component quality (or
the best component quality) in the system. In quality utility systems, if
component

or

attribute

qualities

are

not

substituted

with

or

complemented by each other, they are called quality independent. The
component or attribute qualities which can satisfy the same need of the
consumer show up to have the property of quality substitution, while the
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component or attribute qualities that are used jointly to satisfy some
particular needs of the customer are said to have the property of quality
complement. Since consumer utility functions are derived from consumer
behavior, the above utility-based relationship of attribute qualities may
or may not be consistent with the relationships among these component
or attribute qualities found in quality engineering. In order to satisfy
consumer

requirements,

quality

control

activities

should

consumer information on product quality evaluation into

combine

engineering

and economic quality design.

4.2 Consumer Utility Improvement in Two Attribute Qualities
4.2.1 Relationship between Two Attribute Qualities
A product usually consists of a number of components or attributes.
The quality component approach proposes that change in

consumer

utility due to quality improvement could be equally transferred from the
overall product quality to a number of component or attribute qualities.
For instance, when an individual wants to buy a TV set, he evaluates the
TV's quality based on a number of attribute qualities which can be
observed and easily evaluated, such as color fidelity, sound, picture
clarity and convenience of operation. An improvement in any one of
these attribute qualities may affect consumer decision making.
We will discuss the properties of two attribute qualities in detail to get
an insight into how the product quality can be improved in the most
efficient

and economic way. The two-attribute quality/price

decision

model can be expanded to more complicated cases. If two attribute
qualities are independent, an improvement in any attribute quality will
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make the consumer better off. The amount of increase in consumer utility
is
AU = AU2 + AVl
= As 1 /(a 1 ) +As 2 /(a 2 )
= si[/(& n ) - /(a 1 2 )] + s 2 [/(a 21 ) - /(a 2 2 )]

( 4.2.1-1 )

where AU _ gain in consumer utility due to quality improvement, $;
AUj _ utility increase from improvement in attribute quality i , $;
Sj _ weight for attribute quality i, Xsj = 1;
&u _ attribute quality i deviation from its target value before
quality improvement, unit;
a i 2 _ attribute quality i deviation from its target value after
quality improvement, unit;
In equation (4.2.1-1), the consumer assigns the weights for the two
attribute qualities. As mentioned before, different people give different
weights for various attribute qualities, based on their preference of
attribute qualities. However, the weight distribution for product attribute
qualities is assumed to be the same for a homogeneous group. If
producer knows the information

the

on consumer quality preference, he

ought to pay more attention to the improvement of the level of the
attribute quality that consumers are more concerned with. It should be
noted that there is no substitution between the two attribute qualities
under quality independence assumptions. Although the utility may be
constant when the two attribute qualities change simultaneously, it does
not imply that there is a substitution between them.
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If an increase in the overall quality utility depends on a simultaneous
improvement in both attribute qualities, an increase only in one attribute
quality

does

complement.

not improve consumer
A typical fixed

quality

utility. This is called
complement

for

two

quality
attribute

qualities is shown in Figure 4-1. The utility indifferent curves are no
longer the smooth quadratic convex curves, but straight lines with a 90°
angle toward the origin. Simultaneous improvement in both attribute
qualities could improve consumer utility, and the most efficient way is
along the fixed proportion line OO' whose slope equals the ratio of the two
attribute

inherent

relationship,

qualities 1 and 2 were a n

Sj/s 2 . Assume that original

and a 2 1 ,

respectively,

which

attribute
provided

consumer utility U ^ Attribute quality 1 now changes from a n to a 1 2 , but
attribute quality 2 still stays at a 2 1 . The consumer utility is still on Uj at
which the consumer feels no better off. If and only if attribute quality 2
changes in corresponding to the improvement in attribute quality 1 from
a 2 1 to a 2 2 , the consumer utility will increase, and the increment amount
of the utility depends on the lower attribute quality in these two
attribute qualities. The increased amount of consumer quality utility is

U = min(/1(al)/sl,/2(a2)/s2)
AU = min(AU2,AU!)
= min [/i(& n - & 12 )/si, / 2 (&2r ^22)/s2]
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( 4.2.1-2 )
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Figure 4-1 Complement Quality Properties
The above relationship between attribute quality and overall quality is
quite important in quality control, especially for a reliable system and for
the product with symmetrical characters, such as a pair of shoes. For
example, the overall quality of a turbine blade is evaluated on the one
blade which has the worst quality among the blades. Other blades with
higher quality do not contribute anything to the overall quality of the
turbine. This situation often requires a uniform quality control over all
attributes in the product (or all attributes in a subsystem) to satisfy the
consumer. More engineering and economic resources should be pooled
into the lowest attribute quality to improve the whole system quality.
If two attribute qualities have quality substitution property based on
the diminishing law of marginal utility, any quality increase in one
attribute can be realized by the quality decrease in another attribute. One
could find an optimal combination of two attribute qualities to maximize
consumer utility if other conditions remain unchanged. Figure 4-2 shows
that if attribute quality 2 is increased from a 2 2 to a 2 1 while reducing the
quality in attribute 1 from a 12 to a ^

the overall product quality does not

change. However, the consumer quality utility does not achieve the
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optimal point if the weights assigned for different quality attributes are
not considered. Consumers try to maximize their overall utility by
substituting the two attribute qualities, then
dU = s l d/ 1 (a l ) + s 2 d/ 2 (a 2 ) = 0
( 4.2.1-3 )

d/i(a1)/d/2(a2) = -s2/s1

The point (an, a 23 ) in the overall quality indifferent curve is optimal to
meet the consumer requirement. This is the most efficient

way to

maximize consumer quality utility for two attributes i and j by adjusting
the substitution rate equal to the weight ratio of Sj/Sj.
A special case, in which the substitution indifference curves between
the two attribute qualities are no longer quadratic, but straight lines, is
shown in Figure 4-3. If the weights are known, the corner solution would
be obtained. This quality preference shows that consumer utility largely
relies on one attribute quality when the other sacrificed attribute quality
is reduced to an acceptable quality level.
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Figure 4-2 Two Attribute Qualities with Substitution
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Figure 4-3 Two Attribute Qualities with Fixed Substitution
4.2.2 Comprehensive Decision Model and Price/Quality Decision Table
Since the overall quality utility is usually in the forms of separability
and additivity for individual attribute qualities, an evaluation model to
illustrate

how

the consumer

makes

a decision

on product

quality

selection can be set up. The Lancaster attribute approach cannot be
directly applied in the evaluation model for these reasons: (1) The quality
deviation

from

the target value possesses

a pattern

of

probability

distribution. (2) The relationship between price and quality is usually
nonlinear. (3) The implicit price is not an adequate index to measure the
value of individual

attribute quality. We develop

a comprehensive

quality attribute approach (CQAA) which uses consumer expected quality
loss to capture the consumer evaluation of the product with multiple
attribute qualities.
The consumer decision making in purchasing a TV set is used as an
example to illustrate how the CQAA works. There are three TV models, A,
B and C. Two TV attribute qualities are evaluated, picture clarity and
lifetime. The former is expressed in terms of levels from 1-8 and the
latter in hours. As seen in Table 4-1, these three models have the same
quality mean values but different quality variances.
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Table 4-1 Quality Data for Three TV Models
Model
A
B
C

Price/Unit
300
295
305

Clarity
8 ± 0.2
8 ± 0.6
8 ± 0.6

Lifetime
16000 ± 300
16000 + 600
16000 ± 300

As mentioned before, the budget should equal the highest price in the
set of products under consideration. In this case the consumer budget
equals $305, the price of model C. If the consumer is typically a money
saver (rj =1), he would choose model B, whereas if he is a perfect quality
lover (T| =0), he would select model A. But the consumer usually makes his
decision in light of his weight distribution for price and quality as well as
weights for various attribute qualities.
Generally,

a product

possesses

a feature

with

three

dimensions,

quantity, quality and image index. The quantity dimension includes price,
component unit and product functions. The quality dimension contains
the quality target values and quality variations for various attributes.
The image dimension, which is assumed independent of consumer assets,
consists of color, shape and fashion which are difficult to measure in
terms of physical units. In order to avoid biased estimates for weight
assignment for price/quality effect,

it is necessary first to evaluate

weight distribution for these three dimensions and then evaluate weights
in the subsystems for each dimension.
The following matrices are used to demonstrate the weight distribution
for

a

product.

The

comprehensive

125

weight

matrix

consists

of

a

price/quality/image

weight

submatrix. Mathematically,
W

submatrix

and

an

attribute

weight

it is

lx(l+n+m) = Mlx3A3x(i+n+m)

( 4.2.2-1 )

where W _ comprehensive weight matrix;
M _ price/quality/image weight matrix;
A _ attribute weight matrix;
n, m - the numbers of quality attributes and image index
attributes, respectively.
Matrix M is related to the consumer's assets level which determines his
attitude

toward

the

product

price,

quality

risk

and

image

index

preference, and has the following form

M h 3 =(s p , sq, s^

(4.2.2-2)

where s p , s q , Sj - weights for price effect, quality effect and image effect,
respectively; sp+ sq+ sj= 1.
From equation (3.3.2-6)

sp/( sp + sq) = n, sq/( sp + sq) = 1 - rj

( 4.2.2-3 )

Matrix A represents the degree of consumer preference for various
attributes in quality and image index and is relatively fixed with respect
to the weight assignment for product attributes from various groups of
people. Matrix A has the following pattern:
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11 0 0 ... 0 o ... o o\
0 s ql s q2 ...s qn 0 ... 0 0
0 0 0 ... 0 0 snsi2simJ
l+n+m
j=l

One assumes that there are no differences in product functions and
image index among the three models. The consumer is a "quality
preferrer" and his weight distribution for price/quality is 0.3/0.7. The
weights for attribute quality are 0.4 for clarity and 0.6 for lifetime,
respectively. Then the matrix W is :
(0.3 0.28 0.42) = (0.3 0 . 7 ) (

0 04

06

)

The comprehensive evaluation model for these three TV models is

Wxk = W i x ( i + n + m ) Q ( i + n + m ) x k
=

M

lx3A3x(l+n+m)Q(l+n+m)xk

( 4.2.2-4 )

where C _ comprehensive evaluation matrix;
Q _ single factor effect matrix, including price effect, quality effect
and image index effect;
k - the number of products under consideration.
The consumer will choose the product which has the highest value of
the comprehensive effect. The criterion, D, is defined as :

D = max(C!, C 2 ,..., Ck)

( 4.2.2-5 )
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In matrix Q the first row is the price effect, the next n rows are for
quality effects with n attributes and the last m rows are for image effects
with m attributes. The number of columns, k, corresponds to the number
of products in searching. The pattern of matrix Q is

/

Pel.l

Pel,2

Pel.k

ACQL 2 1
ACQL 3il

ACQL 2 , 2
ACQL 3i2

ACQL 2 , k
ACQL 3tk
ACQL (n+1)k

ACQL (n+1)1 ACQL (n+1)2
I (n+2),2
(n+2).l
(n+3),l

I(n+m+l),l

I(n+2).k

C

(n+3).2

!(n+3),k

I(n+m+l),2

l(n+m+l),k

\

In the real world

\

I

there are no products with exactly

the same

functions, prices and qualities. In quantity dimension, the consumer
compares the product functions

with a common ideal product. The

functions that a product possesses but the ideal product does not should
be measured in terms of monetary value and then deducted from the
product price.

The total extra function cost, fc, is

( 4.2.2.-6 )

fc = XCi

where c } - cost for extra function i, $; i = 1, 2, ..., n. fc is not necessarily
equal to the real manufacturing costs.
The actual price effect is
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Pej = Ph " Pj " fcj

4 2 2

- - "7 )

(

where pej - the actual price effect for product j , $;
p h - the highest price in the set of products under consideration, $;
Pj - the actual price of product j , $;
fCj - the total extra function cost for product j , $.
Similarly, the image index cost can be determined by the following
formula
L

Ii=(XCij)/L

j=l,2

L

j=1

( 4.2.2-8 )

where ii - the average image cost for attribute i, $;
Cjj - the cost for image attribute i assigned by income group j , $.
The equation employed to compute the average consumer quality loss
under quality aversion is
ACQLj = -I[k li (H 0i - Hji) + k2ia2ji]

( 4.2.2-9 )

For two quality attributes
ACQLj = - k n (Hoi - Hji) - k 2 ia 2 j! - k12(Ho2 - Hj2> " k22<*2j2
i = 1, 2, ..., n; j = 1, 2, ..., k.
where k 1 5 _ quality loss coefficient for the difference between the
quality mean value and the target value for quality attribute i,
$/unit;
k 2i _ quality loss coefficient for the total quality premium for
attribute i, $/unit2;
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Hoi _ the highest quality mean value for attribute i, unit;
Hoi = max(Hn, Ha - . Hkn)Generally, the quality loss coefficient for the total quality premium is
determined in equation (4.1.1-9")

k 2 i=Ph/(HoiAi)

(4.2.2-10)

where p h _ the highest price in the set of available products, $;
Aj _ specification for product quality attribute i, deviation unit;
Hoi - the largest mean value for attribute i for three products, unit.
In practice, equation (4.2.2-10) should be modified to fit the specific
case. When the attribute quality i must be within the specification, or the
product is defective (or nonconforming), the quality loss coefficient is
determined

by
k2i=ph/Ai2

( 4.2.2-11 )

When the attribute quality i is measured in terms of levels or degrees,
the coefficient is
k 2 i=Ph/(LoiAi 2 )

(4.2.2-12)

where Loi - the highest level value for attribute i for these products, unit.
In the above example
k n = p h /L 01 = 305/8 = 38.125
ki2 = Ph/u-02 = 305/16000 =19.06
k 2 i = Ph/( L oi A 2 i)=

305

/(8 x 36) = 38.125/36 = 1.059
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k22 = Ph/(Ho2A2)= 305/(16000 x 600) = 0.000032
The price and quality effects are shown in Table 4-2.
Table 4-2 Calculation for Quality Loss and Price Saving
Model
A
B
C

P
5
10
0

ACQLJ
-0.471
-1.88
-4.236

ACQI^
-0.32
-1.28
-0.32

Substituting the weights the data in Table 4-2 into equation (4.2.2-4),
we have
C = WQ
D = max(1.23 1.94

-1.32)

The highest value in the comprehensive evaluation matrix is 1.94, and
model B is chosen from these three TV sets. If one is more interested in
the effect of consumer net worth on consumer decision making, it is
possible to decompose the comprehensive evaluation matrix

C into two

submatrices

C = MAQ = (0.3 0.7)

5
10
0 ]
-0.38 -1.52 -1.89 )

If the weight for the price effect changes gradually from 1 to 0, spaced
by 0.1, we can draw a quality/price decision table, shown in Figure 4-4.
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PV

QL

Figure 4-4 Price/Quality Decision Table for Example 1
In Figure 4-4, the horizontal axis, from the left to the right, indicates an
change in the weight of the quality effect from 0 to 1. The left vertical
axis and the right vertical axis represent the price effect and the quality
effect, respectively. They are two extreme cases. The lines that connect
the two values in the price effect axis and the quality effect axis, such as
AA', BB1 or CC, represent the product position in consumer decision
making. For example, model B dominates the other two models in the
range of weight ratio for price/quality effects from

1:0 to 0.19:0.81.

However, if the consumer weight ratio for price/quality effects is less
than 0.19:0.81, model A is superior to the other two models and will be
chosen. If a product is superior to the other products, its price/quality
decision line is above other decision lines. If two lines intersect, it shows
which line is superior to another in what range. Line AA' and line BB'
intersect at point d which corresponds to the weight ratio 0.19:0.81 for
price and quality effects. At this point, a consumer is indifferent to
models A and B. Before point d, the consumer prefers model B to model
A, and after point d, the consumer prefers model A to model B. The
consumer selection depends on the price/quality weight ratio assigned.
Model C would not be selected regardless of the consumer's preference
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for the price/quality effects. Model C cannot compete with either models
A or B in price or in quality and would be forced out of the market. It
should be noted that the above conclusions derived from the present
conditions will be no longer valid if these conditions are changed.
Since the differences in price for the three models are not considerable,
it is expected that the weight assignment for price/quality effects for a
majority of consumers would be in favor of model A. This could lead to
the conclusion that quality improvement will incentive consumers to
choose the product with higher quality when the prices of alternatives
are almost the same. If the improvement in product quality is very
difficult in current levels of technological and economic development, the
lower price strategy may be adopted to affect consumer decision making
on a product choice.
Now we will discuss the case with significant differences in both
product quality effect and price effect and see how the price/quality
decision table and the CQAA model work. Suppose that three alternatives
of production/market strategies can be adopted. Producer A has a good
market share and does not want to change the price and the quality of
model

A.

Producer

B adopts

the

strategy

of reducing

the

price

significantly from $290 to $250 to attract consumers to his product.
Producer C cannot change his higher production cost margin to sell model
C at a lower price and hopes to increase product quality to gain the
competition's advantage in quality. As a result of this strategy, both the
price and the quality for model C increase considerably. The new data are
listed in Table 4-3.
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Table 4-3 New Data for the Three TV Models
Model
A
B
C

Price/Unit
300
250
370

Clarity
8 ± 0.2
8+0.4
10 ± 0.3

Lifetime
16000 ± 300
16000 ± 600
18000 ± 300

Remote Control
the same as before
the same as before
more functions

The highest effective price is p e = the highest market price - extra
remote control function cost = $370 - $20 = $350. If the Lancaster
attribute approach is applied to the consumer decision of selection of
three TV sets, obviously model B would be chosen again because its
attributes are superior. The CQAA is employed to evaluate these three
models again. The quality/price weight assigned is 0.7/0.3 and the
weights

for

attribute

qualities

are

the

same.

The

overall

weight

distribution matrix, W, is
W = (0.3 0.28 0.4 )
M = ( 0.3 0.7 )
1 0
0
A

-(

M

~ V 0 0.4 0.6 '

The quality loss coefficients are determined by the following equations
k n = Pel/Hoi = 350/100 = 35
ki2= Pei/H02 = 350/18000 = 0.01944
k 21 = k n / 3 6

= 0.972

k 2 2 = k 12 /600 = 3.2 x 10-5
The price effect and the quality effect are listed in Table 4-4.
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Table 4-4 Data for Quality and Price Effects
Model
A
B
C

PV
50
100
0

ACQLj

-70.65
-71.30
-0.97

ACQL2
-39.20
-40.16
-0.32

The comprehensive evaluation matrix C is

D = max(-21.25 -6.83 -0.41)

Model C is selected from

these three products. The price/quality

decision table is shown in Figure 4-5.

-100

PV

QL

Figure 4-5 Price/Quality Decision Table for Example 2
Line C C

almost overlaps the horizontal axis (quality/price

weight

distribution) and intersects line BB' at d that corresponds to weight
0.66/0.34 for quality/price effects. Before point d, model B dominates the
other two models; after point d, model C is selected. The advantage in
lower price or in higher quality are weighed by the consumer on the
basis of his preference. Products with neither price advantage nor quality
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advantage cannot compete with other products, whereas products with
both price and quality advantage will offer the strongest competition
with other rivals.
In the above example, the consumer budget should reach $350 so that
the consumer evaluation for these three models can be carried out. The
benefit from the quality/price increment strategy is considerable in the
higher price/quality market section. This strategy significantly

changes

the position of model C, because model C could not compete with both
models A and B in the previous production/market situation. Therefore,
the advantage in quality improvement is very powerful for producers.
Model B in the short-term is still strong in market share competition.
However, in the long-term its advantage in lower price would be offset
by the lower quality because consumers will look for higher product
quality with increases in their incomes. Any improvement in product
quality for model B will strengthen its advantage. The strategy of no
change in both quality and price has weakened model A's competitive
ability.

4.2.3

The Effects

of Budget, Weight

Distribution

and

Information

Availability on Consumer Decision Making
It should be pointed out that no comparison between the conclusions
derived from the first example and the second example in the above
section can be made. This is because the budgetary constraint has been
changed from $305 to $350.

One cannot say that producer C's strategy is

superior to producer B's strategy without consideration of constraint
conditions.
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The budget effect on searching for a product in the separated market
sections is observable and considerable. A consumer's budget is a
function

of

his assets (see equation

(3.2.3-11)). The

total

budget

distribution of the population has a pattern similar to the national income
distribution. Assume that the budget for the above examples of three TV
sets follows a normal distribution, i.e., B(x)

M

N(H, a 2 ) with \i = 300 and o 2 =

1600.
The differences in the prices in the first example (see Table 4-1) is so
small that the consumer is able to adjust his budget to the highest price
to search for a desired product. However, the whole market in the second
example is separated into three sections corresponding to the significant
differences in prices for the three products. The consumer is unable to
make a budget adjustment to search for products in higher price sections
and only searches for the products whose prices are equal to or less than
the budget.

Thus, the budget effect

on product searching in the

separated market sections can be defined in a column matrix as follows

B,

Si
S2

Pj < B < P j + 1
Pj+1 < B < Pj+2

where B e - a column matrix determined by the budget effect on product
searching;
i - number of sections of market separation, i = 1, 2, ..., L; L < k;
Pj - price of product j , Pj « Pj+i; j = 1, 2, .... k;
Si - probability of consumers searching for products in market
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section i.
In equation (4.2.3-1)

Ss^i
i=l

Si = l - Z { ^ - ^ } - £ S t
CT

t=i+l

where Z(x) - cumulative standard normal distribution.
For the first example
Sj = 1 - Z(295-300/40) = 1 - 0.435 = 0.565
B e = ( 0.565 )
For the second example
Sj = 1 - Z(350-300/40) = 0.105
5 2 = 1 - Z(300-300/40) - Sj = 0.395
5 3 = 1 - Z(250-300/40) - Sj - S 2 = 0.395
'0.395'
B e = 0.395
\0.105

The potential market increases from 0.565 in the first example to 0.895
in the second example, which is the result of the budget effect on product
searching in the separated market.
The product

searching

in the separated

market is based

on the

following important assumptions: (1) the differences in product prices are
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significant; (2) consumers maximize their total utility subject to their
budgetary constraints; and (3) the quality information is totally available.
The consumer weight distribution is determined by consumer attitude
toward quality risk and the consumer's assets. The greater the assets, the
higher the weight for quality effect. One can estimate the market share of
various products under the conditions that the quality information is
perfect and completely available. Different income groups give different
weights

for

quality/price

effects.

The

weights

possess

a

certain

probability distribution pattern which can reflect the consumer's assets
and the price difference effect on the distribution shape. In the first
example the price differences

are quite small, such that the weight

distribution for price/quality effects does not widely spread. However, in
the second example, the price differences

are significant so that the

pattern of weight distribution, both the mean and the variance, is shaped
by the price difference. That is
S _ D[H=/(dp), o2=g(dp)]

( 4.3.2-2 )

where S - weight assignment for price/quality effects;
D[H,O"]

- weight distribution pattern;

dp - price difference.
Assume that the weight distribution follows a Weibull distribution in
the following form
p-i

m-*\—\

/ ,

>p-iN

exp|<
s>Y
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( 4.2.3-3 )

where y - the location parameter, 0 < y < 1;
8 - the scale parameter, 8 > 0;
P - the shape parameter, p > 0;
s - weight variable.
The mean and the variance of the Weibull distribution are, respectively
H = Y +8r(l + 1/P)

( 4.2.3-4 )

a 2 = 82[ T(l + 2/p) - T(l + 1/P)2]

( 4.2.3-5 )

where T(-) - gamma function.
The Weibull distribution is very flexible, and by appropriate selection
of the parameter y, 8 and P, the distribution can assume a wide variety of
shapes, y represents the bias of weight distribution toward the quality
effect. The smaller the value of y, the higher the weight for quality effect.
8 and P are related to the price effect. The larger the differences in
product price, the bigger the values of 8 and p. Thus, the mean value
moves toward the price effect side, and the variance of the Weibull
distribution is expanded widely. The cumulative Weibull distribution is

F(d) = 1 - exp[-((d - Y)/8)P]

( 4.2.3-6 )

where d - intersection point for the two product price/quality decision
lines, as seen in Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5. F(d) is the cumulated
probability for the weight distribution for the quality effect.
The market section share percentage matrix F is
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Fl.lN
F2.l(di)

F ^ F ^ d i ) . . Fj^dj^-FjJdJ
F2>5(d2}-F2i](d1).. F ^ ^ j - F ^ d j

...l-Fj,^
...l-F,,^

Fi.i{di)

F^daJ-F^dJ..

Fy^dj^jdj

... l - F ^

Fu'lfdi)

F ^ F ^ ) . .

FLJ+4dj+])-FLjdJ)

... 1-F^d,)

where Fj(dj) - cumulated probability for intersection point j in market
section i, j=l, 2, ..., k; i=l, 2, ..., L.
The total potential market share matrix, T p , is
(Tp)ixk = (Be)TixL (F) Lxk

( 4.2.3-7 )

Assuming that y= 0, P =1 and 8 = 0.1 (actually, the Weibull distribution
becomes the exponential distribution with parameter 1/8) for Example 1,
the percentage of total consumers who prefer quality effect to price
effect in product searching

is

F(d) = 1 - exp(-0.19/0.1) = 0.85
The total potential market share is
T p = 0.565 ( 0.85, 0.15, 0 )
= (0.48, 0.085, 0 )
The actual market share, T a , is
T a = ( 0.85, 0.15, 0 )
Therefore, models A, B, and C share 85%, 15% and 0% of the actual
market, respectively. For Example 2, assume Y = 0, P = 1.5 and 8 = 0.25 for
market section 1 (d=0.34/0.66, $350 < Bj), and y= 0, p = 1 and 8 = 0.2 for
market section 2 (d=0.022/0.978, $300 < B 2 < $350). The matrix F is
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F=
0

0.205 0.795

The total potential market share and the actual market share are,
respectively
T

P = (B e ) T F = ( 0.04, 0.772, 0.083 )

T a = ( 0.044, 0.863, 0.093 )
Compared with the Tp and Ta in Example 1, the strategy of price
reduction adopted by producer B not only gains the potential market
section of lower income groups, but also strengthens its competition
against other rivals. The strategy of quality improvement employed by
producer C makes model C share 9.3% of total actual market. It expects
that model C will show its advantage in quality competition when
productivity and people's incomes move to a higher level. The strategy of
no change in both price and quality for model A would lead to the loss of
a large part of the previous market share. However, the kind of strategies
that ought to be used also depends on a firm's long-term goal.
All the above analyses are based on the assumption that the quality
information is totally available. The procedures in consumer decision
making are deterministic. In an imperfect world, consumers often face
information uncertainty in decision making due to imperfect and biased
(or unbiased) information

sources

as well

as unobservable

product

the total quality variance contains

quality

quality.
In equation

(3.2.1-21)

information uncertainty which affects consumer estimation of inherent
product quality. In order to reduce the total quality risk, the consumer is
willing to pay an information premium to assess the information sources.
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If quality information is obtained by a consumer's search, the cost of the
search is equivalent to the increase in price. Whether the consumer
benefits

or not from

information

the price increase resulting from

the quality

cost depends on the amount of price increase and the

information quality. If a signal does not change an individual's state of
knowledge, it will not qualify as information. Information only has value
if it results in some change in the actions to be taken by a consumer. In
imperfect competition, the information available is not perfect, but offers
the positive potential to reduce the uncertainty associated with product
quality.
The beliefs of a consumer can be changed if the consumer receives a
signal

containing information. Bayes' theorem provides a formal model

for revising probabilities on the basis of the new information. It is
usually very difficult for consumers to get perfect information to help
them

make decisions. We use Bayes' theorem of prior information to

study the experience of consumer satisfaction for a product. The derived
posterior distribution is used to compute a new set of probabilities of a
choice from these products. The information premium for the consumer,
in general , is

Q = (l-ri)Ri
Specifically in this case
Q = ©(Ip'jWi - SpiWi)

( 4.2.3-8 )

where Q - quality information premium, $;
co - degree of consumer attitude toward quality information
uncertainty,

co = 1, risk neutral, co > 1, risk aversion;
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p'i - the posterior probability revised by the imperfect
information;
Pi - the probability of prior information.
For the first example of the three TV sets, assume that the consumer
makes his decision based on the information provided by the consumer
who is satisfied by the product bought. Table 4-5 shows the collected
information about consumer satisfaction for these three products.
Table 4-5 Consumer Satisfaction for Three Products
A
0.6
0.3
0.1

Completely Satisfied
Fairly Satisfied
Unsatisfied

B
0.8
0.2
0

C
0.3
0.4
0.3

The survey in column 1 indicates that for sales of product A, 60% of the
consumers said they were satisfied, 30% of the consumers were fairly
satisfied, and 10% of the consumers were unsatisfied by the product. If
such information

were not available, the consumer's decision

would

depend on the product market share in a general sense (not a specific
consumer is mentioned here): 30% of the market shares for product A,
60% for product B and 10% for product C. By using the information based
on consumer surveys, the probability of satisfaction from these products
is
p'i(product i/satisfaction) = Pi(satisfaction/product
/Zpi(satisfaction/product

i)pj(product i)

i)p{(product i)

The p'(product i/satisfaction) for product A, B and C is 0.26, 0.696 and
0.043 respectively. The information premium is
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Ci = co(Sp'iWi - IpiWi)
= co[1.17(0.26-0.3) + 2.07(0.696-0.6) - 1.32(0.043-0.1)]
= 0.227co

If the consumer can get a set of imperfect information sources which
could provide the same qualitative and quantitative information,

the

quality information premium is

max( C l5 C 2 , ..., Q, ..., C n ) < ©(Ip'jWj - ZpjWj)

( 4.2.3-9 )

The consumer would select the information source whose cost is
Ci = min( Cj, C 2 , ..., Cj, ..., Cn )

( 4.2.3-10 )

For a new product, the consumer will use his subjective

quality

preference (i.e., likelihood probability in Bayes' theorem) for the products
he bought before adjusting the prior probability. The subjective quality
preference reflects the quality credit of a company's products and the
consumer quality reputation. This subjective quality assessment would in
high probability reduce consumer information

uncertainty.

Therefore,

producers should provide quality information as much as possible for
consumers

to penetrate

producers introduce

the consumer

subjective

quality

a new product to the market,

or

barrier,

if

significantly

improve the quality of the product that already exists in the market.
Furthermore, the consumer would use the warranty provided by the
producer to reduce the quality uncertainty for a new product. The
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warranty offers consumers an opportunity to make comparisons for the
products newly introduced into a market.
When

quality

information

is

provided

by

a

producer

through

advertisements, word of mouth and other signal channels, the cost to
provide quality information is totally, or partially, added to the product
cost so that the product price may increase.
Suppose the quality of product A has been improved, as shown in Table
4-6. Producer A provides consumers with very detailed information on
product A and wants to have 20% of the total actual market share. The
question is how much of the cost of advertising could be added to the
price under the assumption of all other conditions being constant.
Table 4-6 Quality Improvement for Product A
Before
After

Price
300
310

Clarity
8 ± 0.2
9 ± 0.2

Lifetime
16000 ± 300
17000 ± 300

Remote Control
no change
no change

The actual market share of product A in the competitive environment
is approximately computed at prices $310, $320 and $330. Product A at a
price higher than $310 is

not able to compete with product C in quality

and with product B in price in the separated market section 1, even
though

enough

information

on product

quality

is provided

to

the

consumers. However, product A shows a strong advantage in quality
improvement in market section 2 (price of product A < B < $350). The AQ
in equation (4.2.2-4) and the intersection point d are, respectively
AQ1(pnce = $ 3.0)=(_ 0 0 3J _ 2 « () 16 )
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d, = 0 % 3

AQ2(pnre = $320) = | 0 ° 3 6 _ 2 ^ 5 ;
AQ 3 (price = $330)

0
80
-0.37 -27.23,

A
_ 0.725/
d2_
/0.275
dA

_ 0.749/
3"
/0.251

By using equation (4.2.3-6) at y = 0, P =1 and 8 = 0.2, the share of
market section 2 for product A and B are, respectively
Fj = ( 0.776, 0.224 )

Bel =

0.494
0.296
0.105

F 2 = ( 0.748, 0.252 )

B

e2

=

0.598
0.204
0.105

B e3

F 3 = ( 0.712, 0.288 )

0.668
0.122
=
0.105

The total potential market share and the actual market share are :
T p l = ( 0.230, 0.582, 0.083 )

T a l = ( 0.257, 0.650 0.093 )

T p 2 = ( 0.153, 0.659, 0.083 )

T a 2 = ( 0.171, 0.736, 0.093 )

T p 3 = ( 0.087, 0.725, 0.083 )

T a3 = ( 0.097, 0.810, 0.093 )

An approximately linear relationship between the price and the actual
market share for product A is shown in Figure 4-6. With an increase in
price, the actual market share decreases proportionately. The product
shares 20% of the total market at $317, which means $7 out of $10 in
advertisement costs may be added onto the price and the rest should be
absorbed by the producer to meet the goal of 20% of the total actual
market share. For a more complicated situation in the real world, a
computational equilibrium model should be used.
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Figure 4-6 Relationship Between Product Price and Market Share
The conclusions derived from the above analysis can be summarized as
follows.
(1) Market segments result from heterogeneous consumer behaviors
and their budget constraints.
(2) Product

market

share depends

on the budget

effect,

income

distribution, product price and product quality as well as consumer
weight distributions for three dimensions.
(3) The degree of information availability determines the patterns of
consumer decision
completely

reliable

making on product
information

selection. If consumers

sources, their behavior

on

have

decision

making can be exposed by a deterministic choice model, which is
developed in this research. If the information is completely unavailable,
consumers would choose products randomly. When the information is
imperfect, the probabilistic models, such as the Bayes updating model,
are suitable to capture the consumer's behavior on decision making.
(4) The product with inferior quality at a lower price could still exist in
the

market,

even

though

the quality

information

is

available

for

consumers. The main reason is that consumers search for a desired
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product and the weights for price/quality effects possess a distribution
pattern which can be modeled by the Weibull distribution.

4.3 Consumer Decision Model in Multiple Attribute Qualities
We will extend the consumer utility and decision making model with
the two attribute qualities in the above sections to n multiple attribute
qualities

mathematically.

If n attribute qualities are quality independent and additive, consumer
utility function can be written as

U = ISj/(ai)

( 4.3-1 )

Any change in one of the attribute qualities will result in consumer
utility change
AU = ISj/(Aai)

( 4.3-2 )

If n attribute qualities are quality complementary, consumer utility
gain depends on the specific relationship among the attribute qualities.
For the fixed proportional quality complement

U = min[Si/(ai)]

( 4.3-3 )

AU = min[Si/(Aai)]

( 4.3-4 )

For the CQAA (comprehensive quality attribute approach) with
attribute qualities, the weight distribution matrix W
W = MA

n

is
( 4.3-5 )
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(sp

s

s
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••• s qn

q2
1

: S

( P.Sq.

S

s

i l s i2 ••• s i m ) l x ( l + n + m )

1 0 0
0
0

i ) 1x3

...

a! a2
0 0

...

\

0

0

an 0
0 an+1

0

...

0 *

0
... 0
a n+2 ... an+m

/ 3x(l+n+m)

where Sqj = sqaj, sy = Siaj, sp + sq + Si= 1, and Isqj = s q , Xsy = Si, s p /(s p + sq)
= T1. Sq/(SP + S q )= 1 -TJ.
Based on the specific requirements in quality activities, a number of
functional operators can be defined. We define an operator © as the
ordinary matrix multiplication operation such that

/Bi\

(CxQ,... c n ) e

C1B1 + C 2 B 2 +... + CnBn

(4.3-6)

\Bny

and define an operator 1 as the operation of taking the smallest product
from a set of products such that

B,
(Cx C 2 ... C n ) ±

= min CiBj, C2B2,

...,

CnBn j

(4.3-7)

\B„J
In contrast, an operator ® is defined as the operation of taking the
largest product from a set of products such that
Bi
(Ci c 2 . . . Cn)<8>

= maxC 1 B 1 , C2B2,
fin
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...,

CnBn

(4.3-8)

Of course, we can define a set of operators according to the particular
requirement in a specific quality activity. A combination of a number of
these operators can be used in

an operation. For instance, if the

relationships among attribute qualities are combination of operator 1 and
operator ©, then the equation can be written as

W

where

"

(S

1

P

V "

submatrix

regulation

and

(0

2

/ 1 0 0 ... 0
0... 0 v
MO ai aa ...aa)»ai+i(l ... l)±'2x<l+tv)

&i a2 ... a,)©

submatrix

ai + i(l

is operated

by ordinary

matrix

...1)1 is operated by the operator 1

defined above, a! + a2 + ... + a; + ai+1 = 1.
The single factor effect matrix Q is a (l+n+m)xk matrix. The CQAA final
step is

C = w lx ( 1+n+m )Q( 1+n+m ) xk
= ( Q C2 ... C k ) l x k

( 4.3-9 )

The decision criterion is

D = Max (Ch C 2 ,..., Ck)

The weight

distribution

matrix W can

( 4.3-10 )

be decomposed

into

two

submatrices M and A. Matrix M is related to consumer net worth,
consumer attitude toward quality risk, and fashion preference.

Different

income classes possess different tastes and preferences for quality, price
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and image index effects. People with higher net worth are less sensitive
to price effect but are willing to pay more for the higher quality product.
Matrix A containing the weights that the consumer assigns to various
attribute qualities and image index attributes reflects the consumer's
preference order for the attributes. Matrix A is relatively fixed

for

various income groups in comparison with matrix M. The price/quality
decision table is a very useful tool to illustrate consumer decision making
for a choice of products with multiple-attribute qualities.
In the classical consumer theory, a rational consumer maximizes his
utility subject to his budget. This rational assumption is also the basis for
consumer

behavior

in quality

economics. The quality

utility

value

function is V(E(U)) = x+T|(B-p)+(l-r|)(/(a)), and the budget and weight
distribution

for

attribute qualities are, B > p and /(a) =

'Ls-J(&l),

respectively. The consumer maximizes his utility subject to the budgetary
and weight distribution constraints

Max V(E(U)) = x+r|(B-p)+(l-ri)(/(a))
s.t. B > p

/(a) = ZsiM)
L = V(.) + MB - P) + W O O - Isi/( ai ))
3L/a(-a i ) = (l-Ti)/ a i -r^ 2 s i =0

MB-p) = 0
^!>0
3L/a^ 2 = / ( a ) - S s i / ( a i ) = 0
/ « / / « = " si/sJ

( 4- 3 " 1 1 )
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The above conclusion

provides

an important

insight

into

quality

improvement efforts in which quality of components should be improved
with a given order of priority. The ratio of the marginal quality utility
must

be

equal

to

the ratio

of

weights

in

the

consumer

utility

maximization. The marginal attribute quality utility divided by its weight
is the same for all attribute qualities. This ratio means that consumer
satisfaction

would increase if an additional dollar were spent on a

particular quality attribute at this ratio. If consumer satisfaction could be
increased by spending an additional dollar on improvement of quality
attribute i rather than attribute quality j , he is not in the position of
maximizing his utility. His satisfaction could be increased by selection of
lower attribute j when other conditions remain constant. The marginal
utility of budget is positive. As the budget increases, consumption of
higher quality goods also increases. Increase in budget is equivalent to
decrease in price. Consumer utility will decrease along with as increase in
product price. The positive marginal budget requires higher

quality

improvement when incomes increase.
Although the weights of attribute qualities are very important, they
cannot be easily captured by the use of conventional methods. One reason
is that consumer preference is related to, or heavily depends on, the
choices of other consumers. Another reason is that there is a lack of a
powerful

method to describe unobservable weight distribution

really reflects consumer decision making behavior.
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which

4.4 Consumer Information Transformation Matrix
4.4.1 Black Box of Consumer Decision Making and Fuzzy Set Concepts
Some of the useful models and methods employed in the analysis of
decision

making

under uncertainty

usually

are

based

on

statistical

concepts. A decision model may be more complicated and sophisticated if
the

uncertainty

involves

human

behavior

and

multiple-criteria.

In

quality activities, a producer's market strategy and production planning
are executed to meet the long-term goal given the consumer behavior
and preference. A lot of information is collected and evaluated on the
nontechnical bases, such as a 5 point or 6 point evaluation system of
product

attribute

qualities,

such

as

the

Consumer

Reports.

The

conventional model is unable to deal with these types of information.
As shown in Figure 4-7, we can observe the input signals, such as
attribute

qualities,

price

and

image

index,

and

the

consumer

characteristics, such as income, age, sex, risk attitude, etc. The final
decision results can also be easily obtained. Meanwhile, the noise of
correlation among consumers, market structures and subjective judgment
errors affects and complicates the consumer decision making procedures.
The process of decision making is directly unobservable, which is called
the black box. The conventional methods designed to capture the process
of consumer decision making are concentrated on the survey and the
questionnaires

about consumer assessment

of the targeted

problems.

These methods do not consider the environment noise factors, such as
consumer interactions. The final output through this process may be
somewhat

inconsistent

with

the real

final

signal

output

from

the

consumer's decision. Moreover, these methods are time and resource
consuming.

Therefore,

it

is

necessary
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to

find

a convenient

and

inexpensive method to figure out the consumer decision making. A fuzzy
set model may be able to play such a desired role.
noise
correlation
among consumers

i

market structure

Black Box

quality

consumer decision
making procedures

final decision

(unobservable)

image

I

income, age, set, risk attitude
and other observable variables

Figure 4-7 Black Box of Consumer Decision Making

In the following, we introduce a number of definitions in Fuzzy Set
Theory

used

in

a

comprehensive

decision

making

model.

These

definitions can be found dispersed throughout the published literature on
fuzzy sets.
A fuzzy set is defined as a class of objects for which class membership
is not clear. We define three fuzzy sets employed in comprehensive
decision making model as
1. Factor set

U = {uj, u2, ...u n };

2. Decision-making set V = {vj, v2, ... v n };
3. Single factor decision set. It is a fuzzy map from U to V. Define R as a
matrix of fuzzy transformation from U to V.
The comprehensive decision making model can be written as

( 4.4.1-1 )

D=/(U,V,R)
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A decision associated only with a single factor is easily made. Although
the decision procedures are complicated in the case of multiple attribute
qualities, the fuzzy set decision model may provide a solution for such a
complicated case.
The decision model in general possesses the following properties. Given
a set U, define 05 as a subset of U which could be the weight set for
multiple-attribute qualities. The comprehensive decision set is
b = 05 • R

( 4.4.1-2 )

where b is a fuzzy subset of V.
The

assumptions

of

preference

transitive,

substitutability

among

groups, relatively homogeneous in their preferences and beliefs among
groups are again adopted in the fuzzy set model.
For example, we will investigate the consumer preference for the TV
set selection. The problem is to investigate a number of TV sets involving
Sony, GE, Emerson and Samsung for 3 major attribute qualities: picture
clarity, color fidelity and sound. Consumers would evaluate each TV set in
four levels, excellent, good, fair and unfavorable. In the fuzzy set concept,
we have attribute quality set U = (clarity, color, sound) and evaluation set
V = (excellent, good, fair, unfavorable). Suppose we ask 100 people to
evaluate the quality of an Emerson TV set. For color fidelity attribute
quality, no one says it is excellent, 40 people say good, 40 people say fair
and 20 people say unfavorable. Therefore, the evaluation for
fidelity attribute quality is
U( color ) = ( 0 0.4 0.4 0.2 )
The matrix R can be written as
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color

excellent good fair unfavorable
0.2
0
0.2

• (

0.7
0.4
0.2

0
\ clarity
0.2 J color
0.2 •^ sound

0.1
0.4
0.4

Suppose the consumer weights for attributes be known as
05 = ( 0.2

0.5

0.3 )

Using the Zadeh operator, the comprehensive evaluation is

(

(

0.2 0.7 0.1 0 •>

0

0.4 0.4 0.2 J

0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 *
0.2A0.2 0.7*0.2 0.1*0.2 0*0.3 -L
0*0.5
0.4*0.5 0.4*0.5 0.2*0.3 l
0.2*0.3 0.2*0.3 0.4*0.3 0.2*0.3 *

= ( 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.2 )
After unifying the matrix,
b =

(0.17, 0.33, 0.33, 0.17)

The results indicate that 17% of the consumers say Emerson TV set is
excellent, 33% say good, 33% say fair and* 17% say unfavorable. Of course,
we can use other operators, depending on the specific requirement of the
problem. Selection of operators should be made and tested in the model
developed.
As mentioned before, it is difficult for the consumer to conceptualize
this probability. If we ask consumers to give probabilities for various
attributes, some of them may be confused and then give some incorrect
figures. The weights for various attributes may be easily collected by
other

methods

rather

than

with

the probability

concept.

consumers to make a simple evaluation, expressing their
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We

ask

preference

degree (number

1-10)

for

color quality,

excellent,

good, fair

and

unfavorable. Consumers can fill in one level, several levels, or all levels
with numbers 1 through 10, which correspond to their real evaluation of
the product. The information obtained, therefore, is more reliable. The
weight, whether or not it could be evaluated by sophisticated methods,
actually exists. To find the weight distribution through the inverse of the
evaluation process is more valuable and meaningful because this method
takes into consideration

for

the noise influence

on the

consumer's

decision. If we know b, the final evaluation set, and attribute evaluation
matrix R, we may obtain the solution. However, there may be no solution
or

infinite

solutions,

depending

on

the

specific

question.

Since

computation details are complicated and tedious, we will not mention
them here. The inverse decision solution could tell us the quantitative
information

to improve the quality design and manufacturing

process

control to meet consumer requirements.
We

can

adopt

another

method,

called

the

principle

of

closer

relationship selection from a number of sets prepared, to compute the
consumer weight distribution. But this method is somewhat subjective.
Some valuable information may be missed and the results of computation
should be carefully explained. Mathematically, there are n fuzzy subsets
in the domain U( GJj, G52, 053, .., G5n). If subset 05, satisfies the following
requirement based on the relationship defined
(B, A;) = Max[(B, Aj), (B,A2), ..., (B, An)]
Aj = G5jR

j = 1, 2,.... n

where 05; - the subject set one looks for;
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B - the observable consumer final decision making matrix;
Ai - the computed consumer decision making matrix.
Suppose we have a set J which consists of a number of evaluation
weight sets, that is
J = (05!, G52, 053)

( 4.4.1-3 )

The close relationship is defined as:

o ( A , B ) = l - l { i>A(uK)-u B (u K )}
k=i

( 4.4.1-4 )

where o(A, B) - distance between the actual and the computed consumer
decision making;
|i. A (u k )- cell k in the computed consumer decision making matrix;
u. B (u k )- cell k in the actual consumer decision making matrix;
The selection criterion is
D = max [(A,, B),..., (Aa, BJ]

Specifically,
B = (0.25, 0.45, 0.20, 0.1)
TS!=(0.2, 0.5, 0.3)
G52=(0.5, 0.3, 0.2)
G53=(0.2, 0.3, 0.5)
One calculates that
GJ^R^O.2, 0.4, 0.5, 0.1)
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( 4.4.1-5 )

G52 • R=(0.2, 0.5, 0.3, 0.1)
G53« R=(0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.1)
then by using equation (4.4.1-4)
(G5X • R, B)=0.90
(G52 • R, B)=0.95
(G53« R, B)=0.905
D = max(0.90, 0.95, 0.905) = 0.95
Thus, 052is closer to B in set J. Note that when this method is employed
in practical cases, attention should be paid to the specific requirement in
the activity, selection of capable operator(s) and an approximate close
relationship should be carefully found.
The weight set is obtained for a specific income group. Although the
small difference in individual preference arises in a group, it can be
treated as a fuzzy boundary. The difference in the tastes of the members
of a group is often small and can be ignored. If investigation shows that
there are considerable differences

in weight distribution for

income groups, it will provide the information
diversified

product

quality

design

to

meet

different

that is necessary for
different

consumer

requirements.

4.4.2. Applications of Fuzzy Decision Making Model on Product Quality
Selection
There

are

few

information

sources

available

about

consumer

assessment of product (service) quality in detail. One reason is that the
data collected through a survey is very expensive. The fuzzy decision
making model can be employed as a filter which transfers input signals
to output signals. Its effectiveness may be evaluated by examining the
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observable final results. The performance

of a mathematical

model

depends on the designer's knowledge and the input signal quality.
Scales and ratings are currently the most popular methods used to
measure

consumer

evaluation

for

product

or

service

performance.

Consumer Report is one of the most popular information sources on
quality assessment. This information provides a direct ranking with five
levels for various attributes for different brands of products or services,
which consumers easily understand. However, this data does not contain
some valuable information about consumer evaluation procedures, such
as weight distribution for various attributes. As Curry [1985] has pointed
out, some foreign testing agencies publish not only attribute-by-attribute
judgments for each brand in a five-point rating, but also explicitly list the
weights with which these scales are combined into an overall quality
rating.
In this section, by applying fuzzy set concepts, we use available rating
data to illustrate consumer information processing and consumer decision
making

for

product

selection

with

this

rating

information.

More

specifically, the fuzzy decision making model will answer the following
questions:
(1) Does the consumer assign weights for various attributes of a
product (or service)? How can it be illustrated by using the data available
in the Consumer Reports?
(2) Is the weight distribution

significantly

different

for

different

income groups? Can the difference be pointed out?
(3) Does the decision criteria developed in the previous section still
work well with such rating information?
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The data are obtained from the survey on hotel service quality, which
are published in the Consumer Report issued in September 1990. [Note:
The consumer assessment for overall quality data is estimated.] The
survey asked consumers about their experience and evaluation with the
hotels' service quality they had stayed at most recently. The study then
sorted

these chains of hotels into four price categories:

economy,

moderately priced, high-priced, and luxury. The information covers the
overall satisfaction index to the reservations line. In order to meet the
requirements of our study, we chose the following attributes of hotel
service quality. Room quality includes cleanliness, size, bed comfort,
climate control, noise, and amenities. Staff service is another factor that is
a crucial quality attribute which must be accounted for in the model.
Although food quality and swimming pools are other factors, especially
the food quality, which affects consumer satisfaction. The data for these
two factors are not completely available for all chains. Moreover, the data
available for some chains are sorted at the same level, which means the
effects of food quality and swimming pool on the total assessment can be
equally taken out without any influence on the outcome. Therefore, seven
attributes of hotel service, cleanliness, size, bed comfort, climate control,
noise, amenities, and staff will be used in the evaluation of hotel quality.
The input signals of attributes had been processed in five points already.
The input signal matrix, for example, for Hampton Inn in the economy
category can be written as
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0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
0
1
0
0
0
1

0
1
0
1
1
1
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

cleanliness
size
bed comfort
climate control
noise
amenities
staff

This matrix contains 1 (preference) and 0 (nonpreference). No other
information could be provided with the exception of comparison with the
other chain's preference in five levels. It is now necessary to transform
the data in the above matrix into the form of fuzzy membership matrix,
based on the output patterns.
The level of satisfaction output reflects the percentage of respondents
who reported one of the three levels for the hotel overall rating,
completely

satisfied,

very/fairly

satisfied,

and

somewhat/very/completely dissatisfied. Three satisfaction levels for each
hotel can be roughly figured out. These levels of satisfaction are the final
result of the consumer evaluation process, which is also the basis to
transfer the input signal matrix in one level to all five levels. Since the
difference between chains less than 4 point in overall satisfaction index is
not meaningful, the chains in each category are classified into several
groups, shown in table 4-7. The input signals in these chains whose
attributes are sorted at the same level are impossible to detect consumer
weight assignment in a strong white noise, because no operator, data
transformation, or weight simulation has an effect on the output signals.
These chains are eliminated from the analysis.
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Table 4-7 The Classification of Chains and Their Final Signals
Group

Category

Satisfaction

Index

Level of Satisfaction
high
medium low

1-1
1-2
1-3

Economy

85
74, 73, 71
66, 63

0.38
0.176
0.15

0.60
0.694
0.56

0.02
0.13
0.29

3-1
3-2

High-Price

86
82, 81, 79

0.45
0.29

0.49
0.63

0.06
0.08

4-1

Luxury

83, 82, 81, 80

0.32

0.60

0.08

Based on the pattern of final signals, the following principles should be
obeyed in data transformation of input signals from 0-1 matrix to fuzzy
membership

matrix.

(1) Even in the case of the most perfect satisfaction, a small number of
consumers

are still dissatisfied.

membership

Thus, zero can not appear in the

matrix.

(2) The level arising in the rating table (or 1 in the 0-1 matrix) has the
highest score.
(3) One and only one peak is allowed for a single attribute. The
adjacent levels can have the same score as the highest level.
(4) The further the level from the highest rating level, the lower the
score.
The reason for establishment of the fuzzy membership matrix for input
signals comes from the fact that not all consumers agree with the rating
of attribute at a certain level; instead, the ratings may be distributed at
some or all levels. The membership matrix of input signal transformation
is
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1

2

3

0.5
0.1
0.1
0.1

0.45
0.45

0.6
0.4
0.4

0.3

0.3

0.05

0.15
0.15

4

5

0.3

0.1

0.45

0.35

0.05
0.05

0.55

0.4

0.1
0.2
0.4

This matrix is somewhat subjective. (An objective matrix can be
derived from the survey.)

A number of similar forms can also be built

in light of the level of understanding of the problem.

Of course, we can

use the original data to establish a reliable membership matrix if data is
available. The average input signal matrix in 0-1 form for group 1-1 is
transformed as follows
0.0714
0.0714
0.0714
0.0714
0.0714
0.0714
0.0714

0.3214
0.2143
0.3214
0.2143
0.2143
0.2143
0.3214

0.3214
" 0.4286
0.3214
0.4286
0.4286
0.4286
0.3214

0.25
0.2143
0.25
0.2143
0.2143
0.2143
0.25

0.0357
0.0714
0.0357
0.0714
0.0714
0.0714
0.0357

Corresponding to the three levels of satisfaction in the final signals, the
column 1 and 2, column 3 and 4 in the above 7x5 transformed matrix are
combined together, respectively, to form a 7x3 matrix.
single factor matrix R in fuzzy set concepts. That is

0.3929 0.5714 0.0375
0.2857 0.6429 0.0714
0.3929 0.5714 0.0375
0.2857
0.2857
0.2857
0.3929

0.6429 0.0714
0.6429 0.0714
0.6429 0.0714
0.5714 0.0375
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It actually is the

The comprehensive decision making set, B, is
B L ! =(0.38

0.60

0.02 )

By analogy, we can derive single factor matrices for group 1-2, 1-3, 31, 3-2, and 4-1.

As described before, the weight distribution is just the

solution of the inverse problem.
defined

fuzzy

From the solution conditions for the

sets, the above inverse problem has many solutions.

However, our purpose is to examine consumer weight distributions and
their patterns related to different hotel categories (i.e. different income
levels).

Adopting the selection principle in fuzzy set theory, we prepare a

set of weight distributions to carry out consumer decision processing.

We

predetermine that the weight for no single attribute may exceed 0.3.

The

prepared weight sets are
05!
G52
G53
G54
G55
G56

=
=
=
=
=
=

( 0.143, 0.143, 0.143, 0.143, 0.143, 0.143, 0.143 )
( 0 . 2 5 , 0.15, 0.0875, 0.0875, 0.0875, 0.0875, 0 . 2 5 )
(0.2, 0.2, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.2)
( 0 . 2 5 , 0.21, 0.1, 0.1, 0 . 1 , 0.1, 0.25 )
(0.3, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.2)
( 0 . 2 , 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.3 )

The implications of the above weight sets are briefly described in Table
4-8.
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Table 4-8 Implications for Various Weight Sets
Weight Sets

Roles

051

Equal weight for each

05 2

054

Cleanliness, staff attributes, and room size
can be distinguished from other attributes
Equal higher weight for cleanliness, room
size, and staff attributes
Cleanliness and staff are more important

G55

Cleanliness is weighted more than staff

attribute

05g

Staff

attribute

G53

attribute

is weighted more than cleanliness

By using equation (4.4.1-4), the selection criterion is defined as
( B, A ; ) = Max[Z(B, A^/n, I ( B , A 2 )/n

I ( B , A n )/n]

Ai = G5iR
w h e r e Z ( B , Aj)/n - the average close relationship, n = 3 for the economy
category and for the high-priced and luxury categories, respectively.
In order to examine the effect

of consumer

groups

with

different

incomes, the economy chains are separated from high-priced and luxury
chains.

Two operators are used in the comprehensive decision model,

one of which is <8>, Max.

Product,

and

the

other

is

ordinary

matrix

operator ©, Sum.Product. Table 4-9 and Table 4-10 show the computation
results with two operators. The close relationships are ranked in order in
the

economy

chains

and

in

the

respectively.
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high-priced

and

luxury

chains,

Table 4-9

Close Relationship for Various Weight
Sets for Economy Chains

Weight Set

Operator

Computation

Rank

051

Sum.Product
Max.Product

0.966
0.957

6
6

052

Sum.Product
Max.Product

0.977
0.972

4
3

053

Sum.Product
Max.Product

0.967
0.964

5
6

054

Sum.Product
Max.Product

0.973
0.973

2
2

055

Sum.Product
Max.Product

0.974
0.988

1
1

056

Sum.Product
Max.Product

0.972
0.958

3
5

The operators Sum.Product, €>, Max.Product, ®, were defined in section
4.3 (see equations (4.3-6) and (4.3-8)). In the economy chains, all of the
sets with different weights for seven attributes are better than the equal
weight for seven

attributes. It means that the consumer's

different

weight distribution for various attributes actually exists. Consumers pay
more attention to the attributes of cleanliness and staff in hotel service,
which is consistent with the survey in which the study reveals the best
predictors of consumer satisfaction turned out to be how clean the room
was, whether or not the staff was helpful and efficient, and how well the
front desk was run. Weight set 5 is ranked number 1, which may imply
that consumers might be more concerned with room quality than with
the staff. However, more data is needed to confirm such a claim.
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Table 4-10

Close Relationship for Various Weight
Sets for High-Priced and Luxury Chains

Weight Set

Operator

Computation

Rank

051

Sum.Product
Max.Product

0.973
0.967

4
5

052

Sum.Product
Max.Product

0.977
0.970

2
3

G53

Sum.Product
Max.Product

0.980
0.971

1
2

054

Sum.Product
Max.Product

0.973
0.968

5
4

055

Sum.Product
Max.Product

0.972
0.963

6
6

056

Sum.Product
Max.Product

0.974
0.974

3
1

Compared with Table 4-9, several changes can be seen in Table 4-10.
Not all of the weight sets are better than the equal weight set.

The

higher income group may be more concerned with the staff service than
with the cleanliness.

The room size attribute seems to become more

attractive than other room quality attributes, which are claimed by the
hotel service survey.

Improvement in all aspects of various attributes

will result in gaining as advantage in competition in high-priced and
luxury chains groups.

However, more information is needed to support

the above conclusions. We pointed out that the membership matrix which
was somewhat subjective plays a crucial role in this analysis.

The quality

and reliability of the analysis depend largely on the fidelity of input
signals and the fuzzy membership model.

Nevertheless, the following

findings can be derived from the above analysis.
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(1) Consumers assign different weights for various attributes of the
hotel service quality.
(2) In the economy chains, the cleanliness and the staff

attribute

qualities are good predictors of consumer satisfaction.
(3) Consumer's weight distribution for service attributes changes with
their income levels and the hotel categories. The higher the price paid,
the better the service required.
(4) An improvement

in

any attributes

would

gain

a competitive

advantage in high-priced and luxury chains.
In general, the ratings information roughly provides an evaluation for
product attribute qualities on the 5 point scale. Consumers really do not
know the exact cost pattern for each attribute of the product, and they
are simply the price takers. The fuzzy membership among 5 point ratings
has the linear form in

the most simple way. The utility in terms of

money value provided by the attribute quality is proportional to the
rating level. If consumers are concerned more with a specific attribute
quality, the membership among the levels in this attribute could be the
nonlinear one. In the following example for selection of moderately
priced 19- and 20-inch TV sets, we will show that this imperfect rating
information can be used to help consumers make decision after the fuzzy
membership is determined.
Suppose the consumer predetermines his need of a 19- or 20-inch color
TV with remote control. He selects RCA F20700DG, Montgomery Word
12690, Zenith

SF2033Y,

General

Electric

20GT612,

and

Sylvania

RKK191WA as candidates (see Consumer Report, 1988). The attribute
qualities,

picture

clarity,

black-level

retention

and

color

fidelity

determine the picture quality, on which more weights are put. The
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attributes of cable channels, inputs/outputs, S input and warranty are
similar for all sets, or not important. These attributes can be ignored for
selection of the TV sets.

The lowest rating is taken for couples of

attribute qualities, such as airplane flutter

and spark reject,

fringe

reception in VHF and UHF. The information about quality variation from
the quality target value for each TV set can not be provided by the
ratings of attributes because the test designers do not take a large
enough sample for data collection. Consumers, on the other hand, rely on
historical repair data as the quality variation information.

As mentioned

in

includes

previous

sections,

the

consumer

quality

premium

the

consumer loss due to product repair and time waste. The repair rate
really reflects the product quality variation from its quality target value.
Specifically, consumer repair loss is computed by the following formula

Cr = C x L

( 4.4.2-1 )

where C r - consumer repair loss, $;
C - repair cost at present value, $;
L - level of historical repair rate from 1985-1989, $.
Detailed

data

about

various

attribute

qualities,

distribution and repair cost are shown in Table 4-11.
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price,

weight

Table 4-11 Data for 5 Types of Color TV Sets with Remote Control
Weight
3
3
3
3
2
2
2

The

Quality

Attributes

RCA

MW

ZENITH GE

SYLVANIA

Picture clarity
Black-level retention
Color fidelity
Tone quality
Geometric distortion
Color control
Adjacent channel rejection
Brightness
performance
Interlace
Auto color control
Fringe reception
Spark rejection
Resolution
Repair cost $30
Price $

1
1
1
2
2
2
3
1
1
1
2
3
1
3
470

2
1
1
2
3
3
3
2
3
1
2
4
1
3
327

2
1
1
2
3
3
4
3
4
2
3
4
1
4
405

3
2
1
4
2
3
1
2
2
1
2
3
2
5
383

linear

form

of

fuzzy

membership

function

2
1
1
3
3
4
3
2
2
1
3
4
2
2
375

is

adopted.

consumer decision making criterion is (see equation (4.3-10))

D = Max(C1,C2,C3,C4,C5)
Cj = ti(P 0 - Pj) + (1 - n)(ZP 0 Si(l - L,)/5 + C rj )

w h e r e P 0 - the highest price in the products searched, P 0 ^ B;
Pi - the price for product i;
Si - the weight for quality attribute i;
Crj - the repair cost.
The price effect and quality effect are shown in Table 4-12.
Table 4-12 Price/Quality Effects for Color TV
Model

RCA

MW

ZENITH

GE

SYLVANIA

Price effect
Quality effect

0
-66

143
-108.9

65
-139.1

95
-126.2

87
-141.3
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The

Compared with the score ranking in the study, the quality effect ranks
of Zenith and GE sets in Table 4-12 are modified with consideration of
the consumer repair loss. If the consumer prefers higher quality and
assigns weights 0.1/0.9 for price/quality effects, he would choose the
RCA model.
D = Max( -59.4, -82.9, -118.7, -104.1, -118.5 )
From Table 4-12, it can be predicted that the RCA F20700DG would
dominate the other 4 models with higher quality at a higher price, and
the Montgomery

Ward

12690 model would

gain

the advantage in

competition in both price and quality with Zenith, GE and Sylvania.
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Chapter 5 Evaluation of Consumer Benefit in Quality
Improvement

5.1

Total Consumer Quality Loss and Consumer Expected Price

With developments in technology, science, and the economy, product
quality should be continuously improved in a competitive environment.
The consumer quality gain from quality improvement (or the consumer
quality loss from quality deviation from the target value) is also a
continuous process, which can be measured by the consumer surplus.
In Chapter 3, we defined the average consumer quality loss (ACQL) as
the difference

between

the quality

target

value and

the

consumer

expected quality value for a certain product; see equation (3.2.1-12).
Table 3-6 lists the ACQL for four types of quality characteristics under
quality

aversion.

Taguchi

and Taguchi

introduced a quality loss function

et

al.

[1984,

1985,

1989]

to compute quality loss with the

following formula

L = k[(u. - T) 2 + a2]

where L- quality loss function, $;
k - coefficient;
T - the product quality target;
\i, a2 - the product quality mean value and the quality variance.
It has the same form as the ACQL in the nominal-the-best type of
quality characteristics for concave quality value function under quality
neutral. The ACQL under quality aversion is the more
approach

to describe

consumer

behavior
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for

appropriate

most consumers.

The

consumer quality loss comes from not only quality deviation (variance
and mean value) from the target value, but also quality premium due to
consumer utility adjustment under risk.

Nevertheless, the ACQL only

measures consumer quality loss for the product unit purchased.

The

quality target value is relatively stable with product market time. It is
very difficult to determine the terminal quality target value so that the
cosumer quality loss is also a relative concept against time. It is common
to use the following formula to approximately compute the consumer
quality loss and consumer quality gain from quality improvement.

L = ACQLxQ

(5.1-1)

G = (ACQLj - ACQL2)Q

(5.1-2)

= Lj - L 2

where L - total consumer quality loss from quality deviation,$;
L j , L 2 - total consumer quality loss before and after quality
improvement, respectively, $;
ACQL^ ACQL2 - average consumer quality loss for an individual
before and after quality improvement, $/unit;
Q - total production output, unit;
G - total consumer gain from quality improvement, $.
Equations (5.1-1) and (5.1-2) are conveniently employed in practice to
compute the approximate total consumer quality loss or quality gain,
respectively.

Equation (5.1-2) is a more meaningful measurement of

quality activities on consumer welfare. Obviously, these approximate
computations

are based

on the assumption

conditions except product quality.
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of no change in

other

However, the above equations would underestimate total consumer
quality loss or social quality gain.

As a matter of fact, consumer quality

loss (gain) not only results from consumer quality loss in utilization of the
product purchased, but also from less consumption of the product due to
reduction in the purchase of an inferior quality product in the general
sense.

Furthermore, it is rare to have quality improved without a change

in other conditions in quality activities, especially price. The following
questions might arise in evaluation of total consumer quality loss (gain):
Is it gain or loss for consumers if a quality activity improves product
quality accompanied with an increase in price? Does quality activity
reduce product quality and product price simultaneously?

How can the

pure effect of both price and quality be separated on the consumer
quality loss (gain)?
We introduce two concepts: consumer expected quality price and
quality equivalent price. By using the consumer indifferent utility curves
developed in previous chapters, we will illustrate the implications of
these two concepts in detail.

A consumer is indifferent between two

products with different qualities and prices if and only if these two
products have the same indifference curve.

Consumers will be better off

if either price, quality, or both move onto the higher utility indifferent
curves.

In contrast, consumers will be worse off if either or both price

and quality move onto the lower utility indifferent curves. The quality
equivalent price on the basis of substitution between price and quality
can be derived from equation (3.3.2-5). As shown in Figure 5-1 a, the
product price remains at p 1? and product quality is improved from &j to
a 2 , which cause the consumer utility to move from ux to u 2 . If the utility
moves along with u 2 from a2 to ax, the consumer is indifferent. In other
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words, quality

improvement from

&j to a2 is equivalent to the price

change from p1 to p 2 . In Figure 5-lb, the consumer utility increases from
ul to u 2 due to simultaneous reduction in price and improvement in
quality. The difference between pj and p 2 is the price effect, while the
difference

between

p 2 and p 3

corresponds

to the quality

effect.

Therefore, the price/quality effect can be distinguished from the overall
outcomes.

a2
Figure 5-la Quality Equivalent Price

ai

a

Figure 5-lb Price/Quality Effects

From equation (5.1-1), assume that the consumer utility is additive for
both price effect and quality effect, and the relationship between price
and quality value (not quality deviation variable) is linear. Then define
dp and d(-p) as an increase and a decrease in price, respectively. The
same definitions are made for changes in quality value.
Assume that the consumer utility increments are derived from price
reduction

and

quality

improvement

respectively.

From

equations

(3.3.2-5)

dp = /'(a)d(-a)//'(p)

( 5.1-3 )
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Quality improvement is equivalent to the reduction in price. The
aggregated demand is easily executed for the higher quality product in
meeting the needs of consumers if consumers and product quality are
homogeneous. The individual consumer evaluates product quality by
using his quality value function, which is different from the other income
groups. Therefore, it is very difficult to induce the aggregated demand
curve for nonhomogeneous products due to widely varying quality value
functions. For tractability and without significant

loss of generality,

assume that the relationship between quality and price is linear such that

/ W / ' C P ) = (i- nVn
dp = (1- Ti)d(-a)/Ti

( 5.1-4 )

The equivalent quality price, AP q , is

AP q = dp = (l-rOd(-a)/n

(5.1-5)

The weight distribution variable ri is assumed to have the pattern of
Weibull distribution. The consumer expected price increment is the sum
of the difference in the actual prices and the difference in the quality
equivalent prices. The consumer expected price is the sum of the actual
price before the change in the price and the expected price increment.
Mathematically,

APC = APa - APq

( 5.1-6 )
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P c = E(Pa + APC) = P a + APa - E(APq)
= Pa + APa - [T(l - l/P)/8 - l]d(-a)

( 5.1-7 )

E[(l - Ti)/n] = r(l-l/p)/8-lW
where APC - consumer expected price increment for the product, $/unit;
AP a - difference in the actual price for the product, $/unit;
AP - difference in quality equivalent price for the product,
$/unit;
Pc

- consumer expected price for the product, $/unit;

P a - actual market price for the product before change, $/unit.
The difference between the actual price corresponding to the quality
target value and the consumer expected price reflects consumer quality
loss in terms of price equivalent.
In previous sections, the quality loss for a unit of a product was
measured in terms of monetary value. The ACQL is transformed into the
equivalent price to measure total consumer quality loss for the reasons:
(1) Total consumer quality loss is not equal to the sum of the individual
consumer quality loss. (2) Conventional theoretical concepts of total
consumer loss (gain) measurement can be directly employed in quality
loss. (3) It is easy to illustrate the effects of quality activities for various

[1]

/(x) = (p/8)[(x-Y)/8]P-lexp(-[(x-Y)/8]P) x 2: y
Let 7=0, x SO
/(x) = (p/8)(x/8)P-lexp(-(x/8)P)

E(l/x) = Jl/x{(p/8)(x/8)P-lexp(-(x/8)P)}dx
E(l/x) = 1/8 jVl/Pexp(-t)}du
r(l-l/P) = Ju-l/Pexp(-i>}dv, E(l/x -1) = r(l-l/P)/8 - 1
179

products on consumers by using price elasticity of consumer demand. (5)
A partial equilibrium mechanism can explain the results of competition in
substitutable products.
The consumer quality price index, I, is defined as the difference in
consumer expected price increments between the substitutable products

I = AP c l - AP c2

( 5.1-8 )

= APal-APa2 + APql-APq2

One important condition for the partial equilibrium for these products
is I = 0. Assume that positive changes in both actual price and quality
equivalent price for product 1 are higher than those for product 2, such
that
I = APal-APa2+APql-APq2 >0

Consumers prefer product 1 to product 2 and will gain from a switch
from product 2 to product 1. This switch will not stop until the consumer
quality price index equals 0. In the competitive environment, product 2
could survive only by either reducing the actual price or increasing the
quality equivalent price or both. On the other hand, with demand
increase in product 1, the price would go up due to the upward slope of
production

cost function.

The market reaction

resulting

from

both

product 1 and 2 adjustments will force index I to zero under competitive
market condition. Equations (5.1-7) and (5.1-8) can be used to measure
total consumer quality gain in partial equilibrium.
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5.2 Consumer Quality Surplus in Consumer Welfare Evaluation
The welfare function

usually comprises both consumer surplus and

producer surplus. Since producer surplus in quality activity is well
defined and easy measured, the light is shed on the consumer benefit
from quality activity in this section. In order to simplify the exposition,
this section makes some formal assumptions: (1) Follow Willig's [1976]
statement that consumer surplus could be employed
unobservable

compensation

and

equivalent

to estimate the

variations

for

consumer

welfare. (2) The concept of "presentive consumer" is used here to avoid
the spillover effect in demand. (3) Consumer surplus does not allow one
to

assess

directly

the

initial

impact

of

quality

improvement

(Trajtenberg,1989). (4) Consumer surplus can be treat as the lower bound
of social welfare in some special cases.
The consumer surplus concept in quality cost-benefit analysis is not
purely an accounting system, but an evaluation method based on the
applied welfare theory. Because the prevailing market price, even in a
perfect competitive market, is an inadequate index of the real value of
product quality in society, consumer surplus is, therefore, a very crucial
concept in the measurement of consumer benefit (or loss) in quality
improvement.
The basic idea is that the utility of a certain good is at least equal to the
price paid for it, so that a person buying a good at a certain price and
attaching to a product value greater than its price will derive a net
"profit," which is called consumer surplus. This implies that the real value
of a product's quality is determined by the buyer's willingness to pay.
Therefore, benefits taken into account in quality loss-gain analysis are
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not the market value of a good that buyers actually pay, but the real
value reflected by his willingness to pay.
Several measures of such a consumer's surplus have been proposed.
Here we employ the incremental consumer surplus based on the duality
theory to illustrate the effect of quality activity.
The following terms are used in this section.
DD' - demand curve for a specific type of product;
P a - actual price, or the price the consumer is willing to pay for the
product under no quality variation, $/unit;
P c l - consumer expected price, or the price the consumer is willing
to

pay

under

implementation,

quality

variation

before

quality

activity

$/unit;

P c 2 - consumer expected price after quality activity implementation,
$/unit;
Qi» Q2> and Q 3 - total product demand at price P a , P c l , and P c 2 ,
respectively;

$/unit;

G - consumer surplus, $;
AG - consumer surplus gained from quality activity, $;
H(q) - inverse demand function, $/unit.
In conventional
homogeneous

microeconomics,

all products

in the quality equaling

are assumed

to be

the quality target value. The

consumer expected price equals the actual price of the product under no
quality variation. The consumer surplus could normally be written as:
G =
However,

f

a consumer

H(q|) d q - P ^ i
suffers

a loss
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( 5.2-1 )
from

utility

reduction

or

adjustment under quality variation. With respect to the price for the
highest product quality, the consumer expected

price at which the

consumer is willing to pay for the product purchased on average is lower
than the actual price. No consumer quality loss would arise if the
consumer pays for the product at the expected price. As a matter of fact,
consumers

actually

pay

the

same

price

for

the

product

without

accounting for the quality discrimination. The total consumer quality loss,
L, from quality variation is

L 1 2 = -AG = p H l q ) dq - ( P ^ -P2QJ

( 5.2-2 )

As shown in Figure 5-2, consumer surplus under quality homogeneity
is P a D R ! ,

which is simply the difference

between the amount the

consumer is willing to pay for the product, O D R J Q J , and the amount he
actually pays, OP a R 1 Q 1 . Now the product quality varies but the selling
price is still set at P a . However, the consumer expected price for the
product with quality variation on average is P c l , lower than P a . Consumer
surplus will be taken by P a R 1 R 2 P c l which consists of two components,
PjJRjSPp! as the quality loss component and RjR 2 S as the product loss due
to the quality loss for consumers. The quality loss rectangle alone could
be regarded as a minimum calculation of quality loss under quality
variation because it does not account for the product loss. Suppose the
product quality be improved, but the actual price be kept at P a . The
consumer expected price

is P 2 . The total consumer quality loss becomes
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L 13 = -AG = pH(q) dq -(P&j -P4Q3)

( 5.2-3 )

and the total consumer quality gain from quality improvement is
AG = L 12 - L 13 = r H(q) dq -(P3Q3 -P/&)

Qi

(5.2-4)

Qz Q 3

Figure 5-2 Consumer Surplus from Quality Variation
Quality improvement strengthens the competitive ability with close
substitute products in price and in the market share. The increment of
consumer surplus from quality improvement is regarded as the collective
improvement in society that will be calculated as a part of the benefit in
quality loss-gain analysis. It should be noted that the increment in
consumer surplus arising from quality improvement will be valid to
measure an increase in consumer welfare based on the following
assumptions: (1) all other prices remain unchanged, (2) all the inputs are
combined efficiently, (3) the product is in a perfect market; consumer
expected price reflects the product quality variation. However, condition
(3) is a weak assumption. In traditional economics, if the product is in a
monopoly market, the price prevailing in the market is not the real price;
the reduction of price may simply be reduction in monopoly profit. The
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quality improvement component in consumer surplus does reflect

a

major part of an increase in the benefit to consumers. Since the price is
not changed, no benefit is redistributed from producers to consumers.
The consumer is actually benefited from reduction of quality loss, while
the producer increases his profit (or revenue) from higher production
output.
The consumer surplus for evaluation of consumer quality benefit is still
valid

in

the

monopoly

market

for

quality

improvement.

The

maximization of profit under quality variation is the power source to
stimulate

the

producer

to improve

product

quality.

However,

less

competitive pressure will slow down the continuous quality improvement
in the monopoly environment.
If a quality activity is accompanied with a change in price, the net
value in the consumer expected price increment is used to evaluate
whether the activity is taken, see equation (5.1-7). If

P c > 0, consumer is

better off from such activity; if P c = 0, the consumer is indifferent; if P c <
0,

the consumer is worse off from such activity.
Therefore, a quality activity does not necessarily imply a benefit for

consumers as some people might think obvious. A quality activity should
be carefully

evaluated

before

its

implementation

in

quality

policy

making.
The consumer surplus approach with the expected consumer price is
equivalent to the approach of consumer surplus with a demand curve
shift due to product quality improvement. It is easy to illustrate the
relationship between these two approaches. As shown in Figure 5-3, p
and Q' are the price and the quantity at the market equilibrium. For the
former

approach,

the

consumer

surplus
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is

Dp c A.

The

quality

improvement results in the demand curve shift from D to D'; the
consumer surplus in the latter approach is D'pB. Obviously, when DPcA =
D'pB both consumer surplus and producer surplus are the same in these
two approaches.
p
D' \
D

^x
\

B

>

P
Pc

A
Q)

0

Q'

Q

Figure 5-3 Equivalent Relationship Between Two Consumer
Surplus Approaches

The latter approach can be induced from the former one, which has
been well developed in previous chapters. The effect of change in the
consumer expected price from p to p c can be treated as the demand
curve shift from D to D' in most cases. The adoption of the consumer
surplus approach in which the quality differences can be transformed
into the difference in quantity (or in price) depend on the specific
requirement and the property of the problem solved. The consumer
demand is the function of product price and the quality. That is:

Q = /(p, a)

( 5.2-5 )

dQ = /' p dp + /' a d(-a)

( 5.2-6 )

/' P < 0, / " p ^ 0

( 5.2-7 )
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( 5.2-8 )

f\ > 0, f\ < 0
where Q - product demand;
p - product price;
a - product quality.

The quantity is negatively related to the price increase, but positively
related to the quality improvement. The second term in equation (5.2-6)
is the amount of up-right shift in the demand curve corresponding to the
change in quality. The demand function can be written in another form
such that

Q = /(p, P(a))

( 5.2-9 )

dQ = /' p dp - /pdp(a) = /' p dp - /' p MRS ap d(-a)
In the linear form
dQ = /'pdp - / ' p ( l - T])d(-a)/n
= /* p (dp-(l-Ti)d(-a)/Ti)

(5.2-10)

If the product is searched across consumer groups, the average change
in product quantity is

E[(l - Ti)/ri] = r(l-l/p)/8-l
E(dQ) = /' p (dp - [r(l - l/p)/8 - l]d(-a))

( 5.2-11 )

The above equation is used in the consumer expected price approach.
Any change in product quality is transformed into an equivalent price
effect. If we are interested in the effect of quality improvement in a
specific product from

a set of substitutable products on
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consumer

welfare, a conditional multinominal logic model can be employed for
consumer welfare computation (Bresnahan [1986], Trajtenberg [1989]).

5.3. Evaluation of Consumer Quality Welfare at Partial Equilibrium
Evaluation of consumer gain from quality improvement for a set of
substitutable

products

in

a competitive

environment

may be

better

accomplished by using the concept of consumer surplus at the partial
equilibrium. The additional product component, RjR 2 S in Figure 5-2, in
consumer surplus is closely related to the pattern of demand for the
product and may be estimated under the assumption of

approximate

linear demand function in the domain of quality variation range, such
that

*Gi = (pc2 " PciXQi " Q2V2 = APcAQ/2
If APC and AQ are very small
AG1= eAP^Q^P!)

(5.3-1)

where e - price elasticity of the product demand, defined as PdQ/QdP;
Qi» Q 2 - demand for the product before and after the quality
improvement,

respectively;

P c l , P c 2 - consumer expected prices for the product before and
after the quality improvement, respectively.
Equation

(5.3-1) reveals that the additional product component in

consumer surplus is proportional to the increase in demand and the
expected price increment. The consumer surplus from the product with
higher price elasticity of demand is more sensitive to the quality
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improvement.
The quality loss (gain) component is the easy component in the
calculation of consumer surplus and it can be regarded as a minimum
estimate of consumer gain in quality improvement. The component is

AG2 = (Pel " Pc2)Ql =

AP

(5-3"2)

cQl

AG = AGj + AG2
AG = AP^Q! + AQ/2)

( 5.3-3 )

The above results contain an important implication for a government
policy decision maker to implement quality activity. In some countries,
such as Japan, the government stimulates the firm, whether it is private
or public, to improve product quality (or big companies stimulate the
smaller firm) by taxation, fund distribution, partnership and share of
profit. Quality improvement not only promotes the product competition
capability, but benefits the consumers when consumer surplus increases.
The higher the quality reputation for the firm, the more the consumers
would buy the firm's products.
We have to account for the effect of quality activity more carefully in
cases in which a change in one product quality has an effect on the other
in the competitive environment. We examine the effect

of

quality

improvement on two competitive commodities. Assume that X and Y are
close substitutes and their production costs are constant. As shown in
Figure 5-4, demand output is Q j for commodity y at price P x , while Q x l
is the demand output for X at price P x l . These two commodities are
relatively stable in the current market before a quality improvement is
implemented

for product X. Consumers notice a significant
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quality

improvement in product X and evaluate product X at the expected price
P x 2 , such that P x 2 < P x l . The consumer surplus increases by P x iP x 2 C 2 C 1 .
Since an increase in demand for product X would cause the demand curve
of product Y to shift from D to D', the total demand for product Y reduces.
Obviously, with a quality improvement in product X, consumers are
better off and some consumers would switch from buying product Y to
product X. The reduction of area RjR 3 D'D under demand curve D for
product Y is not to be regarded as a loss of consumer surplus because this
reduction in the area is simply

the consequence

of the consumer

bettering himself by switching from product Y to the higher quality
product X. Otherwise, double accounting would occur in the evaluation of
consumer's gains from quality improvement. The reduction in demand
for product Y is definitely the loss for firm Y whereas it is the gain for
firm X. These benefit redistribution in quality competition among the
producers.

0

Qy2

Qy ,

0

Q*lQx2

B

Figure 5-4 Quality Effect on Close Substitute Product

Moreover, in the perfect competitive market, the market mechanism
forces the equilibrium price of product Y to reduce to P

2

because of the

right-upward supply curve S in the short term market equilibrium. The
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demand output of Y now is Q

2

at price P 2 . In this dynamic situation, the

increment of consumer surplus resulting from decrease in the price of
product Y is P 2 P jRgR^ The total increment of benefit to the consumer
would be equal to the initial fall in the real price of product X due to
quality improvement plus the further induced fall in the equilibrium
price of product Y. If the consumer chooses the price of product X as a
base standard of price, the same conclusion derived from this situation
can be obtained. Symmetrical reasoning applies also to products that are
complements. It should be pointed out that the above discussion of pure
quality improvement is based on the assumption of all other conditions
being constant. The product with inferior quality could compete with the
higher quality product either by increasing its quality or by decreasing
its price.
The total loss for firm Y includes not only the part of cost uncovered
but also the part of profit previously earned. That is

AL = (P yl - q ) Q y l - (P y2 - C 2 )Q y2

( 5.3-4 )

= (- q Q y l + C2Qy2) + Q y l (P y l - Py2) + P y2 (Q yl - Qy2)

where AL - total loss for firm Y due to relative poor quality, $;
Qyi> Qy2 "

tne

demand for product Y in market equilibrium before

and after a quality improvement in product X, respectively;
Pyl' Py2 "

me

price for product Y in market equilibrium before

and after a quality improvement in product X, respectively;
Cj, C 2 - the cost for product Y before and after a quality
improvement in product X, respectively.
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The first part in the right hand side in equation (5.3-4) is the loss due
to the uncovered cost (or cost saving), and the second and the third part
are the losses due to the profit reduction in lower price and lower output.
As mentioned before, the above evaluation of consumer surplus is a
static model only accounted for the effects of quality improvement and
price change in quality activities. The production cost, taste of consumers,
income, population and other factors are assumed constant. However,
quality improvement is a continuous process involving time factors. A
dynamic model should be employed to evaluate quality effect over a time
period, and changes in other factors over time must be incorporated into
the model. The information uncertainty definitely has a negative impact
on consumer welfare not only because of larger consumer quality loss on
undeterministic product quality selection under risk aversion, but also
because of the price increase resulting from advertisement cost and other
resource waste.
A change in any product quality does not merely have direct effects on
the

close

substitutes,

the

complement

products,

and

final

(or

intermediate) demand pattern. It may have significant second or third
order effects on many other sectors in the economy. The quality effect
can be fully understood in the context of operation of the whole economic
system. A more powerful method, such as input/output model, could be
used to evaluate the effect of quality improvement on the whole society.

192

Chapter 6

6.1

Product Quality Function and Quality Cost Function

Background in Quality Function Development

A firm produces and supplies commodities with varied quality levels to
society. In quality economics the firm is regarded as a unit which decides
what level of the commodity quality will be produced in order to cover
costs and gain profits. Implementation of product quality plans and the
operation

of

technical

process

are

assumed

at

optimal

conditions.

Compared with the consumer behavior in previous chapters, the firm
consumes inputs which possess the required quality levels (raw material,
labor, capital, energy and other products) and produces commodities for
consumers. Product quality function is objective and the quality cost
function can be determined by quality specification.
In microeconomics

theory

the product

function

which

states

the

quantity of output as a function of quantities of variable inputs has fully
been developed in guiding firm production policies. Product quality
function,

however,

has

not

been

developed

to

respond

to

the

phenomenon of increased competition in quality. However, some basic
concepts of product quantity function can be directly applied to the
development of product quality function.
A firm product quality function is defined

as the relationship between

the quality of inputs and the quality of output. Mathematically, it is
expressed as follows

q = T(q)/( x1? x2, x3, ..., Xj, ..., xn )

( 6.1-1 )

where q - quality of an output product or output attribute, quality unit;
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Xj - quality of input factor i, quality unit;
T(q) - system function; it is related to the adopted production
system and the manufacturing process.
Input factors in the above function include not only physical items,
such as raw materials and intermediate products, but non-physical items,
such as labor skill, environmental factors and process conditions. System
function, T(q), is related to current technology utilization and prevailing
manufacturing processes. The better the utilization of technology, the
higher the value of T(q). Economic system design is employed to select an
alternative from a number of T(q) values which correspond to a set of
available technologies to meet economically the requirement of product
quality development. At first one can determine T(q), that is what system
should be employed; then one can choose a specific quality function from
a number of available input factor functions, / ( x p x 2 , x 3 , ..., Xj, ..., x n ).
Engineering quality design is aimed at enhancing technical efficiency to
optimize the output quality response which may be an intermediate
product quality, or final product quality, or an attribute of the final
product

resulting

from

reduction

of

environment

noise

and

manufacturing process influences. The best utilization of any particular
input quality combination is a technical problem, but the selection of the
best input quality combinations for the particular quality output belongs
to the realms of economic analysis. The output quality is related to input
quality parameters, manufacturing process ability in the short term and
technological innovation and progress in the long term. The output
quality response contains two major characteristics: quality target value
which is determined from a set of input quality combinations under the
current process capability

and environment disturbance, and
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quality

deviation from the target value. Taguchi and Phadke [1984], Leon et al.
[1987] and Phadke and Dehnad [1988] have developed and discussed a
two step procedure for product quality optimization. The first step is to
find values of control factors that minimize signal to noise ratio (s/n). It
is followed

by the second step which adjusts the mean on target.

Mathematically, it is
min a 2 (q)
subject to u.(q) = u.0
Phadke [1989] gives the details for such quality optimization.
Assume that quality variation

is normally

distributed.

An

output

quality and an input quality can be written as, respectively

q = q(u, a2)

( 6.1-2 )

Xi = Xj(m, a;2)

( 6.1-3 )

where u. - the mean of quality distribution;
a 2 - the variance of quality distribution.
Substitute equation (6.1-2) and equation (6.1-3) into equation (6.1-1)
to obtain

q(u., a 2 ) = T(q)/[ x ^ , o^2), x2(n2, a 2 2 ), ..., xn(p,n, a n 2 )] ( 6.1-4 )

In

traditional

quality

control,

engineers

and

managers

often

concentrate their attention on controlling the deviations of manufacturing
processes or promoting the quality of output response by introducing
new technology and machinery, i.e. specifying higher T(q) function. These
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methods are usually costly. The selection of input factor quality level for
output quality response ~ that is the determination of optimal levels of
various input factors

— is most effective

in quality control

which

corresponds to the optimization of quality design and quality engineering.
In recent decades quality competition has required new developments
in quality control and management methods. There have been a number
of methods developed

and employed in engineering product

quality

design in order to meet the challenge. This progress in quality activity
provides a basis for the establishment of product quality function as well
as quality economics. Taguchi's method is a good example of these quality
improvement
meaning.

methods,

Taguchi

which

methods

contains

consist

of

an

understandable

product

quality

economic

design

and

manufacturing process design. Taguchi and Wu [1985] gave the following
exposition of this modern approach.
The purposes of product quality design are to minimize the effect of
noise sources on product quality performance, to minimize the quality
variation

from

the target value, and to produce products that

insensitive to the component variation.

are

Product quality design consists of

three steps:
(1)

System Design (or Primary Design)

(2)

Parameter design (or Secondary Design)

(3)

Allowance design (or Tertiary Design)

System design determines the specification of the system needed to
meet

the

objectives.

A new

material,

new

operating

availability of advanced technology are major factors

method

and

to change or

improve system properties significantly. New system design also includes
the role of adding new attributes of performance with setting target
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values. Parameter design determines the optimum level of individual
parameters of the system within a wide range of performance conditions
at the lowest cost.
This is the core of product quality design. In spite of the details of
engineering methods, the meaningful economic policy is the first to select
the low priced

and wide varying element (or material) which is resistant

to the variation of performance condition from a substituted group,
instead of using high priced ones. Allowance design must be performed
after parameter design. Allowance design which determines the amount
of variation allowed from the target value emphasizes those noise factors
imparting a large effect on the quality response. This is a "cost-up" step
at which cost should be considered for controlling noise in a narrower
range. Elements with higher price and less variation are chosen instead of
low priced elements for which noise factors have a large contribution to
product quality performance.
Manufacturing process design implements the specification of product
quality performance in production processes.

It also consists of three

steps:
(1)

System design

(2)

Parameter design

(3)

Allowance design

The current manufacturing process may or may not be suitable for the
above

product

manufacturing

quality
process

specification.
system

System

at current

design

technology

produce the product designed in the R&D department.

determines
availability

a
to

Parameter design

is a cost effective step in manufacturing process design which determines
the

optimum

conditions

of

each

process,
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including

materials

and

components.

Thus, the influence of causes on the process capability can

be reduced considerably.

On the other hand, through parameter design,

factors which do not affect quality substantially but make noticeable
differences in cost for different levels can be found. In parameter design,
the existing process is adjusted to its optimal operating condition and
continuous

innovations

short-term.

Similar

are

made

to allowance

on

the

design

existing

in product

process

in

quality

the

design,

allowance design in manufacturing process design is costly. It is used to
determine to what extent a factor causes variation in quality or defective
rate, and controls quality by narrowing those factor tolerances which
have a large influence on quality variation.
tight tolerance for those factors which

It can be used to open the

have little effect on quality but

are costly to operate with narrow tolerances.
In this research,

however,

between output quality

we are interested

and the input factor

in

the

relationship

qualities in

economic

analysis. As mentioned in Chapter 3, consumers measure product quality
with its performance under a wide range of operation conditions. A
product that has been designed and built without consideration of noise
disturbance is definitely inferior to a product that has undergone robust
quality design under environment variation. By using the quality design
method, the product quality function (6.1-4) can be simply expressed by
(see Taguchi, 1984; Kackar, 1985)

q(u, o 2 , C /noise) = T(q)/(Y lf Y2, Y3, Y4/noise)
3q/3m = T(qO)/!(n)

dq/da2

3q/8^i2 = T(q°)/ 2 (n)

dq/dc22 = 0
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= TfoO)/^)

( 6.1-5 )

3q/du 3 = 0

3q/8a 3 2 = T(q°)/ 3 (a 2 )

dq/d\i4 = 0

3q/3a 4 2 = 0

where u, -

response quality mean;

o2 -

response quality variance;

£ - product performance measure,

£ = 10 log(u./a)2, called signal

to noise ratio (s/n);
Yj - input factors influencing £ only;
Y 2 - input factors influencing u. only;
Y 3 - input factors influencing o 2 only;
Y4 -

input factors with no detectable influence;

T(q°) - constant system function.
The

noise

contains

environmental

conditions

and

uncontrollable

product variations. Experimental design methods are used to perform
quality design under noise disturbance. In the analysis of factors' effects
on response quality, the first step identifies factors Y1 which affect C,
significantly. The maximum performance measure C, is usually selected
from a set of values of
Taguchi [1985]

t, which are observed in settings factors

proposed the optimization of

Yx.

"signal to noise" ratio in

product quality design to distinguish input factors

Yl.

The second stage distinguishes factors Y 2 which affect u. only from a set
of input factors. The levels of factors Y 2 are chosen in a way to force the
response quality mean to equal the target value.
A third stage identifies factors Y3 that influence o 2 only. This is a costly
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procedure and should be carried out carefully.
Factors Y 4 have no detectable influence upon £, u. and a 2 . These factors
are usually ignored in traditional quality activity but are meaningful in
quality economics.
The effect of input factors on output response quality will be discussed
in the product quality function, and the system function will be analyzed
in quality cost function.

6.2

Basic Properties of Product Quality Function

6.2.1 Quality Mean Function
Product quality is usually characterized by the mean value and the
variance. All quality is expressed in terms of one quantity unit.
Following the concepts developed in the context of product quantity
function, we will define a set of

concepts to describe product quality

properties. The mean marginal quality (MMQ) is partially derivative with
respect to the quality mean of factor i.

MMQ = aq/a^i
= d/[ x ^ , o-!2), x2(n2, a22), ..., xn(un, cn2)]/ani

( 6.2.1-1 )

The effect of the mean value |ij on the product quality target is defined
as follows

qGOI x j=(r/[ x l 0 foi). x2°(^2)> ". ^(Hi). •». x n ° ( M ' Xj=0
j = l,2,... n ; i * j

(6.2.1-2)
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where Xj° - input factor j that remains constant.
The shape of the relationship between u.- and u. is shown in Figure 6-1
when the mean values of other input factors remain constant. The quality
range between a and b is limited by current available technology and
manufacturing process. Changes in other input factor qualities may alter
the relationship between \it and u..

<m

0

bx.(u

a

Figure 6-1 Relationship Between Output Quality and Input Quality
In practice, the mean quality curves and their corresponding mean
marginal quality (MMQ)

have various patterns, which are based on the

assumption that the response quality mean is related to input factor i
quality while the other factor qualities remain constant.

The procedure

for finding the optimal mean value for the output quality from a set of
input factor quality means is deterministic; no stochastic process is
involved. Therefore, it is usually possible to find a combination of specific
input factor qualities to maximize the output product quality. It should
be noted that the product quality mean function is constructed from left
to right. All input factor quality means commonly determine an optimal
output quality target, and their relations are fixed. Any increase in the
output target must require another specific combination of the quality
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means of input factors. To optimize the response quality mean, the MMQ
for input factor i should be

aq/au-i = / i = 0

( 6.2.1-3 )

where / ; = 3/[ x^m, ax2), x2(p.2, o 2 2 )

xn(un, CTn2)]/au.j.

If we are interested in the optimization of the response quality mean
under

current

conditions

of

technology, equation (6.2.1-3)

manufacturing

process

and

prevailing

can be rewritten as:

3<l/3ui 'hi s ui <; ai = / i >bi < ui £ ai = °

( 6-2-1"4 )

where aj, bj - upper and lower bounds for the input factor i at current
conditions, aj and bj vary in the long term. Some factors may satisfy the
boundary conditions.
Therefore, we can find a combination of input quality levels under the
current manufacturing system to optimize the output response quality
target. Assume all input factors are independent. If the relationship
between the quality response mean and the quality mean of input factor
i is nonlinear, the higher order (more than power 2) can be ignored. That
is

x,(|i) = gftii) + k(uj2) + R
= q ^ + C 2 Hi2

( 6.2.1-5 )
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where p.; _ mean value of input factor i;
C [ , C 2 _ coefficients of first order and second order of u,j,
respectively;
R - higher orders of u.;, power > 2.
The mean marginal quality, MMQ, for input factor i is

aq/a^i = c t + 2 c 2 U.J = o
^ii = -C 1 /2C 2

(6.2.1-6)

The linear relationship between input factor quality mean u.j and the
response quality mean u. is

q[Xi(u.)] =CHj
aq/a^ij = C

( 6.2.1-7 )

Based on the boundary conditions, the desired point for input factor i
can be determined.
If C = 0, input factor quality mean \i{ does not have any effect (or

little

effect, C * 0) on the response quality mean.
If C < 0, input factor quality mean u.j has a negative effect on the
response quality mean. The extreme point at the low side boundary
corresponding to the optimum value of the response quality mean should
be chosen.
If C > 0, input factor quality mean \il has a positive contribution to the
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response quality mean. The extreme point at the upper boundary should
be selected to optimize the response quality mean.
If

an interaction

among factors

occurs, it changes

the

optimum

response quality value. The higher order of interaction may generally be
ignored. The effect of interaction on the output quality target should be
carefully examined and interpreted. If the reduction in the quality target
value due to interaction is considerable, an alternative combination of
input factors may be needed. The contribution of a single factor quality
on the response quality is fixed without accounting for the effects of
other input factors when no interaction is present. Otherwise, the levels
of the interacting factors must also be taken into consideration.
If two input factors

are independent

but their qualities

can be

substituted, the priority order for individual factor quality depends on
(1) which one is easier to control, and (2) their cost ratio. Suppose the
voltage from a DC circuit is required to be 200 ± 2V. The

component

current I and resistance R are normally and independently distributed,
such that

V = IR
^v = ^i "R

°2V

= H2R o2i + M-2i <>2R

( 6.2.1-8 )

where u. v , u^and u.R - the mean values for voltage, current and resistance,
respectively;
a 2 v , a 2 ! and o 2 R - the variances for voltage, current and resistance,
respectively.
There are many combinations of I and R to meet the requirement of
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voltage

output. The selection

criterion

means that the

combination

possesses the lower cost and is more easily controlled. If the combination
of I = (2 + 0.6) and R = (100 ± 4) is easier to control than the combination
of I = (1± 0.6) and R = (200 ± 4), the first alternative is accepted.
In general, equation (6.1.1-6) can be written in the following form

q(u, a 2 , C /noise) = T(q)f[(Yl, Y2, Y3, Y4)/noise]

( 6.2.1-9 )

/(Yj/noise) = ftlxfa, o^2), x2(n2, a 2 2 ), ... x ^ , a p 2 )]
/(Y 2 /noise) = /j[xp+1(Up+1, a p+1 2 ), Xp+2(np+2, a p+2 2 ), ... x0(u.0, O 0 2 )]
/(Y 3 /noise) = /k[x0+1(u,0+1> a 0+1 2 ), x 0+2 (^ 0+2 , o 0+2 2 ), ... xn(^in, a n 2 )]
/(Y 4 /noise) = /|[x n+1 (n n+1 , a n+1 2 ), x ^ u ^ , a n+2 2 ), ... x j u ^ , a m 2 )]
i =1, 2 ..., p; j = p+1, p+2, ..., o; k = o+l, o+2, ..., n; 1 = n+1, n+2, ..., m

where /|[x n + 1 (n n + 1 , a n + 1 2 ), x n+2 (p, n+2 , a n + 2 2 ), :.. x m (n m , a m 2 )] is the part that
contains all input factors whose changes in quality levels have little or no
effect

on the quality response. Although part Y 4 has no effect on

engineering design at this stage, it is meaningful in selection from a group
of substituted input factors in light of the cost criterion, and should not
be dropped from the product quality function. Each factor in part 1 could
be selected from the cheap priced group. While the part /j[x p + 1 (u. p + 1 ,
°p+i 2 )' xp+2(llp+2' °"P+22)' quality

levels

affect

x

o(^o' a o 2 )l

the

contains the

quality

response

factors whose changes in
significantly,

since

it

contributes nothing to the output quality variance low priced and low
grade input factors can be chosen. The above two parts are cost free or
cost effective.

It needs both engineering and economic attention to
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determine input factor values in part fl[xl(\ily

Oj2), x 2 (|i 2 , a 2 2 ), ... x (p. ,

a p 2 ) ] . Hunter [1985] pointed out that even when the response quality
function is known, the environment noise produces variability in the
response and reduces the quality of product performance. Therefore, the
input factor quality values are chosen so that the response quality
variance is minimized under disturbance of the environment noise. Or, in
order

to meet consumer

requirements,

further

reduction

of

quality

variation is needed. A high grade with high priced input factor may be
desired in this group. In all, the optimization of the output quality mean
is cost-effective. From the product quality function, the input factor
means are set in levels such that the output quality target value is
uniquely determined. Any optimal combination of input factor means to
increase the target value should be evaluated in economic analysis based
on the firm's objectives.

6.2.2 Quality Variance Function
In the quality optimization procedure, we search the optimum response
quality in conditions in which all input factors are set at their optimal
operating quality levels. Nothing is said about the variation from the
operating point. Once the response quality target value and all input
factor operating levels are determined, we should work out how to
specify the allowance derived from the quality deviation from the mean
value in real operating environment conditions. Compared with

the

unique quality target value setting in the above section, the specific
quality variance can be obtained by a number of combinations of input
quality

variances.

These

steps

(mean

value

determination

and

the

variance setting) are in order and cannot be inversed. We will prove that
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the quality variation can only be minimized after the determination of
the output quality target value. Generally, when the system function is
predetermined, in the short term the product quality function is

q = /(xi, x2, ..., xn)

where q - the output quality;
Xj - the quality of input factor i.
Total differential for the above equation
dq = /idx! + / 2 dx 2 +..., + / n dx n + ..., + /ydxjdXj + R
where R are the higher order items and usually can be ignored. The
above equation can also be written in another form
Aq = / 1 Axj + / 2 Ax 2 +..., + / n Ax n + ..., + /JJAXJAXJ
Quality variation is stochastic and may be assumed to be normally
distributed. Assume that the value of / f (MMQ) is constant in the small A,
and all input factors are independent. For Aq ^ c 2 (|i ^ u.0) and Axj ~ a2i(u.j *

V(Aq) =f\ V(Axj) + / 2 2 V(Ax 2 ) +..., + / 2 n V(Ax n ) +..., + /^(AxjAXj)
o 2 = f\a\

+ S\<5\ +...,+ f\<s\ +...,+ ftfii* o2j + u,V j )

For Aq „ o2(\i = u0) and Axj „ a 2 i (|i i = |ii0)

f2M = Ro) => °
/2i(Hi * M^io) * / 2 i(m = mo)» /2ijM-2j(Mjo * MJO) * / W ^ j O = M

a 2 0i*u 0 ) ;> o2(u = no)

(6.2.2-1 )
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These factors, Y 2 and Y 4 , which do not affect the response quality
variation, are not involved in the allowance quality design procedures
such that the quality variance function is written as

q(a 2 /n=p 0 , £, noise) = /[(Y l f Y3)/p,=|i0, £, noise]

( 6.2.2-2 )

/ ( Y i / u ^ o , £, noise) = f\ x ^ a ^ / u ^ m , , ) , x 2 (c 2 2 /n 2 =n 20 ), ...
Xp(a p 2 /ltp=lipo )1

/(Y3/u.=p0, C, noise) = / k [ x 0+1 (a 0+1 2 ), x 0+2 (a 0+2 2 ), ... x n (a n 2 )]

Any

deviation

contributes

from

positively

the
to

quality

the

mean

response

values

quality

of

input

deviation

factors

from

the

response target value.
The average variance quality (AVQ) and the marginal variance quality
(MVQ) for input factor i are defined as

da2/dai2

AVQ = q(a 2 )/aj 2

( 6.2.2-3 )

MVQ = aq(a2)/aOi2

( 6.2.2-4 )

designates

how many

unit changes

in response

quality

variance due to one unit change in input factor i quality variance, when
other factor quality variances remain constant. In other words, it is the
weight for one unit change in input factor i quality variance. AVQ

is the

percentage of contribution for input factor i variance onto the response
quality variance. There are many sets of solutions to determine the
combination of input factor variances for a desired value of response
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quality variance. But the problem is to choose a solution in the scope of
quality economics analysis. The output quality variance elasticity of a-2,
expressed by to, is defined as the proportionate rate of change of output
quality variance q(o 2 ) with respect to input factor variance Cj2:

o)j = /(o 2 i )Aq(o 2 )/(q(o 2 )A/(a 2 i )) = / ( a 2 i ) a q / q ( a 2 ) a / ( a 2 i )
= AVQ/MVQ

( 6.2.2-5 )

Aq = (OjqA/i/Zi

We will

examine

( 6.2.2-6 )

the relationships

between

the response

quality

variation and the input factor i quality variation, shown in Figure 6-2. In
part a of Figure 6-2, the response quality variation is simply a linear
function of an input factor quality variation. Any change along the
location of input factor curve does not alter the output quality variance.

q(o2) = /(of)
a2 = bo-2
acryaaj 2 = b

( 6.2.2-7 )

In part b of Figure 6-2, the response quality variation is a nonlinear
function of input factor i quality variation. One can expect that the
response quality variation will be minimized when the partial derivative
is the minimum along the input factor curve (Taguchi [1985]).

q(o2) = /(of)
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aa2/aOi2 = /^of)

( 6.2.2-8 )

In part c of Figure 6-2, two linear input factor quality variations lead to
parallel contour curves for a set of response quality variation while two
nonlinear factor quality variations lead to nonparallel contour curves,
shown in part d, ox2 < a 2 2 < c 3 2 . This situation can be expanded to n input
factor quality variations.
Define the rate of quality technical substitution, RTS(qj), for input
factors i and j as:

RTS(q y ) = - d/(a 2 i)/d/(o 2 j)

( 6.2.2-9 )

In part c of Figure 6-2
q(c 2 ) = f(Cl2) + /(o 2 2 )
o2 = b 1 o l 2 + b2a22
da 2 = b^af

+ b 2 da 2 2

RTS(q 12 ) = b ^

( 6.2.2-10 )

In part d
q(a 2 ) = / ( o y , o22)
do 2 = fxdcx2 + f26a22 + fx26<5x26a22
d o 2 « / 1 d o 1 2 + / 2 d022

RTS(q 12 ) = - d a 1 2 / d a 2 2 = / 2 / / 1
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( 6.2.2-11 )

c

d

Figure 6-2 Relationship Between Input Factor Variance
And Response Quality Variance

Generally, the response quality variance has or can be approximately
transformed into an additive function form in which the response quality
variance is simply a sum of individual input factor quality variances

a 2 = / ( o y ) + / ( a 2 2 ) + ..., / ( o f ) + ..., + / ( a n 2 )

( 6.2.2-12 )

We classify all input factor variances into two groups, one of which
contains the input factor variances that can be more efficiently

and

economically controlled. In the other group, input factor variances are
costly or difficult to control.

q(a2/p.=n0, £, noise) = g2[ x^Oj 2 ), x 2 (a 2 2 ), ... x^Oj2)] +
82! x i+i(°i+i 2 )' xi+2(°"i+22)> - ^ n 2 ) ]
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( 6.2.2-13 )

where gj - first group that can be economically controlled.
g 2 - second group that cannot be economically controlled.
There are several possible scenarios to achieve the predetermined
response quality specification (variance): We may (1) reduce variances in
group 1 or group 2, respectively, (2) reduce variances in group 1 and
group 2 simultaneously, and (3) reduce variances in group 1 but increase
variances in group 2 when the benefit from group 1 is more than the loss
from the group 2. The economic criteria for the response quality variance
specification will be discussed in combination with quality cost function
in the next section.
The product quality variation usually is specified as a multiple of
standard deviation, that is

A = ±3a
= ± 3{/(a 1 2 ) + /(o 2 2 ) + ..., /(of) + ..., + / ( a n 2 ) } ^
A/Aj = o,/Oj

( 6.2.2-14 )
( 6.2.2-15 )

where A - the product quality specification (or manufacturing
specification);
Aj - the quality specification for attribute i.
The relationship between A and input factor quality variation is no
longer linear and additive. One unit reduction in the specification A
corresponds to more than one unit reduction in the quality variance a 2 .
We can derive a number of the same (or similar) formula and conclusions
for A as for quality variance a 2 .
Quality of production and quality control are implemented through top
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managers to workers in the production line. It is impossible to produce
higher product quality if the human factors are not fully considered in
the

total

quality

management.

Quality

competition

also

involves

management. An effective management approach should be developed in
U.S. industry, though it is more difficult to establish than the methods of
engineering quality optimization, to meet the increased quality challenge
worldwide.
6.3

Quality Cost Function Features

6.3.1 Quality Cost Function in the Short Term
The short term in quality activity is defined as the period in which the
quality system function is fixed. However, it is a relatively longer term
with respect to other economic parameters, such as quantity output level.
The reason

is that once the quality

level is set, other

economic

parameters in turn can be determined.
A controversy and an inconsistency in the relationship between quality
and cost exist in both theoretical concepts and empirical evidence. There
are many different approaches to quality cost modeling to show the role
of

cost-based

quality

control

[Campanella and Corcoran, 1983;

and

management

Gilmore, 1983;

strategic

decisions

Gale and Brance, 1982;

Phillips et al., 1983; Bader, 1983; Batson, 1988]. However, since

quality

costs are defined differently based on the assessment, background and
understanding

of quality control activities in different

research

and

practical areas, a general quality cost function should be formed to verify
the relationship between quality and cost. Quality cost functions are used
to provide an evaluation basis for quality activity and give economic
criteria

for

decision

making,

allocation
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of

resources,

investment,

budgeting, etc.
In microeconomics, the term "cost function" is used to denote cost
expressed as a function of output and input prices.

The term "cost

equation" is used to denote cost expressed in terms of input levels and
input price. A set of theoretical concepts, such as marginal cost, have
been fully

developed. A firm's

optimal behavior can be illustrated

completely on the basis of quality cost function.

However there is a need

to set up quality cost function and quality cost equation to guide quality
planning and quality activities. A number of research and empirical
efforts have contributed to the quality cost of production conformance;
few papers are related to the quality cost of quality target value settings.
There is a number of cost categories related to quality activities. They
are usually classified into four major groups as follows:
(1)

Research and Development Cost.

Product quality design cost

belongs to this group in which the engineering and laboratory resources
as well as time taken are the major elements that contribute to quality
improvement. The quality design makes the product performance robust
to the environment condition variations and keeps the

manufacturing

and operating costs at a minimum.
(2)

Manufacturing

Cost.

Manufacturing

cost

includes

machinery,

labor, energy, raw materials, reworking,

inspection.

Through

parameter

design

and

equipment,

scrapping,

allowance

design,

and
the

lower-grade materials and optimal manufacturing conditions are selected.
Processes

with

less

sensitivity

to

manufacturing

disturbances

considerably reduce the manufacturing cost expended on the control of
operation conditions.
(3)

Maintenance

Cost.

The

worker-retraining
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cost,

production

maintenance cost, and inventory of spare parts are in this group. The
higher product

quality,

especially

for

higher reliability

and

lower

deterioration, significantly reduces the large maintenance and inventory
costs.
(4)

Investment

Cost

and

Cycle

Time

Cost.

Continuous

improvement needs capital investment for new technology,

quality
advanced

process, and new materials. Higher quality provides a higher

profit

margin and a higher rate of return. Without capital investment, it is
impossible to gain the advantage in future quality competition. However,
the conventional quality cost classification does not involve the costs of
design cycle and manufacturing process cycles. As Stalk Jr. [1989] points
out, time is another strong strategic weapon to strengthen a firm's
competitive advantage, like money, productivity and quality. Chandler
[1989] notes that a company will lose 50% of the potential revenues in a
new product if it enters a market nine to twelve months later than its
competitors.

In the next decade, competition will be focused on quality,

price and time.
a faster

To achieve the advantage of higher quality, low cost and

time cycle, a new quality engineering

method

should

be

combined with other quality approaches to promote a competitive edge
in product quality.
Concurrency is an effective method for schedule compression which
challenges the prevailing quality activities.

Reduction of cycle time can

not be achieved by prevailing quality approaches which run in series
from

quality development

to final

inspection. The role of

quality

assurance in concurrent engineering is to develop hard technical data,
quality

design

information,

and quality

cost flow

data on

quality

performance, manufacturing processes, controlling and test field in time
215

to determine the corrective action taken. The quality activities are
performed in parallel. For two products with comparable quality and
price level, success depends upon which one is introduced into the
market earlier.
the first time."

Another concept related to time advantage is "do it right
The early stages and crucial processes could be given

heavier weights to stimulate the redesign and the corrective action to be
taken as soon as possible.
Lundvall and Juran [1974] proposed a traditional model of quality
improvement to reveal the relationship between quality and per unit
production cost in conforming product. A trade-off between increases in
both quality and cost determines the optimal level q*. Beyond the
optimal level q*, higher quality results in higher cost. Taguchi's methods
in on-line and off-line quality control are designed to provide higher
quality at lower prices through the reduced production cost approach. A
quality loss function is added into the conventional cost function to
achieve higher quality settings (Taguchi et al., 1989;
Obviously, these two models are inconsistent.

Tang, 1989).
Although Fine [1986]

uses a quality-based learning model to explain why quality and low costs
need not be inconsistent, the question "What is economic criteria in
quality design?" still persists. From a quality economics argument, it is
likely that in the short term, the relation between cost and quality at the
early stages of product quality design and process design would be in a
negative direction, and then, after the implementation of robust product
quality design and quality learning, cost and quality would run positively
for

further

quality modification.

In the long term, quality cost is

associated with the properties of product quality life cycle and the
utilization of advanced technology and science.
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The ambiguous relationship between quality and cost is more seriously
distorted by conventional cost accounting system which uses direct labor
hours as an allocation base. As Cooper and Kaplan [1988] point out,
effective decisions about pricing, marketing product design, and product
mix depend on the degree of accurate knowledge of cost information.
They recommended an activity-based cost accounting system to guide
corporate strategy for production of multiple products.
One unit of output and input is used to carry out measurement of
quality cost. With respect to the output quality target design

(see

equation (6.2.1-9)), the output quality cost is

C(q/n)=C1(Y1/n1, o\) + C2(Y2/n2) + C3(Y3/ c23) + C4(Y4)
C4(Y4) = min[C(Xl), C(x2)

( 6.3.1-1 )

C(xn)]

C 3 (Y 3 /p 3 ) = 0
C2(Y2/u.2=p02) = m i n ^ x j / p ^ u ^ ) , C(x2/|i2=p02), ..., C(xm/pm=p02)]

where C(.) - cost for the quality mean value.
Input factors Y 4 have no detectable influence on the output quality.
The input factor with the lowest cost (price) in group Y 4 is chosen, and its
cost can be treated as fixed quality cost. Input factors Y 2 affect the output
quality mean only; low priced but wide variation factors are selected
after the quality design is finished. Group Y 3 has no contribution on the
mean value cost function, but its cost will depends on the influence on
the quality variance. Input factors Yj's costs are balanced for both effects
in quality mean and in quality variation. It usually requires high-grade
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materials at higher prices. We always can find a lowest cost alternative
corresponding to the specific parameter quality design. For a set of
product quality designs, q^M-i) ^ q2(l*2) > ... ^ qi(M-i) ^ ... ^ %(Vn)> i l

is

rationally assumed that the quality mean cost is a nondecreasing function
with respect to the change in product quality mean (target),

C^q^u^) £

C 2 (q 2 /p 2 ) > ... > C^qj/p..) > ... £ C n (q n /p n ). The cost for output quality mean
is

C^ = Cj + C 2 + C4 = C(M-) + b

(6.3.1-2)

ac^/au= coo > o
where C

- the cost for ouput quality mean value;

Cj - the cost for input quality factor i mean value;
C(.) - the cost function for quality mean value.
Assume the cost without product quality optimization methods is C^*,
then

cR* > c^, acR*/ap > ac^/ap, c o o > coo

(6.3.1-3)

If we define p * as the quality target value at current conditions, the
difference, ci , between p.* and the product quality mean value u. is

S = p* - p,

- del = dp

dCR/dp = dC^/d(-cO = C'(ct) > 0

( 6.3.1-4 )
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The cost function for the quality target is a convex function of quality
deviation.
The quality mean value design also provides a smaller quality variance
than the quality variance without the optimal methods (see equation
(6.2.2-1)). In the output quality variance modification,

any

further

reduction in input factor variances is costly. From the experiments and
empirical data, the relationship between input factor variance and cost
can be expressed as a decreasing function in the quality variance domain.

aCi(o 2 )/ao 2 i = Cj' < 0 or aCi(a2)/a(-a2i)= - C^ > 0

( 6.3.1-5 )

The cost of output quality variance is

C(c2) = q t o 2 ! ) + C2(o22) + ... + Cj(G2j) + ... + Cn(a2n)

( 6.3.1-6 )

aC(a2)/3o2i = qXo2;) < 0

( 6.3.1-7 )

a2C(o2)/a(a2i )2= Ci"(a2i) < 0

( 6.3.1-8 )

The variance cost function is (1) decreasing and (2) convex over the
domain

of

quality

noncontrollable

variation.

input factors

The

in quality

costs

for

controllable

variance function

and

have the

following obvious patterns:

C g l (c 2 ) < C g2 (o 2 ),

IC'gll < ICg2l

( 6.3.1- 9 )

where gl and g 2 are the controllable and the noncontrollable input
factors, respectively.
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We can adjust the input factor variances to minimize the total quality
variance cost such that
Min C(a2)
Subject to a 2 = a 2 0
L = C(a2) + Ma 2 - a20)
Substitute

equation

(6.2.2-12)

and equation

(6.3-6) into the

above

equation
L = [ C ^ ) + C2(o22) + ... + Cn(o2n)] + X[f(c\) + /(o 2 2 ) +... + /(a 2 ,)]
3L/aa2i = Cj + \ / j = 0
aL/aa2- = Cj + Xfi = 0
C'i/C'j = /i//j = - RTS(qij)

( 6.3.1-10 )

The absolute value of RTS(qij) for every pair of input factor variances i
and j , holding the levels of output quality variance and all other input
factor variances constant, must equal the ratio of their marginal costs. If
the condition of equation (6.3.1-10) is not satisfied, one can adjust the
input factor variances to achieve the minimum cost given output quality
variance. We can use quality variation specification A to derive the same
conclusion.
Considering the product quality function and cost equation, the cost is
an implicit function of the quality level of output, input costs and the
costs of

fixed inputs.

C(p) = 4>[q00, IC(Pi)] + b

( 6.3.1-11 )
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C(a 2 ) = <*>[q(a2), L C ^ 2 ) ]

( 6.3.1-11' )

C(a) = «D[q(u, a 2 ), XC(p b a 2 )] + b = <fr[a, C ^ ) ] + b

( 6.3.1-11")

where C(a) - the total quality cost function;
*[a, C(aj)] - the quality cost function which is related to the input
factor quality costs and output quality level;
b - the fixed cost.
Costs in the above equations only include the quality design cost and
quality control cost. Lundvall and Juran [1974] presented two distinct
classes of conformance-related costs. The concepts in this static economic
model can be expanded to all the quality stages from quality design to
service quality after product sale. The patterns of various costs are still
valid in the total quality function. Quality of design and quality of
conformance were regarded as two distinguished quality activities in the
conventional quality approach. As proved in the previous section, the
optimal

quality

design

also increased

the conformance

quality

and

reduced its cost. The conformance quality cannot be separated from the
quality design procedures, and its cost is regarded as a part of total
quality cost.
There are three distinct classes of quality costs in light of their
relationships with quality change in the conventional quality approach.
They are quality operation cost, failure cost, and prevention and quality
setting cost. Quality operation cost consists of time and resource costs in R
and D, equipment maintenance cost, inventory cost, energy consumption
cost, quality planning, data

acquisition

and reporting. Failure

cost

includes internal failure costs, such as scrap, rework, downtime and yield
losses, and the external failure costs, such as warranty, penalty, service,
221

cash return, rebate, recall, uncovered material and labor. Prevention and
quality setting cost contains design cost, inspection cost, process control,
high-grade materials, test cost and quality planning. The costs of the
product parameter and allowance designs (see equations (6.3.1-11) and
(6.3.1-11')) are classified into this cost class. The operation, failure, and
prevention and quality setting costs are constant, strictly decreasing, and
strictly increasing as the quality deviation decreases, shown in Figure
6-3. The total quality cost, therefore, is

c(ci) = c0(ci) + q<ci) + cp(ci)

( 6.3.1-12 )

ac(ci)/a(-ci) = c f + c p
C o = 0, c f <o, c p > o
if c f + c p = o, ac(ci)/a(-ct) = o

( 6.3.1-13 )

Before the minimum cost point
Cfl(a) > C^a) > 0

( 6.3.1-14 )

Cfl<Cfh<0,C"<0

( 6.3.1-15 )

After the minimum cost point
Cfh(a) > Cfl(a) > 0

( 6.3.1-16 )

Cfh>Cfl>0,C">0

( 6.3.1-17 )

where C 0 - operation cost, $;
C f - failure cost, $;
C p - prevention and quality setting cost, $;
C fl - cost function for lower product quality setting;
C fh - cost function for higher product quality setting.
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Figure 6-3 Three Types of Quality Costs and Quality Setting

When marginal costs for failure and prevention and quality setting are
equal in terms of absolute value, the total quality cost achieves the
lowest point. Although constant operation cost has no contribution on the
determinant of quality setting, it does have a noticeable effect on the
minimum total cost. This trade-off cost approach can be used to illustrate
the firm's strategy that under the same quality setting, it minimizes the
total cost in order to gain the potential quality cost rent. Any quality
activity

which

reduces quality costs is adopted. For instance, the

concurrent engineering method reduces operation cost and time cycle. It
also helps product quality redesign through a quality leaning curve.
These approaches, which change the shapes of failure cost and prevention
cost, can have significant effects
traditional

quality

economics

on the quality settings. However,

theory

assumes

that

the quality

cost

function is convex, such that the higher quality products are more costly
to

be produced. The firm is not stimulated to provide consumers with

anything other than the minimum quality product. This

assumption

ignores the optimal quality engineering approaches, the producer quality
learning ability and the effective

quality managerial methods which
223

reduce quality cost and increase product quality simultaneously. The
quality function with U shape is more rational to describe the quality
activity theoretically and practically.
Taguchi [1984] proposed a producer's quality loss function

which

decreases with quality improvement. Taguchi et al. [1989] added the loss
function into the total cost function to determine the quality specification.
A noticeable piece of evidence for the loss function addition is that the
producer would suffer a serious sell loss (market share reduction) due to
consumer switching from inferior product quality to the competitor's
product, though all products may be in the conforming limitation. This
cost is omitted

in conventional

quality

approaches. Through

these

methods, equation (6.3.1-12) becomes

C(A) = C0(ct) + Cf(cO + Cp(ft) + CL(ci)

( 6.3.1-18 )

ac(ci)/a(-ci) = c f + c p + c L , c L < o
To meet the cost minimization conditions

ac(cO/a(-ci) = c f + c p =o, ac(ct*)/a(-ci) = c f + c p + c L = o
where CL(ci) - the quality loss function in terms of cost.
Obviously, q(ci*) > q(ci'). The quality setting is further promoted in the
cost minimization approach when the quality loss function is accounted
for in the total quality cost. In a competitive environment, both the
minimum quality level and the optimal quality setting increase. The
strategy for minimizing loss at the same manufacturing unit cost, or
minimizing both quality loss and manufacturing cost, can gain both
advantages in quality and cost.
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As shown in Figure 6-4, in a competitive environment, TQCj reflects the
total quality cost with an addition of quality loss function due to the
consumer switch effect. The cost for the minimum quality standard is Cx
rather than C 0 . Both the minimum quality standard and the optimal
quality setting are demonstrated higher, i.e. q(Sj) > q(a 0 ) and q(a* t ) >
q(a* 0 ). If no competition is considered, the total quality cost TQC0 would
be employed.
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Figure 6-4 Effect of Quality Loss Function on Minimum Quality Standard

The above approaches do not consider

the quality reaction

and

preference on the consumer side (demand side). Some costs, such as
warranty, reworking cost, and advertising cost, are directly related to
consumer behavior. Without accounting for consumer behavior under
quality variation, the total cost is undetermined and, in turn, the quality
settings are not fully optimized. The producer's quality loss function
should be replaced by the consumer's quality loss function.
The quality cost function is expressed in terms of product unit, item, or
attribute, whereas the quantity cost function is related to the output
level. The total cost is the quality cost per unit multiplied by quantity
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output plus the fixed cost

C = C(ci)Q + b

(6.3.1-19)

The product quality and quantity settings are processed successively.
The firm, based on its long term goal, first sets the product quality level
and then determines the output quantity. In quantity production the
input factor costs (or price) are predetermined in the quality system
evaluation and quality design. The input factors in quantity production,
KLME (capital, labor, materials and energy), are also needed in the
quality design and quality control. The operation cost, failure cost, and
prevention and quality setting costs in quality cost function represent the
unit cost for the quantity production. The quality loss function can be
treated as either a pure concept of quality loss or the actual waste of
KLME, depending on the firm's specific requirement. These quality costs
also meet the assumptions in classical microeconomics. It is difficult and
unnecessary to distinguish pure quality cost from quantity costs. The
conventional cost equation can be rewritten as

C = r1(S)x1 + r2(ci)x2 + ... + rn(ci)xn + b

( 6.3.1-20 )

where input factor cost (price), r ^ S ) , is not constant, but related to the
quality settings. The quantity of input factor Xj is determined by the
producer's objective. Combined with the quantity and quality product
functions and the path of production expansion, the total cost function is
used to denote the output level and the quality cost per unit plus the
fixed cost.
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C = <D(ct,Q) + b

( 6.3.1-21 )

where C - total cost;
*&(&» Q) - cost function; It is related to the costs of input factor
qualities and quantities and the levels of output product quality
and quantity.
After

the product quality level is determined,

the quantity

cost

function is

C = <D[Q/0I = &0)] + b

(6.3.1-22)

If the quality cost per unit is constant (or say, product quality has been
determined), the total cost function becomes the quantity cost function,
which possesses the general properties in classical microeconomics. The
combination

of

quantity

economics

(current

microeconomics)

development of quality economics will provide a richly

with

interesting

research area.
In the following,
improvement

in

we will describe the firm's

perfectly

competitive

and

activity of

monopolistic

quality
markets

respectively. To maximize profit, for instance, all agents are price takers
in perfect competition. Assume that the firm's attitude toward quality
variation is neutral and all products are conforming. The firm attempts to
maximize its profit %

7i = PQ - <D(a, Q) - b

( 6.3.1-23 )
227

d7t/d(-a) = <D'a(a, Q) = o

o' a (a, Q) = o

(6.3.1-24)

dK/dQ = p - <&'Q[Q/(a = &„)] = 0

P = <D'Q[Q/(a = a0)i (6.3.1-25 >

In classical microeconomics, equation (6.3.1-24) in profit maximization
approach can be interpreted as: (1) There is no quality variation for all
products, &=0. This makes sense in the theoretical concepts. (2) If a
homogeneous product is not assumed, the quality is set in the MQS
(minimum quality standard), which has the lowest quality cost, or set in
the boundary within the quality domain. It seems more rational because
quality variation exists. From equation (6.3.1-25), production output is at
the point where marginal cost must be equal to the price. The output
level is related to the quality cost and varies with a change in quality
costs. If heterogeneous consumer behaviors toward product quality result
in market segmentation, the price is determined by the product quality
and the market mechanism. The producer may set its product quality at
the level which corresponds to the largest gap (profit per unit) between
the price in the market segment and the firm's quality cost.
The producer's demand curve for its output is the horizontal price line
itself if the market is perfectly (or near perfectly) competitive. The
producer believes that he can produce as many products as he can and
sell them at the prevailing price without influence from other firms'
decision making. To cope with the violation of homogeneous product
quality, it is rational to assume that the consumer demand curve is the
function of quality and price. When the price is constant, the higher the
quality, the larger the quantity demanded at the market equilibrium.
Quality and quantity have the following relationship:
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Q = /(p, a), p is constant
dQ/d(-a) = /'(a) > 0, /"(a) < 0

( 6.3.1-26 )

where Q - demand function.
If all firms in the market are identical, the industry total supply is the
sum of an individual firm's production with the same level of quality. The
supply equals the demand at the prevailing price.

S(Q) = XQi(ai=a0), S(p) - D(p) = 0

( 6.3.1-27 )

where S(Q) - product supply function.
However,
manufacturing

producers

in

processes,

the

industry

execute

different

actually
quality

have

different

planning

and

managerial methods, and use diversified resources. Thus, firms provide
different product qualities to consumers. Assume that each firm sets its
product quality at the point with minimum quality cost. Clearly, the
product supply with diversified

qualities exceeds the demand at the

prevailing price in the assumption of homogeneous consumers.

S(Q) = IQ i (a i <a 0 ), S(p) - D(p) > 0

( 6.3.1-28 )

If the information about each firm's quality is completely available, the
effect of consumer selection priority occurs, which means that consumers
first select the best quality product, and then the next best quality
product until the amount of demand is satisfied. The market mechanism
will force the firms with lower quality and higher cost out of business.
For the profit maximization approach, if the quality cost takes the form of
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equation (6.3.1-23), then

7i = PQ - <&(&, Q) - b
d7t/d(-&) = pdQ/d(-a) - 3>'a(&, Q) = 0

The term pdQ/d(-a) is the revenue resulting from higher quality. The
producer providing the higher quality product does not suffer a quality
loss at this moment. If other firms make significant quality improvement,
a potential quality loss may arise. To avoid quality loss, the producers
promote the product quality setting by adding a quality loss function into
the total quality cost function. If the loss function is structured such that

pdQ/d(-a) = - L'(a)
dQ/d(-a) > 0, - L'(a) > 0
L'(a) < 0
the profit maximization approach is
Max 7t = PQ - <D(il, Q) - b
d7t/d(-&) = pdQ/d(-a) - <fr'a(a, Q) = 0
L' + C p + C f = 0
dTt/dQ = P - o' Q [Q/(a = M

=0

P

= <D' Q [Q/(& = aL)]

aL>ao
where a L , a0 - quality settings with and without the addition of the loss
function.
This approach with the quality loss function
classical profit

does not violate the

maximization conditions under a perfect

competitive

market. The argument is that the producer's quality loss function can
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truly reflect the loss due to the consumers' reaction to product quality
variation if the perfect quality information is available.
Three conclusions may be obtained from the above interpretation: (1)
Any quality activity which has the potential ability to reduce cost is
profitable and adoptable. (2) Profit is unchanged when a quality activity
promotes the product quality, but maintains the lowest cost constant. (3)
A quality activity results in profit reduction if the cost increases with
quality improvement. This is why in quality control and quality projects,
cost minimization is the most popular approach employed by a firm to
evaluate the activities. Only those entrepreneurs who have the largest
quality rent (the lowest quality cost, or higher quality at the same quality
cost) can survive in the quality competition. The reason is that once the
quality settings are over, the firms compete with each other with lower
price and high-cost service in the short term. Conclusions (2) and (3) are
not fully consistent with the analysis in previous chapters in which
consumers usually give more weight for product quality and
higher quality products. Consumers' reactions

and behaviors

prefer
toward

quality are not accounted for. Thus, competition is a necessary condition,
but not sufficient to fuel continuous quality improvement if the rational
firm maximizes its profit.
In the monopolistic market, the monopolist's total revenue and total
cost can be expressed as functions of quality unit cost and output level

R = R(&, Q, p)

C = C(&, Q) + b

( 6.3.1-29 )

In this situation, an aggregate of the demand curves of individual
consumers is the firm's demand curve. Consumer preference and utility
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for product quality and quantity are reflected in the individual demand
curves. The price can be represented as a function of product quantity
and quality

P = /(&, Q)

( 6.3.1-30 )

R = QP
dR/d(-&) = pdQtf(-a) + Qdp/d(-a)

( 6.3.1-31 )

From equations (3.3.2-6) and (6.3.1-26)
dQ/d(-a) > 0, dp/d(-a) > 0

( 6.3.1-32 )

The better the product quality settings, the higher the revenue. The
quality cost function takes the form of equation (6.3.1-12), instead of
equation (6.3.1-14), because the consumer switches to a noncompetitor's
product and no sale losses occur due to quality problems in the
monopolistic situation.

dC/d(-&) = C f + Cp
If & = ci0>

then

sucn

that

dc/d[-a/(a=a 0 )] = c f + c p = o

(6.3.1-33)

dC/d[-a/(a>& 0 )] = C f + C p < 0

( 6.3.1-34 )

dc/d[-&/(a<a0)] = c f + c p > o

(6.3.1-35)

For the monopolist's profit maximization
7c=R(a,Q)-C(a,Q)-b
d7t/d(-a) = R'a(&, Q) - c a ( a , Q) = 0, R' a (a, Q) = c a ( a , Q ) (6.3.1-36)
dTt/dQ = R'Q(Q/a<a0) - C Q (QM<a 0 ) = 0
R' Q (Q/a<«l 0 ) = C Q (QM<a 0 )
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( 6.3.1-37 )

Since R'4(&, Q) > 0 (see equation (6.3.1-32)), C&(&, Q) must be greater
than

0.

Only

equation

(6.3.1-35)

meets

the

condition

for

profit

maximization. The optimal quality setting is not at a point with the lowest
quality cost, but on the higher quality side. The monopolist believes that
the higher quality setting puts his product in a position to gain a higher
profit with consideration of demand curve patterns (in other words,
consumer behavior). Therefore, consideration of the consumer quality
behavior can make the product quality setting higher.
One should note that equations (6.3.1-36) and (6.3.1-37) in some cases
may not be simultaneously employed to determine the product quality,
quantity and price in a firm's profit maximization. Since these three
variables are not totally independent of each other, the quality, quantity
and price may not have a unique solution set by solving these two
equations. This is called undeterministic rule. In two-stage model, one
can pre-fix one variable and then find a solution set for the other two
variables to meet the objective predetermined. In a perfect competition
market, the firm is price taker (even though he can choose one price, but
cannot determine the price) and he chooses quality and quantity to
maximize its profit. In a monopolistic market, the firm uses either
equation (6.3.1-36) to determine quality and price with fixed quantity
(or constant quantity cost), or equation (6.3.1-37) to obtain the optimal
price setting and quantity output to maximize its profit after the desired
quality setting is done.

In the perfect competition environment
7c = p Q - C ( a , Q ) - b
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d7i/d(-&) = pdQ/da - C a (a, Q) = 0, pdQ/da = Ca(&, Q)
d7c/dQ = p - C Q (Q, a) = 0, p = C Q (Q, a)
dQ/da = C a (Q, a)/C Q (Q, a)

In the monopoly situation
rc = p Q - C ( a , Q ) - b
drc/d(-a) = pdQ/da + QdP/da - C&(&, Q) = 0
pdQ/da + QdP/da= C&(&, Q)
d7t/dQ = p + QdP/dQ - C Q (Q, a) = 0
p + QdP/dQ = C Q (Q, a)
dQ/da = C a (Q, a)/C Q (Q, a)

The same conclusions, the ratio of the marginal quality cost and the
marginal quantity cost equals the quantity/quality marginal rate, are
obtained from these two market mechanism. The firm can use this ratio
to determine which strategy, quality improvement or quantity output, is
more profitable.
The following relationships are used to demonstrate the effect of the
firm's

quality

strategy

on

its

profit

and

consumers'

utility.

For

substitution between quality and price only

dQ/dp = qp

( 6.3.1-38 )

dp/d(-a) = MRS ap

(6.3.1-39)

dQ/d(-a) = qa

(6.3.1-40)

qa = q p MRS a p
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For linearity
dp/d(-a) = (1-TO/TI
dQ/d(-a) = qp(l-n)/Ti

( 6.3.1-41 )

For average
E(dp/d(-a)) = T(l - l/p)/8 - 1
E(dQ/d(-a)) = q p [r(l - l/P)/8 - 1]

( 6.3.1-42)

For elasticity
PdQ/(Qdp) = e qp , adp/(pd(-a)) = e pa , adQ/(Qd(-a))
e

q&

= e

=

qd

( 6.3.1-43 )

qp e pS

where q , MRS a

e

and qa are the demand quantity/price marginal rate,

the marginal rate of substitution between price and quality, and the
demand quantity/quality marginal rate, respectively, e a , e

and e

a

are

the elasticities for quantity/price, price/quality and quantity/quality on
the demand side, respectively.
Similarly, if demand quantity and quality are substitutable for each
other, such as food, meat and drugs, they can find the elasticity for
demand

price/quality. The relationships

among these three

decision

variables are very important for being considered in the economic model,
or some confusing conclusions would be derived. For example, Gal-Or
[1983] studied the quality and quantity competition in an oligopoly
market and demonstrated that the average quality would decrease and
the average aggregate output would increase on the base on entry
impact. However, the Gal-Or model would break down if the relationship
between quality and quantity is accounted for in a realistic model.
The firm, monopolist, will determine how to maximize its profit by
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increasing the product price or expanding the output derived from the
quality improvement. If MRS for price/quality is high and quality cost is
low, the firm
predetermined

will

adopt the strategy

output

level.

to increase

Traditionally,

the

the price

firm

determines

with
the

product price and output level with a fixed quality level. Consumers are
indifferent or worse off with the former strategy, if all utility surplus
from

quality

promotion

are

transferred

into

the

producer

surplus

through the high price. Consumers are definitely better off if the quality
increase is totally transformed into quantity increase at the constant
price. Both the consumer and the producer may share the benefit from
quality improvement, if the price determined by the traditional profit
maximization methods is located between these two prices in the above
two approaches.
The above analysis about product quality settings is made in profit
maximization

under

two extreme

market

conditions.

Assume

other

comparative conditions are the same for these two market situations. The
quality setting at higher or lower levels depends on the measurement of
quality loss function in the competitive market, whereas it depends on
the observation of consumer behavior in the monopolist's market which
situation can set higher product quality is undetermined by the use of
conventional approaches in a profit maximization. Since the product price
is much lower in a perfect competition market, consumers are better off
with the activity of quality improvement. This analysis suggests that: (1)
Competition and consideration of consumer quality behavior are two
sufficient conditions to have the optimal product quality settings. (2) The
conventional

economic

approaches

are not enough

for

the task of

evaluating and determining quality planning and quality activities in
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quality competition. (3) A new quality approach should be developed to
describe

the

producer's

behavior

under

quality

risk

and

market

uncertainty. This approach is expected to be more realistic with a better
illustration of the optimal quality setting.

6.3.2 Quality Cost Function in the Long Term
In the short term, quality projects, such as process innovation, learning
procedures
improvement,

influenced
training

by

ongoing

production

redesigns

workers,

or

manufacturing

tooling

simplification,

automation, and design to product life cycle reduce the quality cost and
improve quality. In the long-term, system design, adoption of new
materials, and employment
factors

of advanced

to push quality improvement

technology

are the critical

forward. The establishment of

quality cost function in the long-term is a fully dynamic process.
The current manufacturing system may not be suitable to produce the
product that satisfies satisfy both the consumer's requirement and the
producer's long-term objectives. If advanced technology is available,
producers will quickly adopt it to build new systems and processes such
that the total quality cost (operation, prevention, quality design, failure
and quality loss) can be significantly cut. Producers can achieve the role
of quality leadership for that product through utilization of new science
and technology. However, adoption of new systems and processes does
not mean the process is automatically set in the optimal conditions to
produce a higher quality product. Innovation for current processes may
achieve the same product quality as the adoption of new processes, but at
a much cheaper cost. It reflects the different attitudes for U.S. and
Japanese manufacturing

industries

toward quality improvement. U.S.
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manufacturers prefer to adopt new process system to improve product
quality, while the Japanese achieve the quality goal through

efficient

management approaches and optimal quality design methods. A great
potential capability of technology and processes is wasted in the U.S.
manufacturing industry. If the U.S. top managers in industry learn and
establish a set of better quality management procedures and develop
more

powerful

methods

for

product

quality

design

supported

by

advanced technology and science, the products made in the U.S. can catch
up and exceed Japanese product quality. Figure 6-6 shows the effect of
the system function (technology and process) in the short-term and in
the long-term on quality improvement and cost.

S4
S3
S2
SI

S04

al

62
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Figure 6-5 Quality System Cost in Long-Term

From the technological point of view, S4 > S 3 > S2 > S1. S 01 , S 02 , S 03 and
S 0 4 are the best utilization for this technology and the processes in the
short term through innovation and optimal condition settings. S is the
system function in the long-term, which is the focus of the optimal
setting points in a number of short term settings. S' is the long-term
quality cost function without implementation of the innovation and the
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optimal quality settings. For a given product quality setting kz, S 2 , S 3 and
S 4 have enough capability to meet the design requirements. But the
innovation and optimal condition setting make the current process S1
able to produce the product quality needed. For the product quality
setting S 1 , S 2

is the better alternative to implement the producer's

quality goal at an acceptable cost. Advanced technology does not mean it
can produce higher product quality than disadvantaged technology unless
it is set in the optimal conditions. We assume the quality system cost is a
function of

technological level

Cs = Cs(T(q))

( 6.3.2-1 )

ac s /aq = ac s (T(q))/a q = acs(T(&))/a(-&) > o

(6.3.2-2 >

C'S<C'S.

( 6.3.2-3 )

where Cs - system cost function;
T(q) - level of technology system;
Cs> - system cost function for an advanced technology system.
On the other hand, the utilization of new technology and advanced
processes reduces the manufacturing and design cycle time which is one
of

the

most

effective

improvement

levers

to

reduce

investment,

resources, control cost, inventory and manufacturing unit cost (Schein
and Berman, 1988), as shown in Figure 6-6. The cycle time cost is a
function of technological level, such that

C t = Ct(T(q))

( 6.3.2-4 )

aCt/3q = 3Ct(T(q))/aq = 3Ct(T(a))/a(-&) < 0
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( 6.3.2-5 )

( 6.3.2-6 )

c\zct,
where Ct - cycle time cost function;

C t . - cycle time cost function for an advanced technology system.

Cycle Time Cost

&

Figure 6-6 System Function and Cycle Time in Long Term

The operation quality cost is variable in the long term and is a trade off
between system cost and time cycle.

c =c +c

( 6.3.2-7 )

ac 0 /a(-a) = 3cs/3(-a) + 3ct/3(-a)
c s + ct<o,

c0<o,

C's

Ct=0,

Co=0,

C's + C t > 0 ,

Co>0,

+

c0>c0.

c 0 = c s + c\

( 6.3.2-8 )
( 6.3.2-9)
(6.3.2-10)

c0<c0,

(6.3.2-11)

where C 0 - operation cost in the long term.
The operation quality cost is strictly convex within the quality domain
in the long term.
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The long term total cost equation is

C(ft) = C 0 (a) + Ctf&) + Cp(&) + CL(£)

( 6.3.2-12 )

3C(il)/3(-&) = C 0 + C f + C p + C L

( 6.3.2-13 )

Assume the shapes of Cf(ci), Cp(ci) and C L (S) are affected by the
technology, learning procedures and the progress in quality management,
such that

If

C 0 + C*f + Cp + C'L < 0

3C(<l)/3(-&) < 0

If

C o + Cf + C p + C L = 0

3C(&)/3(-sl) = 0

If

C 0 + Cf + Cp + CL > 0

3C(a)/3(-&) > 0

when

3C(ci)/a(-cO = 0, it is called the long term saturation of the

minimum quality standard. The long-term quality cost function

is a

function of output quality level in the conditions in which product quality
is produced in the optimal condition settings. The long term cost function
is a strictly

convex curve. With

adoption

and utilization

of

new

technology and process, the total quality cost would decrease until
saturation is achieved. After that point, the total quality cost increases.
Quality improvement is more and more difficult and costly after some
periods. The specific relationship between quality and cost also depends
on the market structure and the pattern of product life cycle. Costs are
negatively, constant, and positively associated with quality improvement
when the product is in the stage of introduction into the market,
saturation or deterioration. Based on this approach, products for which
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the pattern of cycle time cost is not significantly

affected

by the

employment of new science and technology would show a positive
relationship between cost and quality improvement in the product life
cycle.
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Chapter 7 Producer Behavior Under Quality Risk and
Consumer-Based

Quality

Setting

Approach

7.1 Conventional Producer Behavior under Quality Risk
Like

consumer

behavior

under

quality

discrimination,

producer

decision behavior toward quality risk can be described by decision
theory.

The term "producer" as used here may have double features.

He

is a pure producer if he produces the inputs himself that are demanded
in production and sells the final products to consumers; while he is a
consumer/producer if he purchases inputs from other producers and sells
the output to the consumers. In the latter, a firm possesses consumer
behavior described in Chapters 3 and 4, and the producer behavior which
will be described below.
Producer quality production function is objective, and in most cases
product quality can be measured in scientific and technical terms.
single firm

A

may produce more than one product, and its decision

behavior

under

uncertainty

can

be expressed

by the firm's

utility

function.

A firm's action on quality improvement will increase the profit

and gain the advantage of competition through strategies such as cost
minimization under product quality variation.
The expected

utility

analysis

developed

in Chapter

3

concerning

consumer behavior and decision making under quality variation can be
applied here when the firm is subject to uncertainty.
in Chapter 3 are still valid, and the firm
Neumann-Morgensterm

axioms.

Assumptions made

should

obey

the Von

Furthermore, it is assumed that the

producer's utility function is based on the argument of profit gained from
product quality activities and that the product quality has been set by
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using the optimal quality design methods.
It is impossible for a firm to provide consumers with all products in
homogeneous quality. In conventional quality activities, a firm classifies
all its products as either "conforming" or "nonconforming." Any product
with

a

characteristic

(or

attribute)

outside

the

manufacturing

specification is regarded as "nonconforming" and results in the firm's
profit loss which includes scrapping cost, reworking cost, and waste in
material, labor and other resources.

This conventional concept, called the

on-line approach in quality control, is widely used to express a producer's
expected quality value in terms of money unit. That is

E(V) = p v 1 + ( l - p ) v 2

(7.1-1)

where p - probability of an item being conforming;
1- p - probability of an item being nonconforming;
Vj - quality value from a conforming item, $;
v 2 - quality value from a nonconforming item, $;
E(V) - firm's expected quality value for a product, $.
The values of w1 and v 2 are predetermined by the firm's objective goal.
For instance, if the firm minimizes the total cost in its product quality
activities, then

Vl

=q

v2 = q + c 2

E(V) = P q + (i - p x q + c2) = q + (i - P )c 2
where Cl - cost for a conforming items, $;
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(7.1-2)

C 2 - added cost for a nonconforming item, $.
When the nonconforming item is reworkable, C 2 contains reworking
cost, inspection cost and other costs contributed to the rework process.
When the nonconforming item is not reworkable, C 2 represents the cost
due to uncovered capital, labor, materials and energy (KLME) resource
wastes for the item. It also includes the penalty cost and the consumer
credit loss. It is straightforward to minimize the total cost by increasing
the conforming rate.
If a firm is quality neutral, then

U[ E(V) ] = E{ pU( Vl ) + (1- p)U(v2) }

( 7.1-3 )

If a firm is quality averse, then

U[ E(V) ] > E { pU(Vj) + (1- p)U(v2) }

( 7.1-4 )

In the perfect competitive conditions with quality variation, the firm's
profit in the short term is computed on the assumption that price is
certain and all products are conforming, but output is the decision
variable to maximize firm's profit (see Chapter 5.3.1).

ic = PQ - q ( Q )
d7t/dQ = P - C'^Q*) = 0
C1(Q*) = P

where Q* - output level for the conforming products.
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(7.1-5)

However, when not all products are conforming, the firm's expected
utility of profit under risk neutral is

E[U(7t)] = E(TC) = p[PQ - q(Q)] + (l-p)[PQ-C1(Q) -C2(Q)]

( 7.1-6 )

dE(7t)/dQ = P - C^Q) - (l-p)C' 2 (Q) = 0
C'^Q') + (l-p)C 2 (Q') = P

( 7.1-6' )

where Q' - output level when the conforming rate is less than 1.
Clearly, Q' < Q* and rc' < n* when p * 1.
The firm's expected utility of profit under quality aversion is

E[U(7t)] = pU^rc) + (1 - P )U 2 (TO

( 7.1-7 )

dE[U(7t)]/dQ = pU'^TOtP - C^Q)] + (l-p)U'2(7i)[P- C^Q) - C 2 (Q)]
U'2(TC)

> U'^TI) , U'2(7t)/[U'2(7r) + p(V\(n) - U*2(TC))] ;> 1

C'^Q") + (1 - p)C2(Q")U'2(7t)/[U'2(7c) + p(V\(n) - U' 2 (T0)] = P

( 7.1-7' )

where Q" - output level under quality risk aversion.
U'(7t) is a function of price and output. Since marginal quality cost
increases with reduction in quality deviation from the minimum cost
point, Q" must be lower than Q'. Thus, the firm's profit is also reduced.
Insofar, nothing is said about the price at equilibrium in the above cases.
If other conditions are constant, the output levels and the profits under
conventional quality approaches with the price certain are
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Q" < Q' < Q*,

(7.1-8)

7t" < 7t' < 7C*

Only and only if the rate of conforming, p, equals 1, the outputs and the
utility of profit would be the same in formula (7.1-8). The lower quality
conforming rate and the producer behavior under quality risk aversion
lead to lower production output than that which would be produced in
the

perfect

quality

conditions.

In

contrast,

the

increases with improvement in the conforming

production

output

rate. A relationship

between the quantity and quality for a certain product exists and is used
to guide the quality control activity in practice.
This is producer-based

behavior for the quality control

approach.

Producers mainly concentrate their attention on the reduction of the
nonconforming

rate

through

manufacturing

process

control

and

inspection procedures. This approach has contributed to product quality
improvement

in manufacturing

industries

in

the

1940-1960s.

The

properties of the quality control approach are mainly: (1) Minimization of
total cost is the cornerstone to determine the adoption of quality activity.
(2) Quality cost function is convex against the improvement activity in
the conforming

rate. This

conformance

set

is

by

means

cost

that

criteria,

once
any

the level

quality

of

product

improvement

is

accompanied with a production cost increase. (3) The price and the
quality are positively related.
Although Taguchi's loss function has a form similar to the simplified
consumer quality loss function developed in Chapter 3, the meanings
contained in their forms are absolutely different. Taguchi's quality loss
function is derived from producer behavior and employs production cost
to compute the quality loss. This function reveals that producer quality
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improvement

is

a continuous

activity.

Quality

control

should

be

concentrated on the activities which promote the quality target value and
reduce quality deviation. The nonconforming rate can also be improved
through Taguchi's methods.
Taguchi loss function usually is written as
L p = k[(p - T)2 + a 2 ]

where L

( 7.1-9 )

- producer quality loss function, $;

k - loss coefficient, $/unit2;
p - mean value of product quality distribution, unit;
T - quality target value, unit;
CT2 - variance of product quality distribution, unit2.
Substitute equation (7.1-9) into equation (7.1-1), and the producer
expected quality value becomes

E(V) = p ( v r Lp) + (l-p)(v 2 - Lp)
= pvj + ( l - p ) v 2 - L

( 7.1-10 )

for reworkable item

E(V) = p ( v r L p )

for not-reworkable item( 7.1-10' )

Equation (7.1-10) and equation (7.1-10') are much better to reveal the
producer's
conforming

expected

quality

value which

depends

on not

only

the

rate but, more importantly, the quality loss due to the

deviation from quality target value which causes consumer complaint,
dissatisfaction, and switching to another competitor's product. Taguchi
methods, the modern quality approach, do not necessarily require a cost
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increase accompanying quality improvement, and they are cost-effective
methods.

If

product

quality

variations

have

the

same

quality

characteristic distribution pattern, reduction in loss function

through

quality design will also improve the conforming rate p. In contrast,
increase in p does not necessarily mean an improvement in quality
design. If the same conditions for equations (7.1-6') to (7.1-7') are
applied on equation (7.1-10), it is easily found that the output level
would be:

Qi<Q

Qn<Q"

(7.1-11)

where Qj and Q n are the output levels under quality neutral and quality
aversion in the modern quality approach. Taking the quality loss into
account

for

production

output,

the producer

would

provide

fewer

products to consumers concerned with quality loss in a competitive
environment. In other words, producers would be more likely to improve
product quality to strengthen the competitive capability to avoid the
quality loss. Compared with the conventional quality control approach,
the modern quality approach

accounting for

the quality loss as a

production cost definitely promotes the product quality in production
decision

making.

The

producer

quality

loss

may

overestimate

or

underestimate the real loss due to no consideration of consumer quality
behavior. The approach of total cost minimization is still the economic
tool for quality activity in the modern quality approach. Although there
arise questions on the adequacy of loss function and the procedures of
optimization (Box, Bisgard and Fung, 1988), the modern approach has
been widely employed and has made a tremendous success in quality
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improvement.

7.2 Consumer-Based Approach in Quality Activity
7.2.1 Consumer-Based Behavior under Quality Variation
The producer-based approaches described in the previous section do
not account for consumer attitude toward quality risk. As a matter of
fact, consumers are perceptive and sensitive to quality variation. With
increased quality competition, the producer's quality loss is now mainly
caused by the consumer switching to a competitor's product with better
quality. The reasons and the advantages for taking the consumer quality
utility value as the producer's basis for quality improvement can be
summarized as follows: (1) Product quality is consumed and evaluated by
consumers, not producers. Consumer dissatisfaction causes the producer's
quality

loss.

(2)

Consumer

satisfaction

and

requirement

must

be

accounted for in the firm's long-term objective goal in the product quality
design. (3) Consumer quality loss as opposed to the producer's loss
function is more adequate to capture the effects of product quality on
consumer

decision

making.

(4)

Producer's

loss

function

will

underestimate the optimal product quality settings to meet the firm's
long-term goal. (5) Consumer quality loss is the criterion to correctly
evaluate the effect of the quality activity on the competition advantage
and on the consumer quality welfare. (6) The behaviors and decisions of
both consumers and producers are related to each other. (7) The market
in the real world is operated somewhere between the perfect competition
and the pure monopolist's

markets. Both producer

competition

and

consumer quality preference can be simultaneously incorporated in a
consumer-based

approach.

The

following
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example

gives

a

better

understanding of the changed producer behavior.
One successful

example for

taking

consumer-based

Xerox Corporation in this transformation.

behavior

is

the

As the 1989 winner of the

Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award, Rickard Jr. [1991], the vice
president for Xerox Corporation, points out that "The challenge

facing

Xerox was to change individual and corporate behavior." Allaire, the Chief
Executive Officer for Xerox Corporation, said "Our No.l priority has not
and will not change. It was, and is, and will continue to be customer
satisfaction." (See Rickard, 1991). As a result of the "meeting consumer
requirement," it is found that
- Parts-reject rates on the assembly line fell from 10,000 parts per
million to 300 parts per million, with a goal of 150 per million.
- Ninety-five percent of supplied parts no longer needed inspection;
in 1989, 30 American suppliers went the entire year defect-free.
- Suppliers were cut from 5,000 to fewer than 500.
- Cost of purchased parts was reduced by 45 percent.
- Three-month inventories were reduced to nearly 20 days.
- Six out of seven parts inspectors were reassigned to other jobs.
- Despite inflation, manufacturing costs dropped 20 percent.
- Product-development time decreased by 60 percent.
- Overall product quality improved 93 percent.
- Product quality, measured by customer surveys, increased 38
percent between 1985 and 1989.
- Unscheduled maintenance calls dropped by 40 percent, reflecting
major gains in product reliability.
- Xerox became the first American company to, without any tariffs
or government-mandated protection, regain market shares in an
industry targeted by the Japanese. ( Rickard [1991])
The consumer-based producer expected quality value is

E(V) = p ( v r ACQL) + (l-p)(v 2 -ACQL-L 0 )
= p\l

+ (l-p)(v 2 - L 0 ) - ACQL

( 7.2.1-1 )

where ACQL - the average consumer quality loss for a quality deviation;
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L 0 - consumer quality value loss due to product failure to work.
Specific forms of ACQL are given in Table 3-1 for quality neutral and in
Table 3-6 for quality aversion conditions. L 0 may be expressed in terms
of money for inconvenience, time waste or moral hazard.
The difference between equation (7.1-10) and equation (7.2.1-1) is
only the term of producer quality loss values replaced by the consumer
quality loss value. This change contains a significant meaning. In the view
of quality improvement, a quality activity increasing consumers' utility
may benefit producers simultaneously. It is easy to prove that the
consumer-based

approach is better than the producer-based

for profit maximization

approach

and optimal quality settings. From

equation

(6.3.1-24) and equation (6.3.1-25), assume that the consumer-based loss
function is employed and price is fixed in the short term. The quality
settings and the quantity output level are

7t = PQ - <D(&, Q) - b

When

dic/d(-&) = *' ft (4 f Q) = 0

*'ft(ft0, Q) = 0

dTt/dQ = P - *'Q[Q/(& = 4,,)] = 0

P = 4>'Q[Q0/(& = &„)]

the

overestimates

producer-based
the reaction

loss

function

of consumer's

is

quality

employed,
settings,

which

then

quality setting and the quality output level denoted by subscript 1 are:

dic/d(-&) = O'ftCa, Q) = 0

fc^i,,

d7t/dQ = P - o' Q [Q/(a = &,)] = o
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p

Q) = 0
= *Q[Qi/(fi = M

the

The same procedure is applied to the case with employment of
underestimated producer loss function, denoted by subscript 2. We have
the results

a 2 > ei0 > ci1

Q2< Q 0 < Q 2

7^ < 7c0, it2 < 7t0

( 7.2.1-2 )

Assume that there are n identical firms in the competitive market. The
demand of products equals the supply at the equilibrium condition.

D(p) = S(p) = nQ0,

D(p) > nQj,

D(p) < nQ2

( 7.2.1-3 )

Although consumers prefer the higher quality product resulting from
oversetting quality level, the producer can obtain a higher profit by
expanding his production level at an appropriate quality level, whereas
the lower quality setting arises the problem of supply being greater than
the demand. The producer suffers a loss from over production.
The strategy in quality activity adopted by producers can be judged by
the consumer-based approach. So far, many top managers and quality
experts claim producers must take the consumer's satisfaction

as a

matter of prime importance in quality improvement to cope with the
challenge of the changed world. In fact, successful enterprises emphasize
consumer

requirements

and

satisfaction

in

the

implementation

of

production planning and market strategies. A mathematical model should
be developed to reflect the changes in the producer's behavior and the
interaction

between

producer

and

consumer

decision

making.

The

economic parameters, quality setting and price usually go together in
quality

activity

and

can

be

endogenously
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determined

in

the

consumer-based approach at the market equilibrium. No contract or third
party is needed or assumed in this model implementation because any
force outside the model would, in some contents, disturb the outcomes
derived from the approach.
There are four

possible combinations

for

consumer-based

utility functions: consumer-neutral producer-neutral,
producer-neutral,
aversion

consumer-neutral

producer-aversion.

The

consumer-aversion

producer-aversion
first,

the

second

quality

and
and

consumerthe

fourth

combinations have more common sense and are observable. The third
combination is ignored here. If the producer's expected quality utility
value under risk neutral accounts for consumer attitude under quality
risk aversion, then

E[U(V)] n = pU nl + (l-p)(U n2 - U(L0)) - EUVa

( 7.2.1-4 )

where E[U(V)] n - producer's expected quality utility value under quality
risk neutral;
U n l , U n2 - quality utility for event i, i= 1, 2;
EUVa

- consumer's expected quality utility under quality risk

aversion;
U ( L 0 ) - consumer's quality utility loss due to product failure to
work.
For the sake of simplicity, the conforming rate p and the utility function
are expressed in terms of quality deviation variable, k, i.e.

E[U(V)] n = p(a)U n l (£) + (l-p(<l))[Un2(a) - U(L0(a))] - EUVa(a)
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= U nl (a)-EUV a (a)-(l-p(a))[U(L 0 (a)+U(v(&))]

( 7.2.1-5 )

U„ 2 (£) = U n l (£) - U(v(£))

( 7.2.1-6 )

where U(v(&)) - utility loss due to reworking for the failure of the
product, $.

U(v(ci)) is also related to the producer warranty policy and

the service after sale, U nl (ci) ^ U(v(&)) > 0. The relationships

between

U(L 0 (a) and U(v(^)) for a given quality setting are: U(v(£))T, U ( L 0 ( a ) i ,
U(v(&))4., U(L 0 (a)t. When a => 0, both U(L0(a) and U(v(il)) =* 0, and p(&) => 1.
In a competitive environment, a producer is faced with a number of
uncertainties: (1) Consumer behaviors under quality aversion are actually
different from the generalized form. (2) The strategy of quality activity
adopted by the competitor is unknown. (3) The product demand curve is
related to the consumer's taste and income level, which change from
income group to income group and from time to time. The supply curve
also changes with variation in input costs (prices). (4) Price is associated
with the imperfect market mechanism. Therefore, the producer is more
conservative

under

quality risk.

The producer

behavior

under

risk

aversion is:

E[U(V)]n>E[U(V)]a

( 7.2.1-7 )

E[U(V)]a = E[U(V)]n - U[R(a)]

( 7.2.1-8 )

where U[R(&)] - utility of producer quality premium, $;
E[U(V)] n , E[U(V)] a - expected consumer quality value under quality
risk neutral and risk aversion, respectively.
255

U[R(a)] is assumed to take a decreasing function of quality deviation.
The higher the product quality, the lower the utility of producer quality
premium.

dU[R(a)]/d(-a)] < 0

( 7.2.1-9 )

d 2 U[R(a)]/d[(-a)] 2 <0

(7.2.1-10)

The values for U n l ( a ) and p(a) increase with quality improvement, and
the value of U(v(a)) is an implicit function of quality deviation and is
related to the producer's warranty policy. The higher the warranty policy
compensation for consumer quality loss, the lower the value of U(v(a)).
The producer utility of profit can be directly expressed in the expected
profit such that equations (6.2.1-7) through (6.2.1-10) become

E(70n > E(7t)a

7.2.2

( 7.2.1-11 )

E(7i)a = E(7t)n - R(a)

( 7.2.1-12 )

dR(a)/d(-a) < 0

( 7.2.1-13 )

d 2 R(a)/d(-a) 2 <0

(7.2.1-14)

Consumer Quality Value Surplus Model

Sinha and Wilborm [1985] proposed a model called "maximization of
value addition" to illustrate the relationship between quality value to
consumers and the cost to quality production. Since this model cannot
distinguish

between

producer

and

consumer

quality

values

corresponding to the quality improvement, we modify this model as a
consumer quality value surplus to provide a basis for optimal quality
settings in the longer term. In the point of view of the producer, the cost
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of quality activity is a function of quality deviation. In the short term, no
change in production system and manufacturing processes is made, and
only some innovations and learning rates are assumed to be carried out.
The quality cost is reduced considerably through optimization of product
quality design and manufacturing parameter settings as well as effective
management. The quality cost function is a convex function in the quality
domain, as described in Chapter 6. This pattern of quality cost curve
reflects an argument in quality activity. Quality improvement does not
necessarily imply an increase in cost over quality range. Producers
should

first

pay

attention

onto

product

quality

design,

processes'

parameter setting and innovation to reduce the cost. Taguchi methods
and other optimization techniques are powerful and cost effective in
quality activity. In contrast, the conventional quality control approaches
are focused on the quality specification (conforming rate) and claim that
quality improvement is costly, and they ignore the employment of
optimization methods and learning effects.
In the long term, the quality cost function will vary with development
in technology and science. Previously high-cost quality activities will
become the economic ones to realize continuous quality improvement.
The change in quality cost is partially or entirely transformed into the
product price. The product price has a negative effect on consumer
quality utility. Both price and quality effects in the consumer quality
value

surplus

model

simultaneously

setting. Product quality determination

determine

the product

is regarded

quality

as a longer run

decision variable with respect to the output variable. In most cases, no
price and quantity planning/strategy

are changed before

the quality

setting is made. The quality is usually the first stage decision variable. In
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some cases, other decision variables will be predetermined. The price
decision variable plays two roles in both the producer behavior of profit
maximization and the consumer behavior of utility maximization. It links
consumer quality utility to the producer profit and finds a point which
may satisfy both consumer and producer objectives in the long term.
From equation (3.3.2-14), the consumer quality utility function is

U = U[x(ti) + t1B(x(ti)) - n/(p) + (1 - ti)F(w(a))]

V(U) = x(ti) + t1B(x(ti)) - n/(p) + (1 - n)F(w(a))
For simplicity, assume that a "representive consumer" is characterized,
and the consumer's utility is expressed in the form of the expected utility
for the consumers. If we are interested in the characteristics of a specific
income group, the above equation is directly employed.

E[V(U)] = xk(ti) + pmBk(xk(ti)) - p w /(p) + (l-pJF(w(a)

( 7.2.2-1 )

in the short term with respect to product quality settings
E[V(U)] = A - p (0 /(p) + (1 - p (0 )F(w(a))

(7.2.2-2 )

where A - constant, assuming the consumer assets and budget are fixed
at time period i, i.e. A = x(tt) + pwB(x(tj)) $;
[ia - mean value of Weibul distribution for quality/price weight;
x k (tj), B k (x k (tj)) - the average consumer assets and budget for
group k at time period i, respectively.
The price variable is exogenous in consumer quality utility function.
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For the sake of discussion, assume the price variable is a function of
quality deviation, quantity output pattern and profit. However, price is
endogenous in the consumer-based producer utility function, and such an
assumption is relaxed. Thus, equation (7.2.2-1) is transformed into the
following form

E[V(U(G))] = A - p (0 /(p(a, Q c , TO) + (1 - uJF(w(a))

( 7.2.2-3 )

where Q c - quantity output cost pattern, which affects the quality
operation cost;
7C - the profit which may or may not be related to the product
quality setting.
It was proved in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 that consumer expected
quality value increases with quality improvement when price remains
constant.

It is no surprise that the consumer achieves the highest utility

value when quality deviation is zero. On the other hand, if product
quality remains constant, consumer utility will increase with decreased
price, but decrease with an increase in price.

In the consumer quality

value surplus approach, we examine the effects of simultaneous changes
in price and expected quality value on consumer utility.

The patterns of

the expected quality value depend on the consumer assets, taste and
preference as discussed in Chapter 3. A rational consumer has a concave
function

for the expected quality value. For a particular

consumer,

however, the concavity condition for the utility function may not be
necessary.
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F(w(a)) = /(w(a)) - [l-p(a)]L 0 (a)

( 7.2.2-4 )

Substitute equation (7.2.2-4) into the above equation (7.2.2-3), then

Max E(V{F}) = A - p t0 /(p) + (l-p (0 ){/(w(a)) - [l-p(a)]L 0 (a)

( 7.2.2-5 )

dE(V{F})/d(-a) = (l-pJt/XwJ+p'Lo^) -(l-p(a)) L0']-pw/'(p(a,Qc,7c))= 0
(l-H M )[/'(w) + p' L 0 (a) - (l-p(a)) L0'] = \ij\p&,

Q c , TC)

( 7.2.2-6 )

d/(w)/d(-a) > 0, /"(w) < 0

( 7.2.2-7 )

dp(a)/d(-a) > 0, p"(a) < 0

( 7.2.2-8 )

d L 0 (a)/d(-a) < 0, L 0 "(a)>0
d/(p)/d(-a) > 0, /"(p) > 0

(7.2.2-9)
( 7.2.2-10 )

The optimal consumer quality surplus in the above conditions given is
F'(a)//'(p) = p j d - p j

( 7.2.2-11 )

The quantity output cost pattern has an impact on the consumer
surplus, but not on the slope of quality cost function. To avoid complexity,
we assume a constant return to scale exists. Thus, the price is the sum of
the quality cost function and the profit. If the profit is constant, it does
not affect quality setting. Otherwise, it does.
The consumer's compensation for quality loss, such as replacement of
the product which fails to work, is the producer's cost reflected in the
product price. To avoid double counting in the above model, some
assumptions should be made. More details will be discussed in the next
section. However, the qualitative explanation of the model is meaningful
without losing generality. The positive, neutral and negative quality
value surplus corresponding to E(V{F}) > 0, = 0, or < 0 are used in the
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maximization, minimization and equality approaches. All of these three
options of optimal approaches are meaningful, and their applications in
quality activity depend on the specific requirement of the situation. We
mainly discuss the case with positive consumer quality value surplus.
The consumer quality utility value reaches the optimum point a* where
dE(V[F})/d(-a) = 0, shown in Figure 7-1. Before the maximization point,
the gain from one unit increase in the weighed quality function

offsets

the loss from one unit increase in the weighed price function, while after
the maximization point, the weighed quality gain is less than the weighed
loss in terms of one unit change in price.

The intercept points A and B

are called neutral points at which the consumer does not lose or gain
from quality activities, and the consumer is indifferent

to the high

quality product with a high price and the lower quality product with a
lower price.

The outcome resulting from one neutral point to the other

neutral point does not affect

the changes in the consumer surplus,

demand level, and consumer quality welfare for the uniform consumers
assumed.

E(V) i A

Figure 7-1 Maximization Approach for Consumer Quality Value Surplus

When the consumer quality utility under risk neutral is considered, the
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optimum point of quality setting corresponding to the maximization of
consumer value surplus is lower than the quality deviation under risk
aversion.

We have

a*n > a*a

( 7.2.2-9 )

where a*n and a*a represent the product quality settings under consumer
risk neutral and consumer risk aversion, respectively.
If consumers give more weight for product quality, the quality setting
in the optimal consumer surplus will be higher. In the competitive
market, the producer is price taker, and he cannot determine the price.
In the monopolistic market, the producer will set the price as high as
possible to exploit the consumer surplus in its profit maximization. The
consumer surplus in a competitive environment is much higher than in a
monopoly

market.

The consumer quality value surplus approach provides a criterion for
the adoption of quality activities and for comparison among a number of
alternatives. A more impressive result from the approach is that the
optimum quality setting is not located at the place of MQS (minimum
quality standard) where the lowest price is set through cost minimization
methods.

But the quality setting point is located in the region where

higher quality is accompanied with a higher price.

The properties of a

variety of factors in consumer quality utility, such as assets, budget level,
information

uncertainty, quality premium, conforming rate, and price

developed in Chapters 3 and 4, illustrate consumer quality behavior. The
price is the exogenous variable in the model. The producer behavior of
product quality settings, and his attitude toward quality risk, have not
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been incorporated into the model. Competition and consumer satisfaction
are sufficient conditions for quality activity and product quality setting.
Quality usually is a long-term decision variable with respect to the price
and the quantity decision variables. This model should incorporate the
competition

in it to determine

the optimal

quality

setting

in

the

long-term.

7.2.3

A

Simplified Utility Value Function for Implementation of Quality

Settings
The complexity of the consumer quality utility under quality risk may
reveal a difficulty in applying it to practical problem solving, though
equation (7.2.2-5) is very useful in theoretical and qualitative analysis.
Generally, the forms of consumer expected utility value (EUV) for the
commercial product could be obtained through a survey of consumer
quality assessment or analysis of the historical production/market data.
A consumer quality value function for implementation of quality setting
for coming products in a future market can be established. If a specific
form of EUV is not available, a simplified EUV with the linear quality
value function developed in previous chapters could be used here for the
sake of appropriateness and simplicity. Another reason is that the linear
quality value function is more conservative than the concave functions
(see Chapter 3 for details). The EUV under quality neutral and quality
aversion are summarized in Table 7-1 which is obtained from

parts of

Table 3-1 and Table 3-6. (The EUV for the smaller-the-better type of
quality characteristics has the same patterns as for the larger-the-better
type).
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Table 7-1. EUV Under Quality Neutral and Aversion
with Linear Quality Value Function
quality neutral
w H - 0.8kja
w H - k'^T-p)

The nominal-the-best
The larger-the-better

wH
wH

quality aversion
- 0.8kjO" -O.lSk^a 2
- k\(T-p) - (k^a) 2

The quality target value in Table 7-1 is no longer the quality value for
the products sold in the current market, but the designed value with the
availability

of technology and science in the future

market. w H is

determined by the price the consumer is willing to pay for the future
product quality, while w L is determined by the price paid for the lowest
product

quality.

Thus,

in

the

nominal-the-best

type

of

quality

characteristics

wH = PH

wL = P L

( 7.2.3-1 )

kj = (wH - wL)/A

( 7.2.3-2 )

where P H , P L are the highest and the lowest prices the consumer is
willing to pay for the quality designed product, respectively.
The quality target value w H could be determined by the information
available

at

the

present

time

in

the

larger-the-better

or

the

smaller-the-better type of quality characteristics:

w H = TP0/H0

( 7.2.3-3 )

k 2 ' = w'/T = P0/|X0

( 7.2.3-4 )
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where T - designed quality target value in the future market, unit;
P 0 , p-o - price and quality mean value for the current products.
Therefore, a simplified consumer quality utility function can be written
as follows. For the nominal-the-best type of quality characteristics under
consumer quality aversion

E(V{F})=A-p (O /(p)+(l-p (0 )[(w H -0.8k l a-0.l8k l 2 a 2 )-(1-p)L 0 ]

( 7.2.3-5 )

For the larger-the-better type under consumer quality aversion

E(V{F}) =A-p m /(p)+(l-p C0 )[(w H -k' l (T-p)-(k' l a) 2 )-(1-p)L 0 ]

If the multiple-quality

attribute approach is incorporated

( 7.2.3-6 )

into the

above equations, the multiple utility function value is

E(V{F})=A-p {0 /(p)+(l-p (B ){Is i [ w Hi -(ACQL r (1- Pi )L 0i )]

( 7.2.3-7 )

where s{ - weight for attribute quality i;
ACQLj - average consumer quality loss for attribute i, $.
If the specific consumer utility function is not available, the above
simplified function can be approximately used in the model to determine
the quality settings. Another advantage of utilization of this function is
that the consumer quality utility becomes computable.
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7.3

Producer Optimization Behavior under Quality Uncertainty

Traditionally, the producer strategy on optimization behavior mainly
includes

constrained

cost minimization,

output

maximization,

profit

maximization, and producer utility maximization, which are successfully
applied on the producer's quantity strategy.

Diversity of frameworks on

optimization is structured on the specific requirement and conditional
limitations of the problem solved. However, the basic framework of the
optimal approach to the specific construction of the mathematical model
is similar.

The traditional

optimal

strategies

on production

output

quantity are based on the assumption of quality homogeneity.
As mentioned before, quality activity is related to both consumer and
producer

behaviors. Any change in product quality will cause the

variations in cost, price and quantity output level singly or jointly. A
degree of uncertainty is introduced into the above optimal models if
variation in product quality exists. The conventional production approach
under uncertainty, see section 7.1, is employed to explain the producer
strategy of the effect of quality variation on the output level. Although
this

approach

needs

further

modification,

it

provides

information that the quality output level is reduced,

meaningful

corresponding to

the degree of producer aversion toward quality risk. In other words, the
product

output

improvement
models

level

when

will

increase

other conditions

on product quantity

should

with

quality

and

information

are constant.

The

optimization

be modified

or restructured

to

account for quality variation. These conventional optimal models are used
to implement producer objectives after quality design is implemented. A
set of solutions, quality setting, price, demand quantity level, consumer
quality value surplus, will be derived from the consumer-based surplus
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maximization model under a variety of attitude toward quality risk.
7.3.1

Constrained Consumer-Based Quality Value Surplus Maximization

in Static State
Assume that the producer behavior and objective about product quality
is known. The producer will set a higher product quality standard to cope
with the uncertainty he is faced with.

It concludes that the firm's

attitude toward quality risk and uncertainty depends on both consumer
and producer behavior, not only on the firm itself, if the firm wants to
benefit from quality activities.

It is very important for the firm to

transform the consumer quality utility to his own part of utility to avoid
resource waste in establishment of a specific firm quality loss function.
This approach may find an optimal quality setting point subject to some
constraints. These constraints include all requirements, limitation and
resources availability for both consumers and producers.
Taguchi's methods and other optimization methods in quality activity
are aimed at optimal quality improvement and reduction of quality cost.
Whatever effort is made with the conventional quality control approach,
the quality value surplus is always smaller than that with employment of
optimizing quality engineering methods. However, the cost/quality or
price/quality

trade-off

ideas

in

the

conventional

quality

control

approaches are still alive. Based on the economic point of view, the
optimum quality setting through optimal methods in quality engineering
may or may not be the desired point which is obtained from the
consumer-based quality value surplus. Quality engineering methods lack
economic criteria and ignore the consideration for the consumer's utility
function shapes and the producer's attitude toward quality risk. In the
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consumer

quality

optimization

value

methods

surplus

applied

on

approach,

combined

the product,

process

with
and

the

system

designs, an economic optimization criterion is used to select the best
optimal quality engineering settings.
The consumer-based quality value surplus maximization is employed
to determine the quality settings and other decision variables in the long
term.

If

providing

the

producer

some

compensates

policies,

such

as

the

consumer

recall-repair,

quality

loss

advertisement

by
and

warranty, the costs for these policies must be added to the cost function.
This model has the following form

Max

E(V{F})={x(t i )+p to B(x(t i ))-p (0 /(p)+(l-p (0 )[/(w(a))-[l-p(a)]L 0 (a)]}q
( 7.3.1-1 )

S.t.

7c = p f ( Q ) - C ( a , Q ) - C - R ( a , Q )

(1)

S(Q) = D(q)

(2)

B(x) > p

(3)

F(w(a)) = Zs i F(w(a i ))

(4)

T(q) = T( qi )

(5)

For the demand quantity q
q = q0 + eq 0 Ap c /p 0

( 7.3.1-2 )

Ap c = (p0 - P) + (r(l-l/P)/5 -1) [F(w(a)) - F 0 (w(a 0 ))]

( 7.3.1-3 )

where q 0 , p 0 , F 0 - initial quality demand level, price and quality utility
value at stage t£_x;
e - demand price elasticity;
Ap c - consumer expected price increment;
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T(qj) - system function at stage i, i = 1, 2, ... n.
We will discuss the reaction of one side to the change in the other side
conditions through this model. To simplify this exploration, the following
assumptions are made so that the analysis can be focused

on the

implications of the model:
(1)

Monopolistic competition exists, which contains elements of both

monopoly and perfect competition.
(2)

Free entry and exit will occur as long as profits are positive. The

equilibrium is a zero-profit.
(3)

The consumer is rational to maximize his utility subject to the

constraints.
(4)

Firms act as quality leaders, given consumer utility maximization

under the quality attitude taken.
(5)

Quality

and

price

are

the

first-order

decision

variables

determined in the model. The demand and supply quantity levels are the
second-order decision variables. The demand quantity is the nominal one
and suggests that the firm can produce these volume products at both the
price and the quality determined to maximize its utility value without
any effect on consumer behavior.
(6)

In the maximization of producer utility of profits, each firm

chooses quality to maximize profits, if the firm is risk neutral. The firm is
willing to pay the quality premium to achieve its long term goal, if it is
quality averse.
(7)

Consumers are quality risk neutral or averse depending on their

attitude toward quality variation and information availability.
(8)

Technology for producing an additional unit is constant return of

scale.
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(9)

A representive consumer quality behavior is considered in the

approach.
(10) All firms are identical and have the same cost function.
(11) Quality information is completely available.
Assumptions (9) through (11) are weak and will be relaxed in the real
market situations. The total industry demand is the sum of individual
consumer quality value and is endogenously given such that the market
quantity and price are in equilibrium in the long term. The firm decision
variables are product quality under various specified

conditions and

other strategy variables, such as price, consumer value surplus, demand
and supply output levels, which are determined in the sequence of the
model operation.
The objective function in the model consists of consumer quality utility
derived from product quality, product price, inherent quality variation,
assets,

budget

constraints

and weight

distribution

for

price/quality

effects. It may also include multiple attribute quality. The information
premium is excluded from the objective function in this moment because
of assumption (11). The consumer will maximize his quality utility under
risk aversion or risk neutral. The price variable is endogenous in this
model, q is the demand quantity such that the objective of the model is
aimed at maximizing the total consumer quality value surplus rather
than the single value surplus.
Constraints (1) is from the producer behavior which is centered at
profit maximization. In the long term, the firm's expected profit is

K

= pf(Q) - C(a, Q) - C - R(a, Q)
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The producer's quality premium R(a, Q) equals zero under producer
quality risk neutral. The quality cost function can be decomposed into
several different parts. For the sake of demonstration, we will use the
following quality cost function (see equation(6.3.1-19))

C(a, Q) = [C(a)]Q
C(a) = Cp(a) + q ( a ) + CL(a) + C0(a)

Free entry drives active an firm's expected profits to zero. Quality cost
per unit can be separated from the total cost function, based on the
two-step procedure where quantity output level will be determined after
the quality setting is implemented.

p = Cp(a) + q<a) + CL(a) + C0(a) + R(a) + C/Q

( 7.3.1-4 )

R(a) = 0 for producer quality neutral
R(a) > 0 for producer quality aversion

where C/Q - average fixed cost, $/unit.
When a zero-profit condition is satisfied, the price equals the average
cost. The price at the equilibrium is not only related to quantity
determination, but also the product quality settings.
Constraint (2) means that the market demand equals the industry
supply at the equilibrium conditions. The demand quantity is related to
price,

quality,

weights

for

price/quality

effects

and

demand

price

elasticity, shown in equations (7.3.1-2) and (7.3.1-3). To maximize total
consumer value surplus, both product quality and quantity must be set
under the optimal conditions, respectively.
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Constraint (3) may give a boundary solution for the model. The budget
constraint may or may not rule out the maximization point. When the
budget is greater than the price corresponding to the optimal quality, the
consumer

arrives at the maximum utility value in the long

term.

Otherwise, the budget limitation determines the optimum quality level at
the boundary conditions. Although the budget constraint may have two
solutions for quality settings around the lowest quality cost point, the
firm has no reason to operate at the higher cost but lower quality setting
condition. If the optimal solution is beyond the scope of quality settings
constrained by the budget, the quality setting point at which the budget
equals the price will be chosen. The constraint will be meaningful in the
spectrum of budgets corresponding to the differentiated income groups
and the spectrum of product brands. However, based on the objectives
and production conditions, the producer can promote the product into the
higher brand category through new quality design and quality control
subject to higher budget constraint. When the product quality attribute
has an impact

on consumer decision

making in product

selection,

constraint (4) must be adapted to maximize the consumer overall quality
utility. The last constraint is utilization of advanced technology and
science in the production system and processes. System function

is

related to time, technology and investment. Any variation in consumer
assets and producer system function

will change all parameters and

variables in the model.
Assume that the consumer utility E{V(f)} = V 0 , p = p 0 , q = q0, and a = a 0
at the initial conditions. First of all, we consider the situation under
combination of consumer-neutral producer-neutral. To maximize total
consumer surplus subject to the constraints, then
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3L/3(-a) = 3E{V[F]}/a(-a) = 0
F'(a)/C(a) = pffl/(l- p j
3L/3q = 3E{V[F]}/3q - X2 = 0
V = *2
dh/BX2 = Q - q = 0
Q =q
A,3[B(x) - p] = 0
%3>0

For multi-attribute quality with additivity form
3L/3(-3j) = 3E{V[F]}/3(-aj) - ^ ( a ^ - a ; ) = 0
aL/a(-ap = 3E{V[F]]/3(-a|) - ^ 1 C(a)/3(-a j ) = 0
SjFXaiVSjFXap =

fk{C\k.)lfkf\k)

Specifically, the two parts of a quality setting, the quality mean and the
quality specification (variance), are determined in the following
EtsjFXaiVsjFXap] =

B[f^\m^f^

SjFXpjVSjFXpp = /^CXPiV/^CXpp
SiFViVSjF'^j) =

fa2]CWi)/fa2f'^2i>

Shown in Figure 7-1, in the range between a" and a 0 , consumer quality
value surplus increases with quality improvement and price reduction. In
the range between a 0 and a*,

the consumer
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quality

value

surplus

increases

though

the

price

also

increases.

For

further

quality

improvement after the optimal quality, between a* and a + , the increase in
consumer quality utility value is less than the utility value decrease in
price-up. The process for the optimal quality setting

simultaneously

determines the optimal quantity level. Any deviation from the optimal
quality setting will result in a decrease in total demand in the long-term.
The total industry

supply equals

the total demand

at the

market

equilibrium where price equals the average cost. For instance, if quality
setting is at a 0 , producers have the potential to produce more products.
Since the decrease in consumer value surplus results in total demand
reduction,
equilibrium

the

supply

condition.

must

be cut

Therefore,

to match

producers

the demand

suffer

a

loss

at
from

the
a

redundant production because of the lower quality setting at a 0 . Although
the zero-profit is realized in monopolistic competition, the consumer
quality surplus is still larger in a competitive market with lower average
cost than in a monopolistic market. Consumer budget saving is discounted
by factor p ^ . If \im < 0.5, consumers are willing to pay more for higher
product quality. For multiple-attributes

quality, the above

condition

should be met to maximize consumer quality surplus. In short, we can
find a solution set for quality, quantity, price and consumer value
surplus. Let a*, q*, p* and V* be the solutions for quality, quantity, price
and consumer quality value surplus in this exercise under combination of
consumer-neutral producer-neutral. Any firm's gain from output level
increase is the other firms' loss in quantities at the market equilibrium, if
the firms' cost function are not identical.
Any increase in the total cost function induces p' > p*, V < V* and q' <
q*. If the marginal quality cost remains constant,
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C* = C, the quality level

does not change at all, a' = a*. If C* > C, a' < a*. If C* < C, a' > a*. If
consumer surplus increases, the demand quantity increases too, and vice
versa. The increase in demand can be regarded as demand curve shifts
up-right.
In comparison with the conventional producer-based quality setting
approach, assume that the producer considers consumer behavior in the
partial equilibrium
utility

separately rather than taking the

consumer-based

value into the entire equilibrium model. He determines

the

product quality at the market situation where both quantity and price
are in equilibrium. Free entry and exit drive pure profit to zero:

7t = PQ-C(a, Q ) - C = 0

Suppose the cost function

(7.3.1-5)

can be separated into quality cost and

quantity cost function

C(a, Q) = [C(a) + r(Q)]Q

(7.3.1-6)

a = C-^P - r(Q) - C/Q]

( 7.3.1-7 )

where C" 1 is quality cost function expressed in terms of price and
quantity-related cost and fixed cost.
Generally, the optimization related to product quantity and quality can
be treated as a two-step model in engineering and manufacturing quality
activity. The quantity cost and quality cost function in the model are
independently

separated.

The

procedures

usually

determine

quality

setting first, and then the quantity level. In contrast, with the procedure
in the conventional producer-based model, the quantity, quality and
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price variables have no decision-order among them, and quality setting
could be made after the quantity level is given. From equation (7.3.1-7),
any increase in the cost function
because

quantity

and

price

would reduce the product quality

are

exogenous

variables

at

market

equilibrium. For example,

&! = C-HP - rjCQ) - q / Q ]
if

a 2 = C ^ P - r2(Q) - C2/Q]

r2(Q) > r2(Q) or q > C2, then kx > a 2

When the demand exceeds the supply in the market, this model may
provide an insight to illustrate a reduction in average product quality,
but the market equilibrium condition is broken down. A change in
product quality, however, will induce the change in market equilibrium,
which also breaks the condition for the market equilibrium. Obviously,
this conventional producer-based model lacks the ability to determine
the optimal quality setting and ignores the fact of decision order between
quality and quantity variables as well as the uncertainty involved in the
future market. This model limits its application on quality activity and
may lead to some confusing
surplus

maximization

results. With the consumer-based value

approach,

if

the

cost

function

increases

or

uncertainty exists, the producer attempts to improve product quality and
reduce production output, rather than to reduce quality to maintain the
same output level. It is rare that the quantity can stay at the previous
equilibrium when quality setting is changed. This behavior explained by
the consumer-based approach is consistent with conventional theoretical
concepts in decision making and also with an observable producer's
attitude toward uncertainty in practice.
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As described in Chapters 3 and 4, it is more realistic for consumers to
behave in a quality averse manner. The consumer is willing to pay the
inherent quality premium to avoid risk in buying the product with larger
quality variation. Clearly, the consumer utility value function is steeper
than the value function under quality neutral. Let S, &, P_ and V. be the
solution set for quality, quantity, price and consumer value surplus in the
exercise

of

combining

consumer-aversion

with

producer-neutral.

In

comparison with the first combination of neutral-neutral, assume that the
quality cost function is not changed. Thus, h < a*, p_ > p*, g. < q*. Since no
consumer could possess quality neutral and quality-aversion behaviors at
the same time for a specific product, no quality value surplus is
compared. Both product price and product quality

are higher,

but

production output level is lower under consumer quality aversion.
If a cost having no effect on the shape of marginal quality cost function
is added onto the total cost function, the quality level is not affected, but
the price increases and the consumer quality value surplus decreases,
which results in output level reduction. If the added cost affects the
shape of the marginal quality cost function, the price definitely increases,
and quality setting change depends on the property of the added cost. In
turn, the consumer value surplus and quantity demand will decrease.
Note that these conclusions are derived from the assumption of quality
information

available.

The producer is quality conservative rather than neutral when he faces
uncertainties described in previous sections. He intends to maximize the
consumer-based value surplus under risk aversion. In this case, the
producer's cost function is higher but more flat in the slope than that
under quality neutral, because of an addition of the producer's premium
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which is related to the quality setting strategy, see equation (7.2.1-13)
and equation (7.2.1-14). The same procedures are carried out for the
quality setting, quantity level, price and utility value surplus represented
by d,q,P

and V" in the case of combination of consumer-aversion and

producer-aversion. The producer quality premium is a. very

flexible

policy and changes with time, event, market place and interest rate, etc.,
which the producer uses to cope with uncertainty. Compared with the
previous case, a" < &.. If the quality premium is totally acted as the real
price reduction for consumer compensation, then V < V_, p > p_, q < g,. The
basic idea is that the producer prefers the strategy having both higher
price and quality, but lower output level, because price and output level
could

be

quickly

adjusted

to

correspond

to

the

change

in

the

uncontrollable market conditions, but the quality variable cannot be reset
in the short term. Furthermore, the quality premium compensation may
affect

consumer

behavior. This approach

implies

that the

producer

maximizes his utility to gain the advantage in quality under uncertainty
and, on the other hand, is willing to pay consumers the partial or total
quality premium to secure his quality position in the market. This
premium value can be regarded as the value transformation from the
producer to the consumer who makes a decision based on his preference
of the quality utility value. The producer premium is also a function of
degrees of uncertainty, which is more flexible than change in price,
quantity and quality alone.
In summary, the following results can be obtained in the static model
when other variables are constant.

( 7.3.1-8 )

l

nn - *an - ^aa
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Pnn^Pan^Paa

"

(7.3.1-9)

qnn^qan^qaa

( 73.1-10 )

where subscripts nn, an and aa represent the combinations for consumerneutral

producer-neutral,

consumer-aversion

consumer-aversion

producer-aversion,

producer-neutral

and

respectively.

The solutions for consumer quality value surplus under a variety of
combinations depend on income group, interaction between consumer
and producer behaviors, and the impact of producer quality strategy.
If the conventional optimal approaches are employed to achieve the
producer's objective, some modification for quality setting must be made.
The quality variable is exogenous and predetermined by the producer's
objective. For constrained cost minimization,
Min Z = C( a*, Q* )
S.t. a* = /(a)
Q* = Q(x/a*)
L = C(a*. Q*) + ^ ( a * - /(a)) + *.2(Q* - Q(x/a*))
Considering quality variation
E(L) = C([u*, a 2 ], Q*) + V ( o 2 ) + ^ ( Q * " Q(x/fo*, °2V
3E(L)/3pi = / . = 0

(To classify the input factors into different

groups, then select the factors with lower costs, see Chapter 6.)
3E(L)/3a 2 i = rj - Xlf'i = 0
3E(L)/3o2j = r_j - XJ) = 0
3E(L)/3xj = Rj - ^ F ' i = 0
3E(L)/3XJ

= Rj - A,2F'j = 0
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RTS(qy) = /',//', = r ^
RTS(Qij) = F J / P J = Ri/Rj

where a*

and

Q* are the quality

and

the

output

quantity

level

predetermined.
The above conditions must be satisfied simultaneously so that the
minimum total cost can be achieved. RTS for quality specification should
equal the ratio of component costs. Meanwhile, the RTS for quantity
output should equal the input price ratio. The cost for product quality
target design has to be minimized. The above conditions are also required
in the consumer-based

value surplus approach. The optimal quantity

level setting in the conventional approach is a local, not global, solution
for

total

cost

minimization.

Similarly,

the

constrained

output

maximization is

Max V = Q(x/a0)
S.t. C° = C(a 0 ,Q)

If the quality setting is given, the above model returns to the
conventional one. If quality setting varies, the quality level is set at the
lowest quality cost such that the maximum output can be obtained if the
conditions in the cost minimization approach are also satisfied here.
In quality competition, the following two models are more powerful.
One is to maximize the producer's profit subject to the product providing
more consumer quality surplus than the rival's. The other maximizes
consumer surplus value subject to the profit level predetermined. They
are:
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Max n = R(a, Q) - C(a, Q)
s.t. Vx > V 2
and

Max V = /(a, p)
S.t. ft = 71Q

7.3.2

Quality Rent and Quality Information Effects

In the previous section, we assumed that all the firms in the industry
were identical and had the same cost function and that the consumers in
the market were uniform and indifferent. We discussed the behavior of
"average" consumer decision making and the objective of representative
firm

in

quality

activity.

Under

realistic

economic

and

production

conditions, the cost functions for all firms are not identical, and the
consumer quality preferences are not uniform. Lack of efficient access to
quality information

sources significantly

affects

both consumers' and

producers' decision making. One reason for the temporary survival of
firms which produce inferior product quality shipped to society is that
perfect quality information is not available. Assumptions 9 through 11 in
the consumer-based value surplus model are now relaxed to match the
real worid situations.
The higher-income consumers have higher budget distribution, lower
quality premium, and higher weight assigned for the product quality
effect.
several

Significant
market

budget differences

segments. With

divide the whole market

lower quality

cost, through

into

quality

optimization methods, a firm can produce higher product quality at a
lower average cost than the other firms. In the consumer value surplus
model, the firm can determine its product quality setting in one of the
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market sections. The higher-income consumers or higher taste consumers
can search for the desired product across the market segments. A firm
may provide different
groups.

The

low-cost

brands of product quality for different
and

high-quality

firm

possesses

a

income
potential

advantage to earn more profit than an ordinary firm. If information is
completely available and product quality is observable, consumers will
select the product with higher quality at a lower price. If

products are

the same in quality, the firms compete with each other in price, while
firms compete in quality if the prices are the same. The traditional cost
rent for differential cost conditions can be regarded as one of quality
rent. The cost difference on KLME in some cases actually arises from the
quality difference in KLME. Quality rents can be classified into two
categories, quality cost rent and quality managerial rent. The former
diminishes in the monopolistic competition in the long term, but the
latter depends on what quality management method is applied in the
production system. Because the quality managerial rent is related to
human

factors,

the top managers

must create an effective

quality

management most suitable for the people in the production system.
The cost function affected by the effective quality managerial method
is lower than the cost function without it. We define /(M.E) as an operator
for producer learning. The operator contains the advanced managerial
methods and engineering quality systems. If the producer exercises this
powerful

instrument, the cost function

will be significantly

reduced.

Mathematically,

C(a, Q)*/(M.E) = C(a, Q/M, E)

( 7.3.2-1 )

C(a, Q) > C(a, Q/M, E)

( 7.3.2-2 )
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C(a > &Q, Q) < C(a > SQ, Q/M, E) < 0

( 7.3.2-3 )

C(a < a0, Q) > C(a <fig,Q/M, E) £ 0

( 7.3.2-4 )

If a* > a**, dC(a*, Q/M, E)/dt < dC(a**, Q/M, E)/dt

( 7.3.2-5 )

where /(M.E) - the operator for producer quality learning;
C(a, Q),
impact

C(a, Q/M, E) - quality cost functions without and with
of

advanced

managerial

and

engineering

methods;

a*, a** - different quality settings.
Equation (7.3.2-5) implies that the learning rate for the higher quality
setting is faster than for the lower one.
There

is

a substantial

body

of

work

examining

the impact

of

information on decision making (Simon, 1981; Schwartz et al., 1982;
Kambhu,

1982; Matthews et al., 1985; Milgrom et al., 1986; and

Wernerfelt,

1988).

For instance, two products with different

quality

levels are supplied for the same income group with k1 < a 2 and p : > p 2 . If
V 1 > V2 and consumers prefer product 1 to product 2, firm 2 should
either improve product quality or reduce the price to compete with firm
1. If complete quality information is available, consumers gain from
switching from product 2 and purchasing product 1 to avoid quality loss.
Firm 2 can improve the product quality or reduce the real price to
survive the competition by using information-guide production planning.
Both consumers and producers are well-informed about the reaction of
quality strategy and quality preference on opposite-side decision making
procedures.

Social welfare is enhanced by a well-informed

economic

system, and the quality setting is determined in the long term quality
competition.
Due

to

the

shortcomings

of

the
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imperfect

market

mechanism,

information is not totally available. It is difficult (or impossible) for the
product quality to be observed. Decision making is subject to information
uncertainty

or

the

risk

generated

by

imperfect

information.

For

diversified cost functions, price is not a reliable signal of product quality
except for the case in which the cost functions for the firms in the
industry are identical. Consumers obtain the information about product
quality through direct search or advertisements provided by firms in
order to avoid incorrect decision making. On the other hand, firms want
to obtain information about the consumer preference patterns and the
rival's quality strategy in their quality design and production. Positive,
correct,

and

truthful

information

aversion

toward information

reduces

the degree

of

consumer

risk, whereas negative information

will

increase the degree of riskiness in the long term. If product quality and
other information

sources are not totally available, consumers would

choose a product randomly or in light of the product price. Consumer
quality loss on the average is larger, and the firm producing the inferior
quality product could

survive in competition.

Social and

consumer

welfare experiences a loss under poor information availability.
In the consumer-based value surplus approach, the objective function
now contains a consumer quality information premium which is related
to product quality

and the consumer's

willingness

to pay for

the

information access. The producer adds the advertisement cost onto the
total cost function. Assuming that the advertisement cost is related to the
quantity cost or fixed cost, which means that the cost does not affect
quality setting but consumer quality utility, then

p = r(Q) + C(a) + R(a) + (C + Cd)/Q
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for fixed cost

( 7.3.2-1 )

p = r(Q) + Cd(Q) + C(a) + R(a) + C/Q for variable cost

( 7.3.2-2 )

where Cd, Cd(Q) - the fixed advertisement cost and the quantity related
advertisement cost, respectively.
The objective function under information uncertainty is (see equation
(3.2.1-21))

Y = E{V[F]} - (1 - p j / ^ )

( 7.3.2-3 )

Let a*j, q*I? p* : and V*j be a set of solutions for quality setting, quantity
demand, price and consumer value surplus with no information on the
combination
information

of

consumer-aversion

and

producer-aversion.

No

cost is added onto the profit constraint. If the information

provided by the firm is absolutely reliable to compensate consumer
quality loss due to information risk aversion, then

Cd(Q) => - (1 - pJ/(o- 2 i)

( 7.3.2-4 )

where =» means that an advertisement has an impact on consumer
quality utility. The consumer quality utility function becomes that under
information neutral. The set of solutions is a** l5 q**I? p**j and V**j.
Compared with the solutions under perfect information, it can be shown
that a**j = a*, q**j < q*, p**j> p* and V**j < V*.
Shown in figure 7-2, line AA' and BB', represent E{V[F]} and E{V[F]} - (1
- ^o))/(° 2 i) f° r consumer quality values without and with an information
premium, respectively. CC and DD' represent the price effects with and
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without information cost (advertisement). It can be shown that:

E{V[F]/(a" =a**T)} - p^Cd = A'D' -D'C = A'C = V**j

( 7.3.2-5 )

E{ V[F]/(a" =a**j)} - (1 - p(n)/(a2I) = A'D' - A'B' = B'D' - BD = V*x
E{V[F]/(a" =a**:)} = A'D' = V*
V* - p a Cd = V**T
V* - (1 - Pj/to- 2 !) = V*j

E(V)

A A'

Figure 7-2 Effect of Information Cost on Consumer Value Surplus

We can approximately

determine

the effect

of advertisement by

examining that Cd is equal to, greater than or smaller than (l-p C0 )/(o 2 I )/p C0 .
If Cd(Q) > (1 - p (0 )/(o 2 I )/p C0 , a*! < a**!, q*r > q**T and V* r > V**If the
consumers are willing to buy the product without an advertisement.
If Cd(Q) = (1 - p 0 ) )/(o 2 I )/p t 0 , a*! < a**!, q*x = q**! and V * I = V*% the
consumers

are indifferent

between

products

with

and without

an

advertisement.
If Cd(Q) < (1 - p C0 )/(a 2 I )/p (0 , a*! < k*% q*x < q**x and V*T< V*% the
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consumers

prefer

the

advertised

product

because

the

information

changes their degree of aversion toward uncertainty and risk.
7.4

Producer Quality Strategies on Production/Market Planning

To avoid the consumer's quality losses and to gain quality advantage,
producers implement a number of strategies and quality policies to affect
consumer

behavior

to

favor

their

products

in

the

competitive

atmosphere. The producers provide warranty policies, such as money
back or product replacement, to make up for the consumer loss due to
product

failure

information
improved

to

work

or imperfect
through

or

for

inferior

quality.

consumer information

advertisements,

word

of

Product

quality

can be obtained

mouth,

exhibitions

or
or

magazines provided by producers or consumer organizations. Repair
policies or warranties enhance the total consumer utility over time
periods due to product quality deterioration. The

differentiated prices,

rebate, and cash-back in product sale policy also affect consumer decision
making in price competition. The producers play the role of quality
leader to build up consumer reputation for their products to cope with
the uncertainties in future markets. The competition among producers is
reflected not only in product quality and product price, but also in the
related strategies which affect consumer quality utility shape. Meanwhile
these strategies also change the shapes of producer cost function and
profit. Producers strive to determine the most effective methods in the
implementation of the strategy.
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7.4.1

Producer Behavior in Quality-Leadership Competition

Producers benefit greatly from playing the role of quality-leader in
quality

competition.

Consumers prefer

products

with higher

quality

reputations to avoid higher risk and quality loss. Two sides' behaviors
react and influence each other, and a particular relationship, called the
quality credit between consumers and quality leader producer, can be
gradually built up. The higher the quality credit, the lower the consumer
quality loss. This relationship also forms a barrier to resist a newcomer to
enter, or to keep the market share from new rivals, unless the new
comer's

or rival's product quality demonstrates

utility

surplus

advantage

to

break

through

a greater
the

consumer

barrier.

The

consumer-based quality value surplus approach is employed to illustrate
why and how producers play the role of quality leader.
In the monopolistic quality competition, a firm plays the role of quality
leader, which is an important stimulation for it to promote its product
quality settings in the market. The fact is that the firm can benefit from
such a quality strategy. Not all firms are capable of being recognized as
quality leaders by the competitors and consumers. The firms who possess
the following conditions have the potential to become quality leaders: (1)
substantial market share, (2) lower product quality cost, and (3) effective
quality management. For simplicity, some assumptions are made before a
detailed discussion of producer behavior in playing the role of quality
leader in a dynamic process. All variables in the model vary with time.
(1) The quality leader firm chooses its quality strategy while taking the
strategies of other rivals as given.
(2) The quality leader firm possesses the information advantage about
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other firms' quality production.
i

(3) Nash-equilibrium is assumed to exist.
(4) Consumers can observe the firms playing quality leader role over
extended time periods.
(5) The cost paid for the role of quality leader in previous periods is
ignored.
In

this

model,

consumer-producer

the

objective

is

focused

quality aversion which reflects

on

the

case

producer

of

behavior

and attitude toward quality uncertainty: (1) Quality competition will be
more serious in the future market. (2) The rivals will

significantly

promote their product quality to place themselves in the position of
quality leader. (3) The goal for quality leader requires product quality
not to be set in meeting consumer satisfaction, but to go beyond as far as
possible. (4) Rational producers maximize their utility value of profit over
longer time periods.
The producer's quality premium is the value given up to guarantee that
his expected utility maximization will be achieved. The producer quality
premium is a cost to the producer, but a benefit for consumers through
price reduction or another producer's policy. The producer's goal cannot
be achieved without consideration of consumer quality attitude.
Recall the model of consumer-based quality value surplus in the case of
consumer-aversion and producer-aversion. The best model for a single
attribute product is defined as follows:
Max E(V{F}) = x + p{0B(x) + pco/(p) + (1 - pJF(w(a))
S.t. ft = pf(Q) - C(a, Q) - Cq(a) - (C + A)
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( 7.4.1-1 )

where Cq(a) is producer quality premium. A is the advertisement cost; it
may be related to the quantity output.
The

second

best

model

takes

the

budgetary

constraint

into

consideration

Max E(V{F}) = x + pJ3(x) + p(D/(p) + (1 - pJF(w(a))

( 7.4.1-2 )

S.T. ft = pf(Q) - C(a, Q) - Cq(a) - (C + A)
B>p

One of the purposes of the firm in playing the quality leader role is
aimed at meeting the goal of "beyond the consumer satisfaction" in the
serious competitive and uncertainty involvement environment. Let Q*, a*,
p* and V* represent the quantity, quality, price and consumer surplus
value under consumer-based quality utility maximization. The producer
expected profit and its quality leader premium are:

ft = pf(Q) - C(a, Q) - q(a) - (C + A)

( 7.4.1-3 )

dq(a)/d(-a) < 0, q"(a) < 0

(7.4.1-4)

where q(a) - producer quality leader premium, $. q(a) is a special case of
producer quality premium C (a).
q(a) is a function of product quality; the higher the quality, the lower
the q(a). q(a) is used to determine the quality setting for the quality
leader. Quality leader premium is a special producer's quality premium,
which may or may not be a real cost for the firm. The quality setting for
the quality leader's product is determined
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under the quality

leader

premium:

(1 - u w )/ , (w(a)) = VLJXP) = p J C ( a ) + q'(a))

( 7.4.1-5 )

The quality leader premium is determined in such a way that the
solutions for the consumer-based approach under the quality leader's
requirement are a' < a* and p' > p* (or p' < p*), but V £ V* and q' > q*.
If product information is not completely available, consumers are not
able to observe the product quality directly and producers will have no
information

on

each

other's

product

quality

setting.

To

facilitate

exposition, assume that there are two firms with identical demand and
cost

functions,

but differences

in quality

behavior.

Firm

1 takes

consumer satisfaction as its goal for quality design, while firm 2 attempts
to maximize its profit for quality design and production. It is also
assumed that initial price-quality combinations are the same for both
firms. In starting year t = 0, both firms designed the quality setting at a
in which the quality cost was at the minimum. Consumers are assumed to
be uniformly

distributed and randomly select a product among the

available brands. Clearly, the initial market is equally shared by these
two firms. Since firm 1 possesses a changed behavior and takes consumer
satisfaction as the objective of quality design at time period 1, t = 1,
consumers perceive the change in the quality of product 1 and spread the
information in the market. Some consumers switch to product 1 in a time
lag, t = 2. The consumer switch will not stop until the market force makes
no difference between these two products. It may be the increase in
quality of product 2, or a reduction in the price of product 2, or firm 2
going out of business. Assume that firm 2 finds that it suffers from a loss
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due to inferior product quality and redesigns the product to catch up
with the quality competition in time period t = 2. Consumers usually tend
to stick to the product they are accustomed to using if other products do
not provide more utility surplus. This process will continue for a number
of time periods. At the t = n period, although the two firms produce the
same product quality, they have different demand curves (number of
consumers) and different profits. Firm l's profit, expected to be greater
than firm 2's, depends on the producer and the consumer

quality

learning rates. The consumers who buy product 1 are better off on the
average, because the consumers' quality loss is less than product 2 in the
long term.
As a result, either of these two firms recognizes that they greatly
benefit from playing the role of the quality leader. Each firm desires to
be

the quality leader whether or not the other's behavior is governed by

its reaction function.
leadership

behavior

It is not efficient
from

the

traditional

to distinguish this quality
Stackelburg

approach

in

duopoly. It is rational to believe that competition in quality leadership is
an incentive to improve quality continuously in monopolistic competition.
It is easy to understand that if a firm possesses a lower quality cost
function, advanced quality management, and the behavior of meeting
consumer requirements other than the behavior of short-term

profit

maximization, the firm has the potential to become the quality leader in
the industry. The individual firm in monopolistic competition faces his
own distinct demand curve of the product which is noticeably different in
product quality but with totally substitutable properties for the other
products. The product which the firm can sell depends on the consumer
decision in product quality selection. The products in the market are
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different in quality and price. The product quantity demand for firm i is

Qi = /(Vi,V 2 ,...,V n )
= / [ V ^ a ^ ) , V 2 (a 2 -p 2 ), ...,Vn(an-Pn)]

where V j is consumer

quality

value

surplus

i = 1, 2, ..., n ( 7.4.1-6 )

for

product

i.

With

consumer-based utility, the firm production quantity, quality, and profits
depend on the consumer's product assessment. If quality information and
other information are perfectly available, consumers will first buy the
product providing the largest surplus value, and then the product with
the next largest value, until the total market demand is satisfied. In the
above equation

aQi/3Vi>0,

3Qi/3Vj<0

i*j

(7.4.1-7)

3Qi/3Vj + SSQj/SVj < 0

( 7.4.1-8 )

aQi/avj + iaQi/3Vj > o

(7.4.1-9)

An increase in quality surplus value for quality improvement of
product i with all other product surplus values remaining unchanged
results in an increase in the demand for product i. A number of
consumers will switch from competitors to firm i, and vice versa.
Equations (7.4.1-8) and (7.4.1-9) are the cross consumer surplus effect.
Equation (7.4.1-8) assumes that firm i's demand proportion will fall if all
firms raise their consumer surplus together. However, firm i demand will
increase even though other firms raise consumer surplus in equation
(7.4.1-9). In this case, firm i possesses a strong quality leadership.
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Although quality decisions made by firm i do not depend on the other
firms' decisions, its effects spread among other firms through consumer
selection decision. Two specific cases are that when prices are the same,
firms compete in quality, and when the qualities are the same firms
compete in price.

If

Pi

-

Pj

3Qi/3(-ai) > 0,

3Qi/3(-aj) < 0

( 7.4.1-10 )

If a ^ d j
3Qi/a Pi < 0,

aQi/3 Pj > 0

( 7.4.1-11 )

If consumers are not homogeneous in behavior toward product quality,
and budget effect has to be accounted for, equation (7.4.1-7) becomes

Qi = /[Vrf&i-P!), V 2 (a 2 -p 2 ), .... V k (a k -p k )]

( 7.4.1-12 )

B ^ P i , i = l, 2, ..., k

The consumer will search for the product subject to his budgetary
constraint. The quality leader competition is carried out at
market

different

segments.

Under imperfect

and biased

information,

the consumer

subjective

credit will result in some power or biased product selection. If there are
not any special characteristics for consumers to distinguish one product
quality from the other, consumers will randomly search and then update
quality information to make selection decisions over time periods. As
mentioned before, firms compete to play the role of quality leader to gain
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some advantages, especially under the imperfect information

situation.

Consumers recognize that the quality leader's products are more reliable
and result in less quality loss. This credit reduces the consumer's degree
of quality aversion. Since the information

premium is one kind of

consumer quality loss, the product quantity for the quality leader firm i
becomes:

dQi/a(<y2ii) < o,

Consumers prefer

aQi/a(o2ij) > o

(7.4.1-13)

the quality leader's product to other

competitors'

products, because it involves less information risk. In most cases, the
competition

in

quality

leadership

will

result

in

a

Stackelburg

disequilibrium, which is a benefit for consumers and social welfare.
It is easy to understand that the optimal quality setting is achieved
through competition in quality leadership in the quality range between
a* and a0, shown in Figure 7.1. The question is "How do firms compete for
quality leadership in a situation in which optimal quality settings have
been reached?" In the following cases, firms still compete for quality
leadership if a feasible solution can be found. Since some uncertainties
exist concerning future markets, and consumer decision procedures and
other competitors' actions are unknown, firms are more conservative in
product quantity output, but more active in promoting quality settings.
Regardless of what happens, one thing is sure: the firm can survive and
succeed in the future if it is really a quality leader.
Consumers
sources

from

know

that

time-cumulated
the

experiences

quality-leader

and other

producer

usually

information
provides

higher-quality products. The degree of consumer risk aversion resulting
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from

quality

information

and

inherent

product

quality

toward

the

quality-leader's products is reduced or eliminated, which means that the
quality loss resulting from the consumer quality premium (information
and variation in quality) is much smaller than before. The degree of
quality

aversion

also reflects

the consumer quality

credit and

the

consumer quality learning rate under information uncertainty. Quality
reputation,

therefore,

can

be

expressed

in

the

cumulated

quality

premium over time periods.

Rp = k/(o 2 ) = k[/(a 2 T ) + /(a 2 p )]

( 7.4.1-14 )

d/(a 2 p)/dx(0 < 0, df(c2i)/dl < 0

( 7.4.1-15 )

where /(o 2 T ) - consumer quality information premium, $;
/(°" 2 p) " consumer premium for variation of product inherent
quality, $;
R

- consumer reputation for quality leader, $.

For example, a specific quality reputation may have the following form:
R p = k[(l-exp(-Rt))o2i + (l-exp(-rx))a 2 p ]

( 7.4.1-16 )

where R - the consumer quality learning rate;
r - the consumer quality aversion degree.
The higher the learning rate and the asset level, the larger the
consumer quality reputation. The consumer quality reputation is related
to not only the quality information and the learning rate, but also the
inherent product quality produced. Any incorrect quality information and
296

quality cheating can only stand for a very short time and will seriously
damage the quality credit for the producer. It will increase the total
quality premium and result in a greater consumer quality loss. The
quality premium that the consumer would pay under quality reputation
is

qp = Q P o- R p

(7.4.1-17)

substitute equation (7.4.1-16) into the above equation
q p = k[ a 2 ie xp(-Rt) + o 2 p exp(-rx) ], Q po = k( o\ + o 2 p ) ( 7.4.1-18 )

The product provided by the quality leader's firm may result in higher
consumer quality utility than another firm's product designed at the
maximization of consumer quality value surplus. As shown in Figure 7-2,
the reason is that the higher quality reputation has changed the shape of
the consumer's quality preference and the speed of consumer learning
under imperfect information. It is easy to determine the quality settings
for a one-period product. Assume that product 1 has a historically higher
quality reputation, and product 2 has a quality level which is determined
by the optimal point of consumer surplus under quality aversion. If the
quality leader premium is designed in such a way that

( l - H j t f W + Rp) " Hco-ftP') ^ (1iO/(A*> " ^/(P*)

( 7.4.1-19 )

then it is easy to derive the results: a' < a*, p' > p* (or p' < p*), V > V*, q'
> q*. The consumers benefit more from product 1 and buy more of it.
Another situation for producers to play the role of quality leader is in
the case of discrete-time product quality settings over multi-periods.
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Product quality is a decision variable in the longer term with respect to
other variables, such as the quantity output level. For these kinds of
products, producers are not able to adjust or improve product quality
instantaneously during the product market time. A considerable quality
change requires

time consuming

and capital

investment

in

product

design, production system (machinery), manufacturing process, materials
and other resources. Assume that the quality change needs T time
periods which also corresponds to a noticeable change in consumer
behavior and other time-related factors, such as income and interest rate.
The interval, in time periods, is determined by the product market time
rather than product life, which means a considerable quality change will
arise, and could be in monthly, quarterly, or yearly intervals. In the
quality-leader approach, the quality level is set up to maximize total
consumer quality value surplus over the product market time periods
subject to a zero profit condition and both consumer and producer
learning constraints. The producer's quality leader premium is chosen so
that

the

maximization

of

consumer

quality

surplus

value

can

be

implemented in the discrete-time quality choice. For simplicity, assume
that all producer surplus in the competition are transformed

to the

consumer. The consumer quality utility function can be expressed as a
function of consumer assets over time periods:

F(a/x t ) = (l-pja(x(t))

where F(a:/x t ) - consumer quality utility function;
a(x(t)) - consumer's assets function.
With time change, the consumer utility provided by the product quality
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designed at t0 will gradually degrade as the consumer's income and taste
changes. This means that the consumer buys the same product but gains
less quality utility surplus in comparison with the surplus at the previous
period for the same income group. Assume that the consumer assets
utility function is concave when the quality setting is fixed over time
periods, i.e. 3F(aj/x t )/3x(t) < 0, F"(aj/x t ) > 0. The product price is
discounted in terms of present value. The price function is a convex
function over time:

F(p) = p w p[exp(-it)]

where i - discount rate for present value.
Figure 7-3 is used to approximately

illustrate the quality

leader

strategy. Assume that the same price discounted curve is employed for
both the quality leader's and the rival's products. The rival firm sets the
quality in the position (a lf p 2 ) such that the consumer surplus value is
maximized at t 0 for discrete-time quality design. The total consumer
quality surplus obtained from the rival product over T (the product
market time) is the area between these two curves from &x to aj + A a P
The total consumer surplus for the quality leader's product over T time
periods is the area from aj - Aa to ax + A&j- Aa. Consumers will have less
quality utility surplus during the first couple of periods but will gain
more utility surplus in the latter periods than the rival's product. If this
situation exists in the market, it can be proved that the quality leader
will choose a quality setting A a such that the total consumer surplus over
the entire periods can be maximized.
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V(U)A
ai+Aai-Aa

©p(i,t,a)
ai+Aai \ ( 1 ^

o)a(Xjt)

a,t
Figure 7-3

Quality Setting Strategy for the Quality Leader Firm

The total consumer surplus over T time periods for the rival's
product, S l5 is

(|rTA

/«&i+Aai
[F(a/xt) - F(p)]da
Sl=
S l dt= |
=
Asidt =
Jo
J&i

r

The function /(a, p) = F(a/x t ) - F(p) is concave. The total consumer surplus
for the quality leader's product over the same time periods is
„T

J

0

-a^Aa^Aa

As 2 dt= /
Jln-Ak

/(a,p)da

= Sl + /
/(a, p)da - /
/(a, p)da
•'Sj-Aa
Jln+MyM

Since Aaj is noticeably larger, and aj is the optimal quality setting in the
static model, then
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/

/(a, p)da - /

JIL,-ML

/(a, p)da > 0

•'s,+ Aa,-Aa

Thus, the quality leader firm can find a quality setting A a higher than
the optimal quality setting in the static model at t0 by the rival firm to
maximize the consumer surplus over the product quality market time.
This quality setting, A a, depends on the product market time (the longer
the market time, the higher the quality setting), and the shapes of the
consumer quality utility function and the discounted price function over
time periods. The other factors which will be shown in the following
model also affect the quality setting. Based on the analysis, the quality
leader firm can choose a higher quality setting under the following more
advantageous conditions to maximize its long term profit

through a

consumer-based approach strategy in quality competition.

Max

q(H)= f T [V r VJdt

(7.4.1-20)

= J L(P2 - Pi) exp(-it) + (1 - u j (F(%J - FJ%Jdt
•'o
s.t. pj = [C(aj) + C(Q) + C/Q]exp(-mjt)
xt = x 0 exp(gt)
F( aj /x t ) = /( a j /x t )-q p j = / ( a / x t ) - k[a 2 Ij exp(-R j t) + a 2 pj exp(-r j x)]
m

i >

m

2> q P i < qP2>

R

i >

R

*

r

i > r2

j =1 for quality leader, j=2 for quality rival
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where Vi - consumer quality surplus value obtainted from product i;
F(a:/x t ) - consumer quality value function for product j at year t
given the assets xt;
i - comprehensive discount rate after consideration of interest
rate

and inflation rate;

T - the product quality market time;
x 0 , xt - consumer assets in time 0 and in time t;
g - income growth rate per year on the average during the
product market time;
m - producer quality learning rate.
It should be noted that the model above is different from the product
quality surplus value over product life, though the model is somewhat
related to the product life cycle. The product market time is much shorter
than the product life time. The former depends on the rate of product
redesign and innovation as well as the degree of consumer satisfaction. If
the product market time is short, T < oo, then the discount rate i in some
cases is ignored.
The objective function still contains all values related to consumer
quality surplus. All factors in the model vary over time. An increase in
consumer income and assets change his or her preference pattern, the
quality/price

weight

distribution p w , the budget level, and the total

quality premium. For the sake of comparison, the monetary value which
is affected by the inflation rate and interest rate should be discounted
into the present value. The quality leader firm introduces the higher
quality product at a higher price through an exhibition or advertisements
to give consumers the price information as well as images of its quality in
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order to affect the consumer's decision making. When other conditions
change, this product at some later periods would be the best product
choice for the consumers. With information available, the consumer's
quality premium is eliminated gradually. The producer's strategy for the
quality-leader in time periods is to maximize the total consumer-based
quality surplus value over time periods of product market time.
Furthermore, in addition to the time needed to achieve the best quality
value, the larger quantity output also possesses a time-lag pattern.
Considering

a product market time-pattern, the quality

leader

may

obtain a better selling record for a higher quality product. This model
illustrates the time-characterized quality properties. If the time period
required for considerable quality change is longer, the product quality
setting is higher in the beginning of quality design. Economic conditions
exercise a great influence on time-characterized product quality. The
quality competition in economic booming periods pushes producers to set
higher quality, while the recession in the economy would force producers
to

concentrate

reduction

of

on

price

quantity

competition

output

level

and
to

quality
cope

with

improvement,
future

or

market

uncertainty.
The product quality setting heavily depends on the firm's prediction
for the economic situation and the income growth rate, g, in the future, i
represents the present value discount rate. The term, (g-i), represents the
net income growth rate. The bigger the net income growth rate, the
higher the quality setting. Since the coefficient of quality/price weight
distribution p w is determined by the consumer assets level, consumers
will put more weight on product quality and prefer the higher quality
product when their assets increase. The consumer reputation for the
303

quality leader has less quality value loss in terms of total quality
premium. The higher consumer learning rate with a time lag will
eliminate the information risk degree sooner than the other competitors'
information risk. On the other hand, the producer learning rate is a
function of quality setting and management efficiency. Effective quality
management methods will enable the quality leader to learn faster in
practice to reduce quality cost compared to the others.
The price for the time being is discounted with the rate (i+m) over the
periods. The higher the rate m, the larger the consumer value surplus
resulting from the lower present value of the product price.
If the second best model with the budgetary constraint is taken into
consideration in playing the role of quality leader, and if the rivals set
their product qualities at the boundary solution, the quality leader is
faced with a decision on quality setting to keep the quality leadership.
The firm may still design a higher product quality, which can be
distinguished from the competitor's product quality, and sell the product
at the same price. The firm may suffer a net loss from such a low price.
The firm determines the product quality setting in light of the leader's
premium such that the quality leader still benefits from the position. The
quality

leader

(constraints

premium

is

determined

by

the

following

formula

are the same as the above model except the

budget

constraint):

q(a) = / V i - Va)dt - f pe"(i"x)t dt

(7.4.1-21)

B = Pi = p 2
where V 1

- consumer quality surplus value provided by the quality
304

leader's product;
V2

- consumer quality surplus value provided by the quality

follower's product;
Pi» P2 " P r i c e s f ° r the quality leader's and follower's products,
respectively;
x - recovery rate for a loss.
In this case, the optimal quality setting for the quality leader firm may
not exist. If q(a) > 0, the quality leader has the product with the higher
quality setting at the price equal to the rival's. The firm loses in the
beginning periods for an appropriate price setting but gains more returns
in the subsequent periods. The loss is recovered after n periods with a
lower discount rate (i-x). Based on the properties of boundary solutions,
consumers prefer the higher quality product even when the product
price is higher than the rival's in the latter period, which can be
compensated by an increase in consumer budget.
If q(a) < 0, the firm takes the same strategy as the competitors do.
Whichever alternative is adopted, consumers are better off for buying
the product provided by the quality leader firm. The product quality
provides the same quality performance to consumers when the quality
leader produces the product with the same quality as the competitor's.
However, from the consumer's point of view, the quality leader's product
also provide a moral comfort and reliability, which is another kind of
utility that the consumer needs.
The firm plays the role of quality leader in another interesting area,
which is to minimize total consumer quality loss over the product life.
The higher quality product has a much longer life time. Therefore, the
product is designed to be larger than the optimum value gradually wears
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out during the utilization periods. The firm determines the time lag when
the product's quality performance closes at its optimum point of other
competitors' products. Promotion

in product

quality

design

and

its

performance also improves other by-product effects, such as reduction in
other resource consumption (for example, a car's gas mileage). The
negative (positive) by-product effect is external diseconomy (economy).
These negative by-product effects put a burden on the consumer and
society and are not accounted for in the producer's cost function. The
consumer reputation for the quality leader firm results not only from its
higher product quality, but also from the responsibility for by-product
effects on society in the modern world. This behavior has grown rapidly
in the modern world. If the firm does not consider the effect

of

by-products and social responsibility, it is rarely recognized as the
quality leader by consumers.
Minimizing

consumer

quality

utility

equivalent to maximizing the difference

loss

over

time

periods

is

between the product quality

utilities provided by the quality leader's and the competitor's

firms,

respectively.
Max q(a) = (l-\ijhf^,

sv Fyx,)- / 2 ( a 2 , s 2 , R2/xt)]dt +

( 1 - p J J p V b2]exp(-if)dt + p j p 2 - P l ) + p j e ^ , GJ^ - e 2 (a 2 , G52)]/(l+i)T
s.t.

B > max(p2, p ^

( 7.4.1-22 )

d//ds < 0, ds/dt > 0
df^fdsx

> d/ 2 /ds 2 , ds^dt < ds 2 /dt

&! < a2, m} > GJ2; e^a^ n^) > e2(a2, GJ2)
For positive by-product effect, b1 > b 2
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For negative by-product effect, b 2 > b

where S: - product quality deterioration rate, j=l,2;
R: - consumer quality learning rate;
G$j - product value depreciation rate;
E: - product residual after T time periods;
bj - by-product effects in terms of money for product i;
i - consumer utility discount rate,
j = 2 and j = 1 represent the competitor's and the quality leader's
products, respectively. The first term is the quality loss due to product
quality

deterioration

over

time.

S 2 and Sl

are the rates for quality

deterioration of the quality-leader's and competitor's product qualities
respectively, and S 2 > Sp The total quality premium (inherent quality and
information) effect was discussed previously. The consumer utility is
discounted as consumer income and assets change with time. The higher
the

utility

discount rate, the

higher

the quality

setting

to

aviod

deteriotation. The second term is the by-product effect, which is usually
proportional to the quality setting for the positive effect. The third term
is the price effect at the purchase time. The quality-leader firm's cost
function determines the product price. The fourth term is related to the
residual value of the products after T time periods, which usually is the
function

of depreciation rate and the quality level remaining in the

product.
The higher quality setting has a lower deterioration rate, a higher
residual value, and a lower (higher) negatively (positively) by-product
effect. Equation (7.4.1-22) is particularly useful for durable goods. In this
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changing world, the firm can no longer concentrate solely on its profit
maximization. Since the consumer-based approach reflects the change in
producer behavior in the modern competitive world, the reaction and
behavior of consumer attitudes toward the effects arisen by the product
quality have a significant impact on the producer profit and utility.
When the quality improvement needs a great deal of investment in the
initial research and development stage (R & D), only those producers who
have enough capital and intelligence resources can play the role of
quality leader. It is called natural quality leadership. Some industries
requiring

intensive

characteristics

of

capital

and

advanced

natural

quality

technology

leadership,

such

possess
as

these

computer,

automobile, aerospace and military industries. The special quality patents
also belong to this case. The natural quality leadership is often associated
with the natural monopoly, duopoly and oligopoly markets. The other
small sized firms play the role of quality followers to compensate for the
shortcoming in R and D investment. They adopt a "wait and see" strategy.
Once the quality leader introduces a higher quality product or a new
product different from the previous one, the followers can rapidly catch
up with the product quality with much lower expenses and then compete
with the quality leader in lower price. Therefore, the competition is
"advantage in quality but competitive in price" for the quality leader
while it is "advantage in price but competitive in quality" for the quality
follower. Based on the consumer-based approach, the quality leadership
premium is computed as the difference
values resulting

from

the

quality

respectively:
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between the quality

leader's

and

follower's

surplus
products

^ R iRi/x
/ x tt),Jf(^Pl)]ddtt -Max q(a)1=1
= V
V,[f(fti,
Jo

s.t.

j

Vif[h, W^t), f(p2)] dt

(7.4.1-23 )

Jo
Pl

= [ C ^ ) + q ^ ) + C(I1)]exp(-it)

p 2 = [C(a2) + C2(Q2) + C(I2)]exp(-it)
a.,£a 2 , li » I

2

x t = x 0 exp(gt)
where I: - capital investment for quality leader, j =1; for the follower,
j=2, $;
Ri - consumer reputation for quality leader, $;
R 2 - consumer learning rate for follower, $.
To gain the advantage of quality leadership, the firm should examine
consumer behavior correctly and devise an effective

market strategy,

thus returning a significant part of investment in the early years of a
product's market time before the follower's product comes onto the
market. The quality leader firm should speed up the quality innovation
rate to shorten the product market time. Meanwhile, the quality leader
firm has to meet the challenge from other large-sized rivals to replace it
with the position of quality leadership. The large-sized rivals cannot play
the same role of the follower as the small-sized firms do because they
would suffer a significant loss for a longer waiting period and market
share. They may survive the competition of quality leadership. The
difficulty of entering and exiting the natural quality leadership industry
also means more gain (or loss) in quality leadership competition.
From the above analysis, the competition in maintaining and replacing
a quality leadership position results in benefits for consumers and social
welfare in most cases of quality activities. However, in some special cases,
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the competition in quality leadership may result in an over-utilization, or
waste of resources, if either consumer or producer behaviors are not
correctly

assessed. The military industry is such an example. The

consumer, the Pentagon, has a particular interest in product quality,
acquiring faster, more accurate, more powerful weapon products. Its cost
function (the product price) is not correctly and economically set up for
the special consumer, and the weight for quality/price distributions is
totally or almost totally put on the quality. Thus, as a requirement of
product quality, the Pentagon preference is biased. A part of resources is
wasted in the pursuit of high quality, and the whole system quality
balance is ignored. The correct way to make a decision for defense
expenses is to set up the Pentagon's quality preference and weight for
quality/price distribution correctly. In this way, the quality leadership
competition in military industry can be effectively carried out.

7.4.2

Quality Related Cash-Back and Rebate Policies under Market

Uncertainty
The policies of cash-back and rebate adopted by the producers (or
sellers) usually is treated as an effective price reduction to increase the
sale under demand and market uncertainty. The higher inventory cost
drives

the

producer's

profits

down

significantly.

In

the

market

investigation, the producers providing consumers with higher quality
surplus values are less active in implementing the policies above to
improve

their

inventory

situations

and

production

stability.

These

products have lower inventory costs and good selling records. To compete
with the other rivals in quality and to cope with demand uncertainty, the
producer uses a cash-back or rebate policy to reduce the real price to
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increase the consumer quality value surplus. The price effect

may

significantly change consumer demand so that the high-cost inventory
and selling loss could be improved.
The information for quality settings of the competitor's products is not
totally available. Product quality is predetermined

by the producers

based on their long-term objectives. Once the products are introduced
onto the market, the quality cannot be changed immediately. If the
quality is inferior in comparison with other firms' product qualities, some
consumers turn to the higher quality products, and loss in sales and high
inventory cost will occur and, moreover, an uncertainty or decrease in
demand side forces the producers either to cut the quantity output level
or reduction of the product price or both. We will illustrate the role of the
quality related rebate policy and the effect of quality improvement to
cope with the uncertainty.
Rebate is a flexible policy, similar to cash-back, to reduce the real price
to cope with demand uncertainty and quality problems. The producer's
profit resulting from the rebate policy is

ft = n[p-(l-p)(b/(l+r)+c)](Q+S) + p(l-TO(Q-S)-C 0 Q-qS

where p - initial price, $/unit;
p - probability of consumer failure to claim rebate;
b - rebate, $/unit;
r - interest rate during rebate effective periods;
c - rebate service cost, $/unit;
rj - possibility for product demand at rebate;
1 - r| - possibility for product demand in future market;
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( 7.4.2-1 )

C 0 - production cost, $/unit;
Cj - average inventory cost, $/unit;
S - inventory, unit.
When the demand decreases, the producers first cut the level of
production output to reduce inventory cost such that the expected profit
becomes

«i = PQi " Tl(l-p)(b/(l+r) + c)Q! - q Q x

( 7.4.2-2 )

ft1 = [p-Ti(l-p)(b/(l+r) + c ) - C 1 ] Q 1
Q 1 = Q- S,

q £ C0

( 7.4.2-3 )

ri reflects the degree of uncertainty in the economy. If T\ and the rebate
service are high, the producer may adopt the strategy of reduction in
price. Rebate is a flexible policy to increase selling and

decrease

inventory, because frequent changes in price will result in the loss of the
consumer's credit for the product. If the rebate does not reduce the
inventory significantly,

the producer may further

cut the production

level. However, this may create some problems in society. Another
effective method is to improve product quality to affect the consumer's
behavior. Assume that the producer wants to keep a certain level of the
expected profit and to examine the potential effect of the strategy on the
future market. In the quality improvement strategy, the price remains
unchanged, and the quality is promoted such that

ft2 = (p - C 2 )Q 2
If C 2 = Ti(l-p)(b/(l+r) + C) + q ,

( 7.4.2-4 )
Qi - Q2,
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&! < a 2

( 7.4.2-5 )

7t2 ^ ftj

Recall that due to the effect of quality resistance during the economic
uncertainty described in Chapter 4, consumers are more biased in favor
of a higher quality product at competitive prices. One of the economic
characteristics for a recession period is that the supply exceeds the
demand.

Consumers

are

more

conservative

concerning

quality

uncertainty and risk. The impact of economic situations on the production
output level for higher quality products is much less than that for lower
quality products. The production is quite stable and smooth over time,
and the policy of lower inventory, or just in time (JIT), can be
implemented. The producers with higher quality rent can survive more
easily in a changeable environment. This situation is observable in the
industries with high inventory costs.
The weight distribution for quality/price, p ^ , is also changed due to a
real income decrease. If the price effect is greater than the quality effect
for some products, i.e. p m > 1/2, the rebate (or cash-back) is more
efficient. If p w < 1/2, the quality promotion is preferred.

For the

uncertainty in a future market, the reduction in product output is far
inferior to the quality improvement.

7.4.3

Quality vs Quantity Under the Constrained Investment

Assume that a firm wants to expand its production capacity and
market share through investment to gain higher profit. The firm can
adopt the strategy either by increasing output level Q, or by promoting
quality level a. The firm is also faced with the possibility of employing a
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mixed strategy to increase both quality setting and quantity level. The
firm expects to maximize its profit from the strategy adopted. Several
fundamental assumptions about the constrained investment program are
described as follows.
(1) The initial product quality setting is located at the point which has
the lowest quality cost. Quantity output is oriented at the optimal
conditions. Any increase in quantity or quality will result in cost-up.
(2) Production system capability is improved by investment.
(3) No uncertainty is involved in the analysis except when noted.
(4) The firm is monopolist. Consumers are homogeneous.
(5) The explosion, quality and quantity output levels are assumed to be
the same in each period over all the periods to return the investment.
A firm's decision variable is the investment I, which determines the
quality setting a, quantity output level Q, or both maximize its expected
profit. Assume that the investment is a function of quality, quantity and
capital cost

I 0 = I(a, Q, Cr)

( 7.4.3-1 )

dl/d(-a) > 0, I"a > 0

( 7.4.3-2 )

dl/dQ > 0, I"Q > 0

( 7.4.3-3 )

dI/dC r < 0

( 7.4.3-4 )

where I 0 - investment, $;
C r - cost of capital, percentage of investment, %.
Equations from (7.4.3-2) through (7.4.3-3) indicate that investment is
assumed to be a convex function

for quality improvement and
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quantity increment, respectively. The higher the cost of capital, the lower
the investment. For the conventional profit maximization with quantity
strategy, as mentioned in the previous chapters, suppose the product
quality is set at the minimum cost point. The firm concentrates on
quantity output level to maximize its profit.

Assume the demand for the

product is increasing and the cost of capital is constant. The cost function
under investment becomes

C 0 (Q 0 /a=a 0 ) + CrI(Q/a=a0) = C(Q/a=a0)

( 7.4.3-5 )

The expected profit is

ft = R(Q/a=a0) - C(Q/a=a0)
= R(Q/a=a0) - C 0 (Q 0 /a=a 0 ) - C r I(Q/a=a 0 )

( 7.4.3-6 )

dft/dQ = R'Q - C 0 - CrI'Q = 0
R

Q

=

C'o + CrI'Q

Q>Qo

( 7.4.3-7 )
( 7.4.3-8 )

where C 0 (.) - cost function before investment;
C(.) - cost function after investment;
R(.) - revenue after investment.
The new production output is set at a level such that the marginal
revenue equals marginal cost. The above profit

maximization

under

investment is greater than the previous one, i.e. ft > ft0; the producer
invests in promotion of the production output level in order to gain more
profit. If the output level is greater than before, the consumer and the
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society are better off, and the consumer surplus is larger.
It has been shown that the consumer quality surplus value increased
with quality improvement if the product price was constant or under the
following limitation:

dp/d(-a) < MRS pa
specifically in the linear form,
dp/d(-a) < (1-pJ/Po

( 7.4.3-9 )

The producer invests in the promotion of product quality to maximize
his profit

under the assumption

of constant consumer

surplus

and

constant output level. The unit cost function is

C 0 (VQ=Q 0 ) + CrI(a/Q=Q0) = C(a/Q=Q0)

( 7.4.3-10 )

The expected profit is
ft = R(a/Q=Q0) - C(a/Q=Q0)Q0
= R(a/Q=Q0) - [C0(a0/Q=Q0) - CrI(a/Q=Q0)]Q0

( 7.4.3-11 )

dft/d(-a) = p' a - C 0 - C r I' a = 0
P'a = c 'o + crl'&

< 7.4.3-12 )

p = p 0 + (l-p 0) )d(-a)/p (0

(7.4.3-13)

where p 0 - the initial price before investment;
p - the product price after investment
Since the consumer surplus value is constant, consumers are indifferent
between

products

with

and

without
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quality

improvement.

For

heterogeneous consumers, the producer will provide a set of products
with different

quality utility

surplus for consumer

self-selection

to

maximize its total profit.
In the above two investment strategies, the monopolist benefits from
quality investment

C r I' a more than the quantity strategy because the

consumer surplus increase from quality improvement is exploited by the
firm.

However,

under

a

monopolistic

competition

for

these

two

approaches the consumer will choose the product from the first approach
for a larger surplus.
As mentioned in previous chapters, the consumer demand is a function
of quality, quantity and price rather than quantity and price only. It is
possible for the producer to find an optimal allocation of investment
between quality and output levels to maximize its profit. Suppose that all
the investment is used up in the belief that the return on investment
(ROI) is higher than the alternative of doing nothing.
The model is

Max ft = R(a, Q) - C(a, Q)

( 7.4.3-14 )

s.t. I = I(a, Q, Cr)
L = ft + X[l - I(a, Q, Cr)]
3L/3(-a) =ft' a -AC r I' a = 0
3L/3Q = 7t'Q - A.CrI'Q = 0
3L/3*, = I-I(a, Q, C r )= 0
If Cr is variable,
3L/3C r = 3ft'/aCr - A9I/3Cr = 0
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ft'Q/ft'a = l' Q /l' a
R

'a = c 'a + ^ ' a '

( 7.4.3-15 )
R

'Q

= C ' Q + Q'Q

R" < 0, C" > 0,1" > 0

ai/aq < o, 3ft'/acr < o
First-order conditions state that the ratio of the marginal quality and
the marginal quantity attribution on the total profit must be equal to the
ratio of marginal investment in quality improvement and the quantity
increment. One can find a point on the quality level which determines the
corresponding price and quantity in such a way that the optimal profit
can be achieved. If the cost of capital is higher, the profit gained from
quality and quantity investment is lower. The second order conditions for
profit maximization are satisfied for the model. The quantity production
function, quality loss function, price function and cost function as well as
investment function are pre-assumed to be strictly concave and convex
in the regions of quality and quantity where the first-order conditions
are met in order to guarantee the existence of profit maximization.
The producer's profit decreases when the cost of investment, C r ,
increases. The results illustrate that the firm can only achieve the profit
maximization by satisfying the above investment roles. The conventional
investment theory on quantity or quality alone may not be the global
optimal. Furthermore, the firm with a low cost of capital will gain more
from both quality improvement and quantity increment. The advantage
of this approach is to maximize the producer's profit by accounting for
consumer behavior regarding quantity, quality and price.
To expose the implication of the above optimal investment in quantity
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and quality, equation (7.4.3-15) can be explicitly transformed into the
following form of functions.

ft'Q/ft's = r Q /r a
\\= ft'al'Q/ft'Q = \'Q(R'& - C' a )/(R' Q - C Q )
= (R'a - C'a)(l'Q/R'Q )/(l - C Q /R' Q )

( 7.4.3-16 )

Substitute l'a = /(Aa), l'Q =/(AQ), R ' ^ / t f l - p J A a / p J and R' Q =/(Ap) into
equation

(7.4.3-12)
/(Aa) = [/((1-pJAa/pJ - C a ](/(AQ)//(Ap)/(l - C Q //(Ap))
= [f^,

Aa) - C a ]/(e)/(l - C Q //(Ap))

where e is the demand

curve slope. The quality level under

investment is positively related
demand

curve

slope,

( 7.4.3-17 )

and

the

to the marginal quantity
consumer

weight

the

cost, the

distribution

for

quality/price, but negatively related to the marginal quality cost and the
cost of capital. The optimal quality and quantity levels under investment
are determined by the first-order conditions. The effective

investment

decisions should be determined by these factors. For a specific production
procedure and process, one should first find the order of effects of each
factor on the quality improvement and then invest efficiently

in the

factor which has the largest effect on quality promotion.
All of the above approaches are producer-based
consumer-based.

However,

information

unknown

and

the

uncertainties,

consumer

demand,

ones rather than

such
are

in

as

imperfect

some

extent

involved in the producer's decision making. The producer-based profit
maximization approach may not be realized under uncertainty. This
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serious problem may be overcome by adoption of the consumer-based
surplus approach.
To examine the effect of investment on consumer quality surplus value,
assume

that

free

entry

and

exit

derive

a zero-profit

in

quality

competition (see section 7.4.1). The initial quality setting is located at the
point with the minimum cost, and quantity output is set in the optimal
position, which means that any improvement in quality and increment in
quantity will result in a cost increase. The cost of capital is assumed to be
zero in the discussion of the consumer-based approach in the previous
chapters. But the cost of capital is now no longer free for quality activity.
Assume that the optimal quality setting a' and the optimal quantity
level Q' can be achieved by investing I. The price is

Pa\Q- =/{Cr[I(a\ Q')] + C(a*, Q*)}

( 7.4.3-18 )

If Cr = 0, the optimal quality setting in the consumer-based approach is
a*. If Cr > 0, the optimal quality setting is a', a' > a*, V < V*, and q' < q*.
The quality setting, the consumer surplus and the demand are negatively
related to the cost of capital while the price is positively associated with
it. The price is undetermined in comparison with the price at Cr = 0. Since
uncertainty and competition are involved in the future market and the
consumer demand, the consideration for the quality and quantity with
profit

maximization

alone may not be adequate to cope with

the

situations. The two-stage model (see equation(7.4.3-14)) is employed in
combination with the producer's prediction for future market conditions.
The first stage determines the optimal quality setting realized by quality
investment. The demand curve shift due to quality improvement mainly
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relies

on the change in

the consumer

quality

value

surplus

plus

consideration for other factors affecting the consumer demand. The price
and

the

quantity

investment

for

output

profit

are

determined

maximization,

in

which

the
is

second
the

same

stage

of

as

the

conventional monopolist profit maximization. The optimal conditions for
the investment described before may not be met, but the consumer
surplus is larger when the output level is larger than before, such that
the advantage to cope with the uncertainty and competition can be
gained. The total investment is

I(a*, Q*) = [I(a*= VAa)] J(Q*= °-o + A Q)

( 7.4.3-19 )

where a* and Q* are the optimal quality and quantity settings. The first
term in the equation is the unit investment to improve the product
quality, and the second term is the amount of investment for output
quantity. A dynamic model over time periods will be more adequate to
describe the optimal investment procedures.

321

Chapter 8 Conclusions and Directions for Further Research

In past decades, the practice of quality control and quality design has
provided sufficient and necessary conditions for development of quality
economics. The increased competition in quality has resulted in the need
for theoretical and practical developments to illustrate how a firm can
survive and succeed in the future.
This research is focused on the study of both consumer and producer
behaviors under quality variation as well as the interactions of both sides
in quality related decision making. Producers should take consumer
requirements and satisfaction as their objectives in quality activities,
whereas

consumer

quality

behavior

and

attitude

are

affected

by

producer market strategies.
This research, for the first time, derives the concept of consumer
quality discrimination which reflects the fact that consumers pay the
same price but get different product qualities. With respect to the highest
product

quality

other

consumers

obtained

at

the

same price,

the

consumer suffers a quality loss due to lower product quality. The average
consumer
preference

quality

loss

function,

(ACQL)

product

depends

quality

on

the

consumer

quality

performance,

consumer

assets,

budget, attitude toward quality risk, quality information availability and
product inherent quality variation. According to the specific research
purpose, the comprehensive consumer quality loss function is flexible
enough so that it can be easily modified and simplified.
Compared with Taguchi's loss function,

the consumer quality loss

function is more adequate to illustrate consumer quality evaluation on
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his choice of a product from a set of available competing brands. The
inherent shortcomings in Taguchi's loss function limits its application in
consumer quality selection and product quality design to meet consumer
requirements.
This research also employs a comprehensive fuzzy set model with
empirical data to show that consumers do have their weight distribution
for various quality attribute components and price/quality effect. This
information should be transformed into the producer's objectives for a
quality system design in order to meet consumer satisfaction as much as
possible.
The market share pattern among completely

substitutable

products

under information uncertainty relies on the access to the information
source and the consumer weight for price/quality which is assumed to
follow a Weibull distribution. To measure the effect of quality variation
on social welfare, neither Taguchi's loss function nor the consumer
quality loss function developed in this research are suitable for such
assessment. The consumer quality value surplus, which contains quality
loss and price effect, can be used effectively to measure the consumer
benefits of quality improvement. Therefore, whether or not a quality
activity is adopted depends on its overall effect on consumer quality
surplus.
The relationships

among quality, quantity

and price in

consumer

demand are established in Chapter 6. An equilibrium in three dimensions
may be more rational to reflect the real market mechanism. However, it
may be impossible to determine all three variables simultaneously if no
one of them is predetermined. This research proposes a two-stage model
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to cope with the impossibility of simultaneous determination of three
variables. That is, one variable is predetermined in the first stage and the
other two variables

are set in the second

stage. From

a quality

engineering and production procedures point of view, quality in most
cases is the variable to be determined in the first stage for the firm's
long-term goal.
The producer's production profit is realized through consumer product
purchase. The conventional approaches to producer optimal behavior are
not

adequate

to

describe

quality

competition,

even

though

the

motivations behind quality improvement are still to make profit and stay
in business in the long-term. A consumer-based approach is developed to
determine the product quality setting. The model reveals that the higher
the market uncertainty, the higher the quality setting. In this model, both
consumer and producer behaviors are combined and interact with each
other. Besides the factors in consumer quality loss function, the cost of
capital, cost function (quality and quantity), producer learning rate and
producer quality premium also affect the product quality setting. Quality
cost function is the crucial factor for the establishment of the quality
model. Some conflicts and incorrect conclusions in previous research have
resulted from invalid assumptions about the properties of quality cost
function. A new set of criteria is used to confirm whether the quality
design or quality activity is economically optimized.
In this research a quality leadership approach is established, for the
first time, to illustrate producer behavior in quality competition. The
producer is willing to pay the quality premium to play the role of quality
leader to reduce the consumer quality loss due to imperfect information
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and inferior quality. As a result of being in the leadership position, the
producer gains consumer good will, the higher learning rate, and the
larger market share as well as higher profit. Competition for quality
leadership explains why the product quality setting is an issue that must
be pursued continuously and why quality setting is higher than that
determined

in

the

profit

maximization

approach,

or

even

in

the

consumer-based approach. The higher than the optimum quality setting
may result in loss of social welfare in some cases.
Two

examples,

investment

a quality-related

direction,

are

market

used

to

policy

emphasize

and
that

the

optimal

conventional

approaches excluding quality features is no longer complete and needs
modification when quality is involved in the main theme and in the
mathematical models.
A set of simplified and computable functions, such as consumer quality
loss function, is provided in the research. These functions are not only
used in theoretical arguments, but, in a more meaningful way, offer an
opportunity

for

application

in

quality

engineering

and

quality

management practice. This change overcomes the problem

that

theoretical

practical

concepts, in

some contents, are isolated

from

the

application.
Compared with the development in quality engineering and quality
control

approaches,

the subject

of

quality

economics

is

relatively

underdeveloped and its importance necessarily needs more effort

and

rapid developments. The quality, quantity and price are three major
factors

in microeconomics,

and their relationships

should

be

fully

understood and developed. Therefore, the effect of quality activity which
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is not separated from the interactions with other variables can be
evaluated

completely.

Consumer

decision

making

in

quality

evaluation

is

complicated,

especially under imperfect information. Although there are many models
to describe consumer behavior, none of the alternatives is superior to the
others. Some important variables may not have been considered in the
models. How consumers learn from product quality experience and other
imperfect information sources and what factors affect consuming learning
patterns require further studies.
How a producer's profit is realized through a consumer-based approach
is not clearly answered. What is different for quality settings by using
the profit maximization approach and by using the consumer surplus
value maximization approach? Which one is more realistic to describe
producer quality behavior? Under what conditions is a quality strategy
better than other strategies? It is well recognized that the managerial
method is one of the most effective ways to achieve the quality goal. How
does

the

managerial

quantitatively?
future

effort

control

variable

All of these questions need

research.
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affect
further

other

variables

development
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